Access Statistics for Andrea Attar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 0 38 0 0 5 141
Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences 0 0 0 18 0 0 3 97
Common agency games with separable preferences 0 0 2 9 0 0 13 58
Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 100
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle 0 0 1 42 1 1 7 114
Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses 0 1 2 16 1 2 5 9
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 0 1 1 3 1 3 5 19
Financial contracting along the business cycle 0 1 1 43 1 2 5 126
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games 0 1 2 44 1 2 7 106
Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency 0 3 4 75 2 6 9 251
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 1 1 2 26 1 2 12 29
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 2 19 19 2 3 11 11
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 0 5 14 1 1 10 31
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 0 4 71 2 2 10 133
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 1 28 28 0 3 24 24
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 74 1 1 10 269
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 163
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market 0 0 1 8 1 2 8 64
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 2 42 1 1 4 179
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 1 3 34 0 1 5 112
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 1 54 0 0 7 169
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 165 1 3 26 484
Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection 0 0 0 85 0 0 5 119
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 1 2 5 54 3 4 12 24
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 2 34 1 2 5 13
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 12
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 1 18 18 0 0 3 3
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 1 2 50 2 3 10 46
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 1 28 28 0 1 14 14
On a Class of Smooth Preferences 0 17 17 17 0 2 2 2
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 1 3 14 0 1 9 55
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10
On multiple agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 89
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 1 1 74 0 3 7 228
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A Comment 0 37 37 37 0 12 12 12
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment 0 5 5 5 0 6 6 6
Private Information and Insurance Rejections: A comment 0 1 12 12 1 3 6 6
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment 0 1 1 16 0 1 1 70
Trading under Asymmetric Information: Positive and Normative Implications 5 25 27 27 1 5 12 12
Total Working Papers 7 105 236 1,411 25 78 299 3,410

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 0 32 1 2 7 124
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences 1 1 1 29 1 1 4 123
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness 1 1 1 8 1 1 7 45
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 0 1 4 223 2 4 10 593
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy 0 0 2 50 0 1 7 141
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 1 37 0 1 6 166
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions 0 1 1 57 0 1 5 126
Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 66 0 0 12 223
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection 0 0 0 41 1 1 8 141
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 1 22 0 0 10 106
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 1 1 56 0 1 6 189
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games 1 2 2 19 1 3 6 77
Total Journal Articles 3 7 14 640 7 16 88 2,054

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2017-08-03