Access Statistics for Andrea Attar

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 1 38 0 0 8 141
Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences 0 0 0 18 0 0 5 97
Common agency games with separable preferences 0 2 2 9 0 6 14 58
Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness 0 0 0 40 0 0 4 100
Competing Mechanisms, Exclusive Clauses and the Revelation Principle 0 1 1 42 0 3 10 113
Competing Mechanisms: Communication under Exclusivity Clauses 0 0 1 15 0 0 5 7
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 1 1 1 3 1 2 5 17
Financial contracting along the business cycle 1 1 1 43 1 1 6 125
Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games 1 2 2 44 1 3 8 105
Moral Hazard: Messages, Delegation and Efficiency 3 3 4 75 4 4 8 249
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 1 7 14 0 2 11 30
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 0 0 1 25 0 0 11 27
Multiple Contracting in Insurance Markets 1 1 18 18 1 1 9 9
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 1 27 27 1 3 22 22
Multiple Lenders, Strategic Default and Covenants 0 2 4 71 0 3 10 131
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 0 30 0 0 4 163
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 0 1 74 0 0 12 268
Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market 0 1 1 8 1 2 10 63
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 2 2 42 0 2 4 178
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 1 1 54 0 1 8 169
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 2 33 0 2 9 111
Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 0 165 0 0 34 481
Non-Exclusive Competition under Adverse Selection 0 0 0 85 0 1 7 119
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 1 14 34 1 2 7 12
On Competing Mechanisms under Exclusive Competition 0 0 5 52 0 2 11 20
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 1 1 3 50 1 2 10 44
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 0 0 0 20 0 0 3 12
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 1 10 28 28 1 2 14 14
On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing 1 7 18 18 0 0 3 3
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 1 2 4 14 1 5 12 55
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 10
On multiple agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 27 0 0 4 89
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 73 0 1 7 225
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents: a comment 1 1 1 16 1 1 3 70
Total Working Papers 12 41 150 1,305 15 53 303 3,337

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard 0 0 0 32 1 1 10 123
Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences 0 0 1 28 0 0 6 122
Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness 0 0 0 7 0 0 11 44
Costly state verification and debt contracts: a critical resume 1 2 4 223 1 2 12 590
Credit cycles in a Neo-Austrian economy 0 1 2 50 0 1 9 140
Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market 0 1 1 37 0 1 8 165
Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions 1 1 1 57 1 1 6 126
Nonexclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons 0 0 1 66 0 2 20 223
Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection 0 0 1 41 0 1 10 140
On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts 0 0 1 22 0 1 15 106
On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard 0 0 0 55 0 1 9 188
Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games 1 1 1 18 1 1 7 75
Total Journal Articles 3 6 13 636 4 12 123 2,042

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Statistics updated 2017-06-02