Access Statistics for Salvador Barberà

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions for Economies with Pure Public Goods 2 5 17 72 5 11 55 332
A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games 0 1 4 45 3 14 40 161
Choosing How Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules 0 1 2 11 0 1 4 86
Choosing How to Choose: Self Stable Majority Rules 0 0 5 118 0 5 33 280
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions 2 3 23 97 3 12 62 353
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 0 0 5 5 2 8 13 13
Free Triples, Large Indifference Classes and the Majority Rule 1 1 7 58 5 8 41 504
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees 0 0 0 0 5 10 59 349
Notes on a Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 383
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 2 3 16 49 2 10 36 144
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 0 1 12 58 1 7 38 213
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union 0 0 3 50 1 6 38 206
Preference for Flexibility and the Opportunities of Choice 1 1 10 63 2 9 36 201
Protective Behaviour in Matching Models 0 0 0 0 1 3 13 169
Ranking Sets of Objects 4 7 31 129 9 21 83 309
Ranking Sets of Objects 0 0 0 0 4 15 48 230
STRATEGY-PROOF VOTING SCHEMES WITH CONTINUOUS PREFERENCES 0 0 0 0 4 8 36 208
Self-Selection Consistent Choices 1 1 3 39 1 2 10 82
Self-Selection Consistent Functions 0 1 3 48 2 8 27 283
Stable Condorcet Rules 0 0 3 44 0 0 15 195
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules 0 1 4 8 4 12 38 268
Strategy-Proof Exchange 1 3 13 14 3 8 35 205
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Rules for Expected Utility Maximizers 0 0 0 0 8 13 38 418
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 238
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 1 4 22 943
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave 'Too Much' to Chance 0 0 2 13 1 2 8 63
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems 0 0 0 0 1 7 36 191
Top Monotonicity: A Common Root for Single Peakedness, Single Crossing and the Median Voter Result 6 14 39 39 11 21 46 46
VOTING BY QUOTA AND COMMITTEE 0 0 0 0 0 2 15 220
Voting Under Constraints 0 0 0 0 1 2 14 93
Voting by Committees 1 5 12 35 5 12 42 217
Voting by Committees Under Constraints 0 2 5 49 2 5 26 158
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution 0 0 5 200 1 2 35 1,098
Voting for Voters: a Model of Electoral Evolution 0 0 0 0 2 6 19 293
Total Working Papers 21 50 224 1,244 90 256 1,089 9,152

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Group Strategy-Proof Decision Schemes 0 0 1 12 1 1 8 66
A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games 0 1 1 1 2 5 16 20
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions 1 2 16 129 5 15 39 292
Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions 1 3 28 100 9 25 140 487
Collective Probabilistic Judgements 0 0 0 4 1 1 5 44
Corrigendum to "On coalition formation: durable coalition structures": [Mathematical Social Sciences 45 (2003) 185-203] 0 0 1 7 0 0 3 36
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394] 0 1 3 7 0 1 5 51
Editor's note 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 59
Extending an order on a Set to the power set: Some remarks on Kannai and Peleg's approach 1 2 8 15 3 5 15 26
Falmagne and the Rationalizability of Stochastic Choices in Terms of Random Orderings 0 0 1 18 0 5 17 104
General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria 0 0 1 7 0 0 8 17
Generalized Median Voter Schemes and Committees 1 3 23 65 3 8 45 178
How to choose a non-controversial list with k names 0 1 1 1 4 9 10 10
Implementability via protective equilibria 0 0 2 4 0 0 7 10
Locating public facilities by majority: Stability, consistency and group formation 0 0 3 3 1 3 13 19
Majority and Positional Voting in a Probabilistic Framework 0 0 1 4 1 2 13 35
Manipulation of social decision functions 0 1 3 6 0 2 8 13
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes 0 1 2 28 1 2 17 218
On coalition formation: durable coalition structures 0 2 5 17 0 3 15 62
On some axioms for ranking sets of alternatives 0 2 7 12 0 5 13 24
On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union 1 2 10 11 5 15 75 87
Pivotal voters: A new proof of arrow's theorem 2 5 19 28 3 7 32 53
Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings 1 1 5 10 1 1 10 17
Self-Selection Consistent Functions 1 2 3 9 2 3 11 41
Stable voting schemes 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3
Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules 1 1 5 20 5 6 21 97
Strategy-Proof Exchange 2 5 15 82 2 8 34 284
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 4 16 0 0 5 42
Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 1 2 7 42 3 4 23 119
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences 3 3 9 16 5 10 27 63
Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers 2 2 2 8 3 3 14 48
Supporting others and the evolution of influence 0 1 1 3 0 2 9 42
The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms That Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance 0 0 7 23 0 3 17 101
Top Dominance and the Possibility of Strategy-Proof Stable Solutions to Matching Problems 0 0 0 0 1 4 21 214
Voting by Committees 1 5 11 57 4 9 31 237
Voting by committees under constraints 1 1 6 12 2 2 11 61
Voting for Voters: A Model of Electoral Evolution 0 1 7 23 0 1 12 72
Voting under Constraints 0 0 5 18 1 1 14 60
original papers: Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms 2 5 7 130 6 14 45 826
Total Journal Articles 22 55 230 953 74 185 814 4,238

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Statistics updated 2008-10-02