| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A theory of trade concessions |
0 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
6 |
12 |
82 |
187 |
| All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
18 |
106 |
| An economic rationale for firing whistleblowers |
4 |
7 |
15 |
15 |
7 |
15 |
26 |
26 |
| Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties |
0 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
1 |
2 |
23 |
79 |
| Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
40 |
| Committee Decisions with Partisans and Side-Transfers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
| Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies |
0 |
2 |
10 |
49 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
106 |
| Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene? |
2 |
2 |
8 |
31 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
85 |
| Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene? |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
26 |
| Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
273 |
| Generalized trust and wealth |
1 |
1 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
13 |
27 |
27 |
| Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
52 |
| Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources |
1 |
1 |
6 |
21 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
65 |
| Incomplete information and incentives to free ride |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
242 |
| Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference |
2 |
7 |
26 |
72 |
5 |
15 |
53 |
146 |
| Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
58 |
| Managerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growth |
0 |
1 |
4 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
114 |
| On the Informational Content of Wage Offers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
53 |
| On the Term Structure of Sovereign-Debt Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
82 |
| On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening |
0 |
1 |
10 |
70 |
2 |
6 |
32 |
414 |
| Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
3 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
97 |
| Optimal supervision intensity, collusion, and the organization of work |
0 |
0 |
6 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
82 |
| Restricted Charitable Donations and the “Cy Pres†Doctrine |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
12 |
| Strategic information revelation in fundraising |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
35 |
| Switching costs and screening efficiency of incomplete contracts |
0 |
0 |
3 |
63 |
1 |
2 |
14 |
316 |
| The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption |
0 |
0 |
8 |
52 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
162 |
| To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
37 |
| Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency |
0 |
3 |
10 |
47 |
4 |
15 |
65 |
201 |
| exposita notes: Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
109 |
| note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power |
0 |
2 |
6 |
44 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
142 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
29 |
141 |
666 |
45 |
109 |
594 |
3,379 |
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