| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A theory of trade concessions |
3 |
4 |
13 |
24 |
6 |
12 |
53 |
97 |
| All-or-nothing verdict as a screening device |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
86 |
| Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties |
0 |
0 |
6 |
11 |
1 |
12 |
39 |
53 |
| Bilateral Relationships Governed by Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
29 |
| Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies |
0 |
4 |
9 |
39 |
1 |
7 |
19 |
86 |
| Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene? |
1 |
3 |
9 |
22 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
61 |
| Corruption, Connections and Transparency: Does a Better Screen Imply a Better Scene? |
0 |
2 |
6 |
8 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
17 |
| Corruption, Supervision, and the Structure of Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
28 |
241 |
| Grace Periods in Sovereign Debt |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
47 |
| Incomplete Information and Incentives to Free Ride on International Environmental Resources |
0 |
2 |
6 |
15 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
48 |
| Incomplete information and incentives to free ride |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
235 |
| Issue-by-Issue Negotiations: The Role of Information and Time Preference |
1 |
5 |
12 |
45 |
2 |
10 |
37 |
92 |
| Law Enforcement and Legal Presumptions |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
50 |
| Managerial defections, promotion criteria and firm growth |
1 |
3 |
8 |
20 |
5 |
14 |
32 |
86 |
| On the Informational Content of Wage Offers |
2 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
3 |
5 |
10 |
48 |
| On the Term Structure of Sovereign-Debt Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
69 |
| On-the-Job Specific Training and Efficient Screening |
1 |
3 |
10 |
57 |
3 |
6 |
33 |
377 |
| Opportunism and the Dynamics of Incomplete Contracts |
0 |
0 |
6 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
84 |
| Optimal supervision intensity, collusion, and the organization of work |
1 |
5 |
17 |
20 |
2 |
12 |
46 |
59 |
| Strategic information revelation in fundraising |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
31 |
| Switching costs and screening efficiency of incomplete contracts |
0 |
1 |
5 |
60 |
0 |
2 |
24 |
298 |
| The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption |
0 |
2 |
7 |
42 |
3 |
10 |
29 |
123 |
| To invest or screen efficiently: a potential conflict in relationships governed by incomplete contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
30 |
| Two Types of Collusion in a Model of Hierarchical Agency |
0 |
4 |
21 |
37 |
4 |
17 |
74 |
133 |
| exposita notes: Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
104 |
| note: A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power |
0 |
1 |
3 |
38 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
126 |
| Total Journal Articles |
11 |
44 |
151 |
516 |
42 |
155 |
587 |
2,710 |
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