Access Statistics for Steven J. Brams

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Generic Negotiation Game 0 2 5 15 0 3 10 341
A Moving-Knife Solution to the Four-Person Envy-Free Cake-Division Problem 1 1 10 26 3 7 33 112
A Nail-Biting Election 0 0 4 67 2 4 38 824
A Procedure for Divorce Settlements 4 9 27 54 18 35 114 709
APPROVAL VOTING IN PRACTICE 1 1 2 10 1 2 3 213
ARE CRISIS RATIONAL? A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS 0 0 4 11 0 0 6 282
ARMS-CONTROL INSPECTION STRTEGIES THAT INDUCE COMPLIANCE: A GAME-THEORITIC ANALYSIS 1 1 2 6 1 2 11 155
Absorbing Outcomes in 2 x 2 Games 0 0 2 8 0 1 6 22
An Envy-Free Cake Division Algorithm 1 4 21 54 5 18 52 518
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 3 7 0 0 5 124
Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 7 0 1 2 218
Are the Two Houses of Congress Really Equal? 0 1 6 8 5 14 105 444
Backward Induction is not Robust: The Parity Problem and the Uncertainty Problem 0 2 16 40 3 10 43 580
Binding Versus Final-Offer Arbitration: A Combination is Best 0 1 6 13 1 3 30 94
COALITION VOTING 0 1 6 15 2 5 15 230
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A CUSTOM-DESIGNED ELECTION SYSTEM 0 1 1 8 0 1 6 275
CONSTRAINED APPROVAL VOTING: A VOTING SYSTEM TO ELECT A GOVERNING BOARD 0 0 0 10 1 3 5 194
Cake Division with Minimal Cuts: Envy-Free Procedures for 3 Person, 4 Persons, and Beyond 2 12 33 196 14 58 208 1,009
Camp David: Was the Agreement Fair? 2 2 13 39 3 6 35 251
Catch-22 and King-of-the-Mountain Games: Cycling, Frustration, and Power 0 2 15 45 6 19 78 1,401
Chairman Paradoxes Under Approval Voting 0 1 2 10 0 1 6 25
Competitive Fair Division 1 3 18 110 3 7 33 779
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 8 54 2 5 36 207
Cooperative VS. Non-cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, but Does that Matter? 0 0 0 0 1 3 14 171
Cooperative vs. Non-Cooperative Truels: Little Agreement, But Does That Matter? 1 3 30 165 4 18 111 658
Cutting a pie is not a piece of cake 3 6 25 25 9 18 29 29
Cycles of Conflict 0 7 13 25 9 24 52 221
Deductive Prediction of Conflict: The Northern Ireland Case 0 2 10 29 1 6 26 1,699
Deterrence Versus Defense: A Game-Theoretic Model of Star-Wars 1 4 18 35 1 9 50 125
Deterrence and Uncertainty: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 2 10 0 1 6 20
Deterrence by Variable Retaliation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 3 7 0 0 6 17
Dividing the Indivisible: Procedures for Allocating Cabinet Ministries to Political Parties in a Parliamentary System 0 0 2 69 2 5 36 290
Dividing the indivisible: procedures for allocating cabinet ministries to political parties in a parliamentary system 0 0 1 51 2 3 10 141
Does Approval Voting Elect the Lowest Common Denominator? 0 0 3 10 1 3 11 42
Equilibrium Strategies For Final-Offer Arbitration 0 3 4 11 0 4 19 48
Fair Division Pareto-Optimality Versus Strategic Robustness 0 1 6 13 0 2 11 163
Fair Division and Politics 0 1 3 12 0 2 5 119
Fair Division by Point Allocation 0 0 8 17 1 1 17 142
Fair Division of Indivisible Items 2 2 16 91 4 7 32 250
Fair Division of Indivisible Items between Two People with Identical Preferences: Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Equity 1 7 19 42 5 21 46 885
Fair Division: A New Approach to the Spratly Islands Controversy 1 10 26 61 4 19 71 305
Fallback Bargaining 1 1 14 59 4 7 33 488
Final-Offer Arbitration with a Bonus 0 1 2 9 0 2 9 48
Forming Stable Coalitions: The Process Matters 0 0 4 20 1 2 16 93
Game Theory and Emotions 5 18 55 127 7 29 99 598
Game Theory and Multilateral Negotiations: The single European Act and the Uruguay Round 0 0 9 26 2 9 26 618
Games That End in a Bang or a Whimper 1 1 6 50 2 2 28 209
Games Theory and Literature 2 7 29 80 7 25 86 523
Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting 0 1 12 105 2 5 30 312
How Should Voting on Related Propositions be Conducted? 0 1 2 5 0 2 10 178
How democracy resolves conflict in difficult games 2 6 73 73 1 7 19 19
Intransigence in Negotiations: The Dynamics of Disagreement 0 0 1 7 0 1 7 101
Mathematics and Theology: Game-Theoretic Implications of God’s Omniscience 0 1 20 47 3 14 59 216
Minimal Winning Coalitions in Weighted-Majority Games 0 1 4 14 2 7 14 229
Minimizing regret when dissolving a partnership 0 2 12 12 3 5 16 16
Modeling Free Choice in Games 0 3 5 16 1 14 34 244
National Security Games 0 0 9 20 0 7 32 90
New Chairman Paradoxes 0 2 3 10 0 3 5 22
Nonmyoptic Equilibria 0 0 4 9 0 1 7 19
Notes on Arms-Control Verification: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 2 3 13 2 8 14 36
OPTIMAL CHEATING AND INSPECTION STRATEGIES UNDER INF 0 0 1 9 0 2 7 362
Old and NewMoving-Knife Schemes 0 0 11 16 0 1 22 130
Optimal Deterrence 0 1 5 10 0 1 9 26
Optimal Resource Allocation in Presidential Primaries 0 0 3 9 1 4 11 33
Paradoxes of Fair Division 2 5 24 278 2 13 78 877
Polls and the Problem of Strategic Information in Elections 0 0 1 7 0 0 3 14
Presidential Power: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 3 6 16 0 14 25 71
Proportional Representation in Variable-Size Legislatures 1 1 3 4 1 2 8 25
Proportional Representation: Broadening the Options 0 1 2 7 0 1 9 86
Putting the Other Side "On Notice" Can Induce Compliance in Arms Control 0 0 2 5 0 0 4 77
Rational De-Escalation 0 1 3 6 2 4 32 177
Resolving Social Issues in a Merger: A Fair-Division Approach 3 6 18 190 6 16 43 1,111
SEQUENTIAL ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 1 1 2 12 1 4 15 331
Sequential Arbitration Procedures 0 0 0 0 3 6 17 343
Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions 3 4 7 30 5 16 45 331
Stabilizing Power Sharing 0 0 5 22 1 3 21 44
THE BOX PROBLEM: TO SWITCH OR NOT TO SWITCH? 5 6 17 67 7 21 83 449
The Dynamics of the Northern Ireland Condition 0 1 3 11 0 1 5 246
The Instability of Power Sharing 0 1 6 24 0 5 23 37
The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions 0 0 4 88 0 0 12 341
The Paradox of Multiple Elections 2 2 10 38 4 5 23 141
The Path to Stable Deterrence 0 1 3 10 1 5 19 48
The Point of No Return: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Crisis Stability 0 2 5 11 3 6 19 145
The Probability of Nuclear War 1 4 19 38 8 30 105 230
The Rationality of Surprise: Unstable Nash Equilibria and the Theory of Moves 1 3 16 38 1 5 26 123
The Responsiveness of Approval Voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen 0 1 9 22 0 1 15 60
The Truel 0 1 14 44 2 8 45 216
The Verification Problem in Arms Control: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 3 5 17 2 7 23 66
The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items 1 2 14 14 3 4 15 15
Theory of Moves: Overview and Examples 4 20 75 196 15 59 198 1,065
Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 9 18 2 4 30 67
Threat Power in Sequential Games 0 5 10 23 2 12 27 59
Three Solutions to Divide the Dollar 1 6 29 78 1 13 74 439
To Mobilize of Not to Mobilize: Catch 22s in International Crises 0 1 4 71 1 3 17 979
Two Stage Auctions I: Private-Value Strategies 1 2 9 28 1 3 13 139
Two Stage Auctions II: Common-Value Strategies and the Winner's Curse 0 1 4 14 0 3 11 232
UNRAVELING IN EXCHANGE GAMES 0 0 2 5 0 2 10 128
Verifications and Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis 0 1 4 7 0 1 9 19
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes 0 3 10 95 1 4 25 239
Voting Procedures 1 7 20 67 1 11 49 475
Voting on Referenda: The Separability Problem and Possible Solutions 0 0 10 20 3 3 28 138
When is Size a Liability? Bargaining Power in Minimal Winning Coalitions 0 0 1 10 1 1 5 44
When is it Rational to be Magnanimous in Victory? 0 0 2 9 2 9 33 300
Winding Down if Preemption or Escalation Occurs: A Game-Theoretic Analysis 0 0 1 3 0 2 7 27
Would Ross Perot Have Won the 1992 Presidential election Under Approval Voting? 0 3 33 43 4 21 160 1,743
Yes-No Voting 1 1 4 17 1 2 14 167
Total Working Papers 61 237 1,105 3,935 239 839 3,448 30,806

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A minimax procedure for electing committees 1 2 6 11 1 6 27 50
A nail-biting election 0 0 3 19 0 0 14 224
Approval Voting in Practice 0 0 0 0 2 3 14 130
Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond 0 0 2 13 3 6 14 79
Competitive Fair Division 0 0 13 146 2 4 36 540
Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? 0 0 4 21 0 2 14 67
Dead Heat: The 2006 Public Choice Society Election 0 0 0 1 0 2 4 19
FAIR DIVISION OF INDIVISIBLE ITEMS 0 2 7 44 1 3 10 115
Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity 0 1 5 55 2 5 17 191
Final-offer arbitration with a bonus 1 1 3 14 1 1 9 55
Forming stable coalitions: The process matters 0 1 1 12 1 2 9 76
Game Theory and Literature 3 17 49 203 7 38 153 472
Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations 1 8 30 30 4 22 72 72
Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting 0 0 6 21 1 4 15 60
Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games 0 0 0 0 22 77 222 1,084
Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries 0 0 3 7 0 0 5 15
Proportional pie-cutting 0 4 6 11 0 8 31 50
Scheduling of panels by integer programming: Results for the 2005 and 2006 New Orleans meetings 0 0 3 6 0 1 11 33
The normative turn in public choice 1 1 4 19 1 1 10 52
The paradox of multiple elections 1 1 4 79 2 3 33 550
Total Journal Articles 8 38 149 712 50 188 720 3,934

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Biblical Games: Game Theory and the Hebrew Bible 0 0 0 0 9 10 10 10
Total Books 0 0 0 0 9 10 10 10

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Electing a Single Winner: Approval Voting in Practice, from Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair-Division Procedures 1 5 16 17 3 15 41 60
Voting procedures 0 4 12 45 1 8 34 141
Voting procedures 3 19 74 173 39 176 651 962
Total Chapters 4 28 102 235 43 199 726 1,163

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Statistics updated 2009-07-03