Access Statistics for Gorkem Celik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents under Collusion	0	0	2	119	0	2	18	345
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism	0	1	19	39	0	1	36	51
Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision	5	9	20	125	5	12	60	413
Mechanism Design with Weaker Incentive Compatibility Constraints	2	2	10	57	13	20	59	259
Optimal Auctions with Simultaneous and Costly Participation	1	6	21	107	1	8	35	230
To Give In or Not To Give In To Bribery? Setting the Optimal Fines for Violations of Rules when the Enforcers are Likely to Ask for Bribes	0	0	7	49	1	2	20	112
Total Working Papers	8	18	79	496	20	45	228	1,410

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties	0	0	1	1	1	2	12	25
Mechanism design with collusive supervision	1	3	10	10	4	9	35	35
Mechanism design with weaker incentive compatibility constraints	0	0	3	10	4	4	13	54
On the optimality of nonmaximal fines in the presence of corruptible law enforcers	1	1	5	5	1	2	8	8
Total Journal Articles	2	4	19	26	10	17	68	122

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04