| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "Near" Weighted Utilitarian Characterizations of Pareto Optima |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
36 |
| "Revolving Doors" and Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
176 |
| A Dynamic Theory of Holdup |
1 |
1 |
1 |
118 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
463 |
| A dynamic theory of holdup |
0 |
0 |
0 |
90 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
389 |
| Adverse Selection in Class Action Suits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
144 |
| An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
34 |
| An Analysis of Top Trading Cycles in Two-Sided Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
| Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
208 |
| Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
243 |
| Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
287 |
| Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
575 |
| Auctions with budget-constrained buyers: a nonequivalence result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
346 |
| Bailout Stigma |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
45 |
| Bailout Stigma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
177 |
| Bailout Stigma |
0 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
675 |
| Caps on Political Lobbying |
0 |
1 |
6 |
527 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
3,758 |
| Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
89 |
| Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
152 |
| Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
331 |
| Contractual Remedies to the Holdup Problem: A Dynamic Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
151 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
677 |
| Contractual remedies to the holdup problem: a dynamic perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
204 |
| Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting |
0 |
0 |
1 |
254 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
837 |
| Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting: Coase vs Williamson |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
875 |
| Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
277 |
| Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
243 |
| Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
529 |
| Difference-form contests and the robustness of all-pay auctions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
116 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
412 |
| Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
86 |
| Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
| Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
| Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
22 |
| Evaluating the Impact of Privacy Regulation on E-Commerce Firms: Evidence from Apple’s App Tracking Transparency |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
16 |
| Expanding "Choice" in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
142 |
| Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
187 |
| Expanding “Choice” in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
126 |
| Exploiting Plaintiffs Through Settlement: Divide and Conquer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
118 |
| Generalized reduced-form auctions: a network-flow approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
182 |
| How to Divide the Possession of a Football? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
154 |
| Incomplete Contracts and Cooperative Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
617 |
| Keeping the Listener Engaged: a Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
31 |
| Know thy enemies: knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions |
0 |
0 |
3 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
196 |
| Lawyer Advising in Evidence Disclosure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
178 |
| Legal Advice and Evidence with Bayesian and non-Bayesian Adjudicators |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
| Leveraging Uncertainties to Infer Preferences: Robust Analysis of School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
187 |
| Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
148 |
| Notes on the Microfoundations of Monetary Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
602 |
| Opinion as Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
182 |
| Optimal Collusion-Proof Auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
192 |
| Optimal Design for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
| Optimal Design for Social Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
| Optimal Design of Research Contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
221 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
704 |
| Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention |
1 |
1 |
2 |
55 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
77 |
| Optimal Queue Design |
0 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
17 |
| Optimal Use of Information Litigation: Should Regulatory Information be Withheld to Deter Frivolus Suits? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
113 |
| Optimal incentives for teams |
0 |
0 |
0 |
394 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
1,084 |
| Pandering to Persuade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
107 |
| Pandering to Persuade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
| Pandering to Persuade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
187 |
| Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
33 |
| Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
| Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Predictive Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
20 |
| Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
98 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
106 |
| Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
94 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
150 |
| Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
93 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
134 |
| Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
| Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem With Ambiguity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
30 |
| Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
| Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: the Wald Problem with Ambiguity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Revenue Comparisons for Auctions When Bidders Have Arbitrary Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
71 |
| Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
106 |
| Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
63 |
| Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
55 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
676 |
| Section 365: mandatory bankruptcy rules and inefficient continuation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
423 |
| Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
54 |
| Statistical Discrimination in Ratings-Guided Markets |
0 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
| Strategic Judgment Proofing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
185 |
| Strategic Judgment Proofing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| The Economics of Collective Negociation: Consolidation of Claims by Multiple Plaintiffs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
192 |
| The Effect of Privacy Regulation on the Data Industry: Empirical Evidence from GDPR |
0 |
0 |
2 |
107 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
326 |
| The Hold-up Problem |
2 |
3 |
5 |
1,113 |
3 |
7 |
20 |
4,026 |
| The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
20 |
| The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
715 |
| The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
| The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
109 |
| The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
226 |
| Weak Monotone Comparative Statics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
38 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
44 |
| Total Working Papers |
4 |
10 |
54 |
5,048 |
28 |
85 |
317 |
26,381 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Theory of Holdup |
1 |
1 |
2 |
183 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
741 |
| An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
49 |
| Assigning Resources to Budget-Constrained Agents |
0 |
1 |
2 |
42 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
173 |
| Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
128 |
| Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
296 |
| Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms |
1 |
1 |
1 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
239 |
| Bidding with Securities: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
166 |
| Brave New World of Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
100 |
| Buy-in through goldplating: The effect of defense profit policy on quality determination |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| Buyer Alliances and Managed Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
187 |
| Can a Contract Solve Hold-Up When Investments Have Externalities? A Comment on De Fraja (1999) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
92 |
| Caps on Political Lobbying |
0 |
2 |
11 |
173 |
3 |
6 |
19 |
561 |
| Caps on Political Lobbying: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
142 |
| Competitive Procurement with Corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
1,019 |
| Contract Damages and Cooperative Investments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
596 |
| Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
391 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
1,360 |
| Credit Market Speculation and the Cost of Capital |
1 |
1 |
2 |
30 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
128 |
| Customer Return Policies for Experience Goods |
0 |
1 |
2 |
114 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
583 |
| Decentralized College Admissions |
0 |
0 |
7 |
102 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
458 |
| Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
515 |
| Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions |
0 |
0 |
4 |
655 |
0 |
12 |
23 |
1,430 |
| Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications |
0 |
1 |
3 |
55 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
312 |
| Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
93 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
207 |
| Disclosure and Legal Advice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
50 |
| Do breakup fees lead to efficient takeover? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
| Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets |
1 |
1 |
10 |
19 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
111 |
| Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
57 |
| Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
| Efficient assignment with interdependent values |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
68 |
| Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Care through Liability and Regulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
48 |
| Equilibrium formation of class action suits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
436 |
| Expanding "Choice" in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
200 |
| Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
153 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
387 |
| Exploiting Plaintiffs through Settlement: Divide and Conquer |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
194 |
| Generalized Reduced‐Form Auctions: A Network‐Flow Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
147 |
| How to divide the possession of a football? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
94 |
| Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending |
0 |
0 |
1 |
229 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
771 |
| Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion |
0 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
2 |
2 |
23 |
48 |
| Mechanism design with a liquidity constrained buyer: The 2 x 2 case1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
116 |
| Opinions as Incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
167 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
600 |
| Optimal Design of Research Contests |
0 |
0 |
2 |
144 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
543 |
| Optimal Dynamic Allocation of Attention |
1 |
1 |
5 |
52 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
308 |
| Optimal Incentives for Teams |
0 |
0 |
4 |
528 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
1,361 |
| Optimal Use of Information in Litigation: Should Regulatory Information Be Withheld to Deter Frivolous Suits? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
173 |
| Optimal collusion-proof auctions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
297 |
| Pandering to Persuade |
0 |
0 |
2 |
53 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
272 |
| Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
| Performance-Based Pricing for Nucleaer Power Plants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
75 |
| Performance-Based Pricing for Nuclear Power Plants |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Prizes versus Contracts as Incentives for Innovation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
2 |
6 |
11 |
39 |
| Products Liability, Signaling and Disclosure. Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
| Prolonged Learning and Hasty Stopping: The Wald Problem with Ambiguity |
0 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
39 |
| Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning |
2 |
3 |
31 |
182 |
4 |
12 |
72 |
530 |
| Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
186 |
| Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The "Boston Mechanism" Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
1 |
82 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
306 |
| Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
223 |
| Revolving Doors and the Optimal Tolerance for Agency Collusion |
0 |
0 |
1 |
141 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
589 |
| Robustly Collusion-Proof Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
386 |
| Section 365, Mandatory Bankruptcy Rules and Inefficient Continuance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
808 |
| Stable Matching in Large Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
81 |
| Stable Matching with Mistaken Agents |
1 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
31 |
| Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders |
0 |
0 |
0 |
413 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1,047 |
| Strategic judgment proofing |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
221 |
| The Economics of Collective Negotiation in Pretrial Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
274 |
| The NFL Should Auction Possession in Overtime Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
128 |
| The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-Constrained Buyer |
0 |
1 |
1 |
78 |
0 |
4 |
6 |
230 |
| The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
319 |
| The role of lockups in takeover contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
| To Trade, or not to Trade, that is the Question: New Roles for Incomplete Contracts in Dynamic Settings |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
| Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions |
0 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
53 |
| Total Journal Articles |
8 |
19 |
123 |
5,382 |
30 |
140 |
498 |
21,760 |
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