Access Statistics for Simon Cowan

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Model of Third-Degree Price Discrimination with Positive Welfare Effects 0 0 1 114 0 0 2 163
Commodity Taxation as Insurance Against Price Risk 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 141
Demand shifts and imperfect competition 0 0 4 183 0 2 8 1,007
Marginal Cost Pricing versus Insurance 0 0 0 65 0 1 8 535
Nonlinear Pricing and Price Cap Regulation 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 367
Output and Welfare Effects in the Classic Monopoly Price Discrimination Problem 0 0 0 361 2 2 3 1,727
The profitability of mergers in symmetric Cournot oligopoly 1 1 33 33 1 2 29 29
The welfare economics of optional water metering with asymmetric information 0 1 1 99 0 1 1 300
The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination 0 0 6 205 1 5 45 1,075
The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with non-linear demand functions 0 1 1 142 0 1 6 585
Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus 0 0 7 438 5 9 42 2,193
Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets 0 0 0 19 1 2 2 439
Welfare-increasing monopolization 0 0 0 42 0 4 8 89
Welfare-increasing third-degree price discrimination 1 1 1 106 2 2 5 236
When does third-degree price discrimination reduce social welfare, and when does it raise it? 0 0 0 181 0 0 3 933
Total Working Papers 2 4 54 2,009 13 32 165 9,819
2 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
COMPETITION CAN HARM CONSUMERS* 0 0 0 35 0 0 0 99
Competition in Regulated Industries: Some Reflections 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 11
Competition in the Water Industry 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 510
How to mix per-flight and per-passenger based airport charges: The oligopoly case 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 45
Monopoly Price Discrimination and Demand Curvature 0 0 3 152 0 0 8 636
Monopoly price discrimination with constant elasticity demand 0 0 2 16 0 1 4 56
Network Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 186
Nonlinear pricing and price cap regulation 0 0 0 206 0 0 2 452
Optimal risk allocation for regulated monopolies and consumers 0 0 0 72 1 2 3 238
Oxford Economic Papers: 50 and 60 Years--A Double Anniversary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 157
Price-Cap Regulation and Inefficiency in Relative Pricing 0 0 1 107 1 1 3 256
Regulating monopoly price discrimination 0 2 4 50 1 4 11 187
Regulation of Several Market Failures: The Water Industry in England and Wales 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 484
The Welfare Economics of Optional Water Metering 0 0 0 27 0 2 2 108
The welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination with nonlinear demand functions 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 83
Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Consumer Surplus 2 3 6 72 2 5 13 323
Tight Average Revenue Regulation Can Be Worse Than No Regulation 0 0 4 52 1 2 7 220
Trade and Competition Policies for Oligopolies 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 101
Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 315
Water Pollution and Abstraction and Economic Instruments 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 491
Welfare Consequences of Tight Price-Cap Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 177
Welfare-increasing third-degree price discrimination 0 0 0 20 0 2 5 89
Total Journal Articles 2 5 20 972 6 23 68 5,224

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Regulatory Reform: Economic Analysis and British Experience 0 0 0 0 7 18 86 2,269
Total Books 0 0 0 0 7 18 86 2,269

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2025-03-03