Access Statistics for Thomas Cortade

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Strategic Guide on Two-Sided Markets Applied to the ISP Market 0 0 0 129 0 0 2 303
A Strategic Guide on Two-Sided Markets Applied to the ISP Market 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Costly patent litigations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20
Costly patent litigations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: An analysis of Article L. 615-7 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 82
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Fusions horizontales sur le marché de l'Internet 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Game Theory Model of a Production Resource Sharing Problem: Study of possible cheatings 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Horizontal Mergers in Internet 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 74
Horizontal mergers on platform markets: cost savings v. cross-group network effects? 0 0 2 93 0 2 9 194
Les plateformes numériques d'échange d'électricité 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 18
Merger Control on Two-Sided Markets: Is There Need for an Efficiency Defense? 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 82
Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 25
Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 53
Merger control on two- sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 26
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 28
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 67
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 18
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 80 0 2 4 114
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficiency defense? 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 22
Merger control on two-sided markets: is there need for an efficinecy defense? 0 0 0 171 0 1 3 236
On patent strength, litigation costs, and patent disputes under alternative damage rules 1 1 1 80 1 1 2 131
Patent litigations under asymmetric information 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 31
Peer-to-Peer Energy Platforms: Incentives for Prosuming 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 23
Peer-to-Peer Energy Platforms: Incentives for Prosuming 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 13
Settlement in Merger Cases: Remedies and Litigation 0 0 0 128 0 0 0 343
Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 23
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 167
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties 0 0 0 38 0 0 0 176
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 69
Total Working Papers 1 1 4 805 3 16 62 2,386
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Damage rules and the patent hold-up problem: Lost Profit versus Unjust Enrichment 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 66
Fusions horizontales sur le marché de l'Internet 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 34
Fusions horizontales sur le marché de l'Internet 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 12
Peer-to-peer energy platforms: Incentives for prosuming 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 22
Success and failure of bargaining in merger control: The case of asset divestitures 0 0 0 5 0 1 2 87
Trial and settlement negotiations between asymmetrically skilled parties 0 0 0 39 0 0 2 165
Total Journal Articles 0 0 0 63 1 3 8 386

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03