| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
4 |
10 |
38 |
615 |
13 |
37 |
100 |
2,662 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
1 |
6 |
39 |
239 |
| A Characterization of the Nash Bargaining Solution |
3 |
7 |
58 |
361 |
11 |
33 |
233 |
1,131 |
| A Critique on the Theory of Linear Price Monopoly |
2 |
3 |
11 |
219 |
3 |
12 |
33 |
916 |
| A Non-Cooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
8 |
21 |
126 |
| A Noncooperative View of Consistent Bankruptcy Rules |
1 |
2 |
14 |
117 |
6 |
14 |
55 |
726 |
| A Note on Thomson's Characterizations of the Uniform Rule |
0 |
0 |
4 |
42 |
4 |
8 |
32 |
533 |
| An axiomatization of the leveling tax-transfer policy |
1 |
3 |
6 |
6 |
5 |
15 |
20 |
20 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
1 |
6 |
22 |
158 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions and Competition |
0 |
1 |
5 |
101 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
822 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
0 |
0 |
5 |
96 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
670 |
| Bargaining, Coalitions, and Competition |
1 |
2 |
12 |
167 |
3 |
6 |
31 |
905 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
1 |
6 |
47 |
3 |
9 |
21 |
367 |
| Bilateral Comparisons and Consistent Fair Division Rules in the Context of Bankruptcy Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
12 |
78 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
11 |
81 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
0 |
3 |
27 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
321 |
| Comment on McLennan and Sonnenschein "Sequential Bargaining as a Non-Cooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium" |
0 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
336 |
| Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
211 |
| Consistency and the Walrasian Allocations Correspondence |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
35 |
| Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: A Characterization of the Price Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
65 |
| Consistent Solutions in Exchange Economies: a Characterization of the Price Mechanism |
0 |
1 |
3 |
62 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
600 |
| Extensive Form Games with Coalitional Actions |
0 |
0 |
4 |
144 |
0 |
2 |
21 |
830 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
14 |
126 |
6 |
20 |
91 |
851 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
19 |
108 |
| Feasible Implementation of Taxation Methods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
14 |
227 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
1 |
1 |
3 |
43 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
565 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare State Minded World |
1 |
2 |
5 |
59 |
3 |
8 |
22 |
409 |
| Formation of Nations in a Welfare-State Minded World |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
3 |
6 |
21 |
89 |
| Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
54 |
| Invariance and Randomness in the Nash Program for Coalitional Games |
1 |
3 |
9 |
82 |
2 |
7 |
32 |
711 |
| New Characterizations of Old Bankruptcy Rules |
1 |
4 |
11 |
91 |
6 |
17 |
49 |
454 |
| On the Least Sacrifice Principle in Taxation |
1 |
3 |
6 |
132 |
5 |
15 |
47 |
950 |
| Recontracting and Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
50 |
| Recontracting and Competition |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
215 |
| Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy |
3 |
8 |
8 |
8 |
3 |
16 |
17 |
17 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: A Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
4 |
11 |
49 |
265 |
| The Bankruptcy Problem: a Cooperative Bargaining Approach |
3 |
8 |
41 |
248 |
14 |
35 |
133 |
883 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
0 |
0 |
6 |
111 |
2 |
9 |
30 |
529 |
| The Time-Preference Nash Solution |
1 |
2 |
13 |
98 |
1 |
8 |
49 |
440 |
| The time-preference Nash solution |
0 |
3 |
14 |
27 |
3 |
9 |
40 |
101 |
| Total Working Papers |
24 |
65 |
303 |
3,190 |
117 |
369 |
1,419 |
18,750 |
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