| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Further Justification for the Negligence Rule |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
30 |
1,692 |
| A SIGNALLING MODEL OF NOMINAL PRICE INERTIA |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
298 |
| Autonomy of the University and the Professionalisation of its Organisation of Control |
0 |
0 |
11 |
16 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
45 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
190 |
| Careers in Ongoing Hierarchies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
28 |
1,186 |
| Contractual Design with Correlated Information Under Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
305 |
| Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle |
0 |
0 |
5 |
120 |
4 |
12 |
51 |
1,145 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
0 |
0 |
8 |
53 |
3 |
6 |
43 |
512 |
| Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof |
3 |
5 |
9 |
59 |
5 |
11 |
31 |
326 |
| Do Factor Shares Reflect Technology? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
35 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
105 |
| Governance: Who Controls Matters |
1 |
4 |
9 |
42 |
2 |
5 |
20 |
110 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
3 |
10 |
38 |
312 |
18 |
55 |
222 |
1,644 |
| Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious |
1 |
3 |
14 |
152 |
3 |
8 |
71 |
968 |
| Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study |
4 |
9 |
10 |
10 |
22 |
55 |
62 |
62 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
0 |
16 |
38 |
1 |
4 |
56 |
103 |
| Incentive Contracts and Efficient Unemployment Benefits |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
10 |
12 |
12 |
| Incentive Contracts and Total Factor Productivity |
1 |
1 |
5 |
124 |
2 |
2 |
16 |
482 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournament |
0 |
0 |
11 |
94 |
1 |
3 |
33 |
424 |
| Inequity Aversion in Tournaments |
2 |
3 |
14 |
107 |
3 |
5 |
30 |
383 |
| Institutional Competition, Political Process and Holdup |
1 |
2 |
5 |
32 |
1 |
2 |
22 |
122 |
| Institutions, Bargaining Power and Labor Shares |
1 |
2 |
7 |
40 |
3 |
6 |
26 |
138 |
| Law enforcement and criminality: Europe vs. USA |
1 |
5 |
30 |
60 |
9 |
45 |
213 |
2,272 |
| Limiting Court Behavior: A Case for High Minimum Sentences and Low Maximum Ones |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
4 |
10 |
49 |
1,472 |
| Managerial Husbandry and the Dynamics of Ongoing Firms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
894 |
| Mechanism Sufficient Statistic in the Risk-Neutral Agency Problem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
22 |
59 |
1,602 |
| Monitoring versus Incentives: Substitutes or Complements? |
1 |
1 |
16 |
708 |
4 |
7 |
50 |
2,512 |
| Monitoring, Moral Hazard and Limited Liability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
1,339 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
1 |
7 |
53 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
225 |
| Output and Wages with Inequality Averse Agents |
0 |
0 |
5 |
30 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
224 |
| Prepondeance of the Evidence: Tort Rules and the Efficient Standard of Proof |
1 |
2 |
7 |
207 |
25 |
82 |
200 |
2,159 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
2 |
6 |
45 |
12 |
27 |
74 |
686 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
3 |
4 |
18 |
183 |
25 |
68 |
409 |
3,163 |
| Preponderance of Evidence |
0 |
1 |
5 |
149 |
1 |
4 |
44 |
2,408 |
| Privatization, Risk Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
9 |
363 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
364 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
208 |
| Privatization, Risk-Taking, and the Communist Firm |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
84 |
| Public Safety, Altruism and Redistribution |
1 |
1 |
4 |
112 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
1,521 |
| Ranking of Information Systems in Agency Models: An Integral Condition |
1 |
2 |
6 |
187 |
1 |
12 |
57 |
1,795 |
| Regulation of Environmental Quality under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
55 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
2 |
4 |
16 |
50 |
4 |
9 |
38 |
128 |
| Rules of Proof, Courts, and Incentives |
0 |
1 |
13 |
70 |
4 |
9 |
48 |
218 |
| Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior |
0 |
0 |
3 |
92 |
1 |
3 |
28 |
1,090 |
| Technological Choice under Organizational Diseconomies of Scale |
0 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
0 |
4 |
32 |
140 |
| The Division of Ownership in New Ventures |
1 |
2 |
6 |
10 |
3 |
9 |
32 |
63 |
| The Division of Ownership in New Ventures |
1 |
2 |
11 |
46 |
5 |
15 |
40 |
162 |
| Total Working Papers |
30 |
70 |
326 |
3,415 |
200 |
563 |
2,334 |
35,399 |
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