Access Statistics for Francesco De Sinopoli

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Forward Induction in a Model of Representative Democracy 1 1 3 19 4 7 17 78
A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria 2 5 8 39 9 17 39 207
A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 273
A remark on votersÕ rationality in Besley and coate model of representative democracy 0 1 6 6 1 3 35 366
A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria 0 0 4 6 1 1 19 355
Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria 1 1 22 22 2 3 19 19
EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE 1 2 11 74 5 9 23 100
Electing a Parliament 2 3 5 5 2 3 10 10
Electing a parliament 0 4 7 27 1 6 18 62
Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case 0 2 7 91 1 3 15 237
Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games 0 0 1 1 0 1 6 178
MEETINGS WITH COSTLY PARTICIPATION: A COMMENT 1 2 6 75 1 3 11 143
ON ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORS IF VOTING IS COSTLY 0 1 1 22 0 2 5 48
ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY 0 4 8 60 3 11 27 218
On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly 0 1 7 79 1 2 9 157
On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly 1 2 3 22 3 10 26 120
On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems 1 2 6 6 3 6 12 12
SOME RESULTS ON STRATEGIC VOTING AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION WITH MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACE 1 2 5 58 3 6 18 157
Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation 1 3 5 5 1 3 9 93
Strategic stability and non cooperative voting games: the plurality rule 2 3 4 4 4 6 17 362
Two examples of strategic equilibria in approval voting games 1 6 12 14 4 10 35 459
Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule 0 1 1 1 0 2 8 262
Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games 3 4 13 57 6 14 45 120
Total Working Papers 18 50 145 693 55 128 431 4,036

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy 0 0 0 24 0 0 3 82
A note on forward induction in a model of representative democracy 0 0 2 16 0 1 6 37
A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria 3 4 11 23 4 5 15 49
Approval voting: three examples 1 4 10 31 5 16 39 128
Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting 0 0 2 7 1 1 6 27
Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case 2 2 7 11 3 4 14 25
Meetings with Costly Participation: Comment 0 1 4 15 1 4 12 68
On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games 0 1 3 7 0 2 6 28
Sophisticated voting and equilibrium refinements under plurality rule 0 0 4 64 1 2 13 250
Undominated (and) perfect equilibria in Poisson games 1 2 2 2 2 5 5 5
Total Journal Articles 7 14 45 200 17 40 119 699

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Statistics updated 2009-12-07