Access Statistics for Geoffroy de Clippel

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games 0 0 3 16 0 1 6 67
An Axiomatization of the Nash Bargaining Solution 0 0 2 29 0 0 9 76
An axiomatization of te inner core 0 1 1 3 0 2 3 75
Axiomatic Bargaining on Economic Enviornments with Lott 0 0 0 19 3 4 6 62
Axiomatizing the Harsanyi value, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent Shapley value 0 1 1 4 3 6 7 23
Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities: a Comment on Maskin 0 2 5 49 2 10 14 71
Bargaining, coalitions and externalities: A comment on Maskin 0 1 1 61 3 5 7 121
Copmment on "The Veil of Public Ignorance" 0 1 1 4 0 1 1 14
Copmment on Egalitarianism under Incomplete Information 1 1 2 10 3 4 8 46
Cores of Combined Games 0 0 2 36 1 6 33 343
Cores of combined games 0 0 1 27 2 4 7 75
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information 0 0 2 15 0 2 4 20
Egalitarian Equivalence under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 19 2 4 8 49
Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information 0 0 1 29 7 44 111 162
MARGINAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND EXTERNALITIES IN THE VALUE 0 0 2 90 5 12 36 351
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value 0 1 2 27 3 4 6 80
Marginal contributions and externalities in the value 0 0 0 0 2 3 8 11
Marginal contributions and externalities in the value 0 0 1 62 4 6 9 167
No Profitable Decomposition in Quasi-Linear Allocation Problems 0 0 1 7 1 1 11 45
On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining 1 1 1 18 1 1 4 22
On the Strategic Disclosure of Feasible Options in Bargaining 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 8
Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects 0 0 0 19 1 2 12 61
Reason-Based Choice: A Bargaining Rationale for the Attraction and Compromise Effects 0 0 1 95 0 0 5 109
The Type-Agent Core for Exchange Economies with Asymmetric Information 0 1 2 11 1 4 11 87
The procedural value 1 2 3 5 1 4 6 16
Two remarks on the inner core 0 1 1 7 0 4 6 35
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information 0 2 2 12 2 8 11 30
Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example 0 2 4 10 1 4 11 72
Total Working Papers 3 17 43 685 48 146 360 2,298

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An axiomatization of the Nash bargaining solution 0 0 1 13 1 1 3 53
An axiomatization of the inner core using appropriate reduced games 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 47
Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games 0 0 1 23 1 1 5 113
Cores of combined games 0 0 2 7 3 7 34 135
Equity, envy and efficiency under asymmetric information 0 0 0 13 6 29 62 119
Impartial division of a dollar 0 1 4 17 2 8 16 68
Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value 0 1 5 36 1 4 12 128
No profitable decompositions in quasi-linear allocation problems 0 0 1 2 2 3 19 31
Reason-based choice: a bargaining rationale for the attraction and compromise effects 0 1 2 22 8 29 50 103
The procedural value for cooperative games with non-transferable utility 0 0 1 7 0 0 2 32
The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information 1 1 2 15 2 2 6 89
Two remarks on the inner core 0 0 1 19 0 1 3 112
Two-person bargaining with verifiable information 0 0 1 13 0 0 1 54
Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: An eloquent example 0 0 0 52 2 2 3 159
Total Journal Articles 1 4 21 245 29 89 219 1,243

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Örebro University School of Business.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2013-05-03