Access Statistics for Gregory K. Dow
Author contact details at EconPapers.
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theoretical Framework for the Measurement of Well-Being |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
61 |
| Allocating Control over Firms: Stock Markets versus Membership Markets |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
17 |
| Climate reversals and the transition to agriculture |
3 |
7 |
22 |
22 |
7 |
15 |
55 |
55 |
| Collective Choice and Control Rights in Firms |
0 |
0 |
9 |
20 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
39 |
| Control rights, competitive markets, and the labor management debate |
0 |
2 |
11 |
19 |
1 |
7 |
25 |
56 |
| Decision making at the top: The shaping of strategic direction: Gordon Donaldson and Jay W. Lorsch, (Basic Books, New York, 1983) pp. ix + 208, $16.95 |
3 |
5 |
18 |
33 |
10 |
15 |
56 |
122 |
| Does Free Exit Reduce Shirking in Production Teams? |
0 |
1 |
10 |
50 |
0 |
2 |
19 |
110 |
| Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Economics and institutions: A manifesto for a modern institutionalist economics: (Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, UK, 1989), pp. xviii + 365, $17.95 (paper) |
0 |
1 |
14 |
87 |
6 |
12 |
50 |
301 |
| Information, Production Decisions, and Intra-firm Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
51 |
| Internal bargaining and strategic innovation in the theory of the firm |
0 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
| Knowledge is power: Informational precommitment in the capitalist firm |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
24 |
| Monitoring Costs in Chinese Agricutural Teams |
0 |
1 |
5 |
24 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
108 |
| Myopia, amnesia, and consistent intertemporal choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
| On the Neutrality of Asset Ownership for Work Incentives |
0 |
0 |
3 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
75 |
| Pools and streams a stochastic process model of applied research |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
| Rationality, institutions, and economic methodology: Uskali Maki, Bo Gustafsson and Christian Knudsen (eds.), (Routledge, New York, 1993) pp. xi + 299, $74.50 (cloth), $19.95 (paper) |
1 |
3 |
14 |
109 |
3 |
10 |
44 |
372 |
| Replicating Walrasian equilibria using markets for membership in labor-managed firms |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
4 |
| Stability analysis for profit-responsive selection mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
| Stable social conventions in fluctuating pay-off environments |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
29 |
| The function of authority in transaction cost economics |
2 |
4 |
35 |
111 |
5 |
9 |
76 |
330 |
| The organization as an adaptive network |
1 |
1 |
7 |
41 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
94 |
| The ultimate control group |
1 |
1 |
4 |
30 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
70 |
| Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis: Masahiko Aoki, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2001, xi + 467 pp., index, US$ 55.00 (cloth) |
2 |
4 |
13 |
102 |
3 |
7 |
37 |
241 |
| Why Capital Hires Labor: A Bargaining Perspective |
1 |
2 |
10 |
84 |
3 |
4 |
28 |
205 |
| Why capital suppliers (usually) hire workers: what we know and what we need to know |
1 |
2 |
10 |
68 |
1 |
5 |
20 |
135 |
| Total Journal Articles |
15 |
36 |
204 |
884 |
44 |
98 |
522 |
2,556 |
|
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