| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Model of Countertrade |
3 |
6 |
24 |
143 |
9 |
18 |
103 |
511 |
| A Model of Countertrade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
760 |
| Anticipated verbal feedback induces altruistic behavior |
1 |
2 |
21 |
85 |
22 |
45 |
246 |
547 |
| Disagreement and Authority |
0 |
0 |
3 |
34 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
59 |
| Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem |
0 |
0 |
2 |
57 |
3 |
3 |
17 |
152 |
| Does Evolution Solve the Hold-up Problem? |
0 |
2 |
15 |
150 |
6 |
12 |
54 |
575 |
| Efficiency Wages and X-Inefficiencies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
74 |
870 |
| Exchange Rates and Foreign Direct Investment: The Role of Mobility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
30 |
1,505 |
| Externalities vs Internalities: A Theory of Political Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
6 |
18 |
65 |
1,502 |
| Fixed or Flexible? Wage Setting in Search Equilibrium |
2 |
2 |
9 |
141 |
9 |
17 |
113 |
1,159 |
| Fixed or Flexible? Wage Setting in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
252 |
| Fixed or Flexible? Wage Setting in Search Equilibrium |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
14 |
312 |
| Foreign Direct Investment and Political Economy of Protection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
195 |
| Generosity |
1 |
4 |
20 |
45 |
4 |
9 |
32 |
111 |
| In-Kind Finance |
1 |
2 |
10 |
68 |
4 |
9 |
24 |
210 |
| In-Kind Finance |
0 |
2 |
13 |
44 |
2 |
10 |
41 |
128 |
| Indebtedness and Unemployment: A Durable Relationship |
1 |
1 |
3 |
99 |
4 |
10 |
29 |
886 |
| Is There a Hold-up Problem? |
2 |
5 |
21 |
266 |
4 |
11 |
66 |
1,176 |
| Long Term Contracts, Arbitrage, and Vertical Restraints |
0 |
1 |
4 |
286 |
3 |
10 |
39 |
1,721 |
| Menu Costs and Asymmetric Price Adjustment |
1 |
3 |
17 |
61 |
3 |
8 |
46 |
188 |
| Monetary Policy and Market Interest Rates |
5 |
8 |
77 |
725 |
13 |
22 |
152 |
2,319 |
| Monitoring and Pay |
0 |
0 |
1 |
129 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
756 |
| ON PERFECT RENT DISSIPATION - A COMMENT ON WENDERS' NOTE |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
9 |
112 |
| On Flexibility in Oligopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
13 |
1,416 |
| Organizational Structure as the Channeling of Boundedly Rational Pre-play Communication |
0 |
1 |
14 |
60 |
7 |
15 |
132 |
470 |
| Payments in Kind |
2 |
2 |
12 |
264 |
6 |
12 |
62 |
1,740 |
| Price Signals Quality. The Case of One-Sided Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
471 |
| Pride and Prejudice: The Human Side of Incentive Theory |
3 |
9 |
57 |
158 |
22 |
66 |
272 |
957 |
| RETAIL PRICES AND WHOLESALE TENDERS - A MODEL OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINED COMPETITION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
421 |
| Skill or Luck? Search Frictions and Wage Differentials |
0 |
0 |
8 |
238 |
2 |
6 |
25 |
1,798 |
| Sticky Consumption and Rigid Wages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
6 |
106 |
| Sticky Consumption and Rigid Wages |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
17 |
474 |
| Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
28 |
328 |
| Testing Guilt Aversion |
0 |
2 |
36 |
92 |
8 |
23 |
135 |
255 |
| The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
12 |
45 |
469 |
| The Stock Market as a Screening Device and the Decision to Go Public |
0 |
1 |
5 |
398 |
4 |
10 |
38 |
1,562 |
| The cost of lying |
3 |
6 |
25 |
83 |
30 |
42 |
106 |
267 |
| Time is not money |
1 |
3 |
25 |
85 |
5 |
13 |
82 |
212 |
| Trust and truth |
2 |
5 |
14 |
66 |
7 |
24 |
92 |
251 |
| What You Sell is What You Lend? Explaining Trade Credit Contracts |
1 |
4 |
23 |
76 |
3 |
9 |
63 |
237 |
| When Does Communication Improve Coordination? |
2 |
5 |
21 |
65 |
11 |
30 |
75 |
144 |
| Why Are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy? |
2 |
5 |
9 |
105 |
2 |
9 |
27 |
269 |
| Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy |
1 |
3 |
21 |
116 |
3 |
11 |
59 |
240 |
| Why are Long Rates Sensitive to Monetary Policy? |
0 |
0 |
5 |
69 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
215 |
| Why are long rates sensitive to monetary policy? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
20 |
165 |
| Total Working Papers |
34 |
84 |
515 |
4,237 |
230 |
559 |
2,563 |
28,473 |
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