| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
2 |
4 |
48 |
4 |
7 |
27 |
383 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
1 |
1 |
5 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
29 |
87 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures |
0 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
77 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
64 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
5 |
28 |
0 |
7 |
28 |
106 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
2 |
9 |
88 |
6 |
14 |
61 |
381 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
2 |
4 |
18 |
82 |
3 |
8 |
47 |
256 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
239 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
11 |
32 |
321 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
127 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
2 |
6 |
28 |
8 |
17 |
46 |
188 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
2 |
7 |
18 |
112 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
1 |
2 |
35 |
3 |
6 |
16 |
303 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
80 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
15 |
571 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
3 |
56 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
328 |
| GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
337 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
1 |
3 |
15 |
81 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
70 |
| Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
349 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
89 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
3 |
9 |
58 |
8 |
18 |
39 |
349 |
| Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
191 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
3 |
8 |
33 |
33 |
10 |
33 |
62 |
62 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
1 |
5 |
45 |
45 |
3 |
10 |
36 |
36 |
| Non-comparative versus Comparative Advertising as a Quality Signal |
2 |
4 |
26 |
26 |
7 |
21 |
70 |
70 |
| On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
784 |
| On the limitation of warranty duration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
19 |
135 |
| Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
5 |
60 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
1,009 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
103 |
| Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
76 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
2 |
4 |
10 |
65 |
3 |
13 |
60 |
343 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
691 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
1 |
2 |
2 |
71 |
4 |
7 |
19 |
637 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
5 |
11 |
31 |
181 |
| The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees |
0 |
2 |
12 |
41 |
1 |
11 |
56 |
223 |
| The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees |
0 |
5 |
19 |
138 |
8 |
21 |
78 |
547 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
2 |
5 |
16 |
162 |
6 |
15 |
80 |
732 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
2 |
8 |
15 |
15 |
14 |
33 |
70 |
70 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
3 |
4 |
11 |
266 |
7 |
11 |
34 |
1,233 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
7 |
8 |
16 |
104 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
3 |
6 |
18 |
119 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
1 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
9 |
22 |
109 |
218 |
| The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
8 |
22 |
152 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
2 |
5 |
21 |
97 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
93 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
2 |
48 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
186 |
| Total Working Papers |
20 |
66 |
292 |
1,767 |
151 |
392 |
1,446 |
12,990 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders |
0 |
2 |
3 |
21 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
77 |
| An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles |
0 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
| Conditional versus contingent fees |
0 |
1 |
8 |
40 |
3 |
11 |
72 |
210 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts |
0 |
0 |
16 |
74 |
4 |
6 |
37 |
296 |
| Credence goods monopolists |
1 |
1 |
7 |
87 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
217 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
37 |
| Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
9 |
70 |
| Genetic Tests and Inter-Temporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
0 |
2 |
5 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
156 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
4 |
26 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
138 |
| Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
19 |
| On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical |
0 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
70 |
| On the Limitation of Warranty Duration |
0 |
0 |
6 |
26 |
5 |
15 |
45 |
138 |
| Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
41 |
176 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
65 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
68 |
| Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
211 |
| The Theory of Warranty Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
26 |
209 |
| The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
0 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
77 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
56 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
69 |
| US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services |
1 |
2 |
16 |
30 |
4 |
5 |
53 |
117 |
| Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem |
2 |
2 |
17 |
50 |
4 |
6 |
40 |
125 |
| Total Journal Articles |
4 |
14 |
101 |
538 |
37 |
87 |
504 |
2,698 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Swedish Business School at Örebro University.