| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
5 |
44 |
1 |
6 |
23 |
356 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
0 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
1 |
9 |
32 |
57 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: The optimal Amount of Evidence under different Procedures |
0 |
1 |
7 |
22 |
1 |
11 |
32 |
51 |
| Accuracy versus Falsification Costs: the Optimal Amount of Evidence under Different Procedures |
1 |
2 |
3 |
5 |
4 |
6 |
27 |
37 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
0 |
0 |
4 |
22 |
1 |
6 |
23 |
77 |
| Conditional versus Contingent Fees |
3 |
4 |
12 |
78 |
7 |
12 |
52 |
317 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
1 |
5 |
20 |
64 |
4 |
16 |
56 |
208 |
| Credence Goods Monopolists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
28 |
216 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudulent Experts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
35 |
287 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
117 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
1 |
1 |
7 |
21 |
2 |
10 |
32 |
140 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
1 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
2 |
6 |
19 |
92 |
| Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
1 |
7 |
33 |
1 |
6 |
25 |
283 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
73 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
556 |
| Expertise, Contingent Fees, and Excessive Litigation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
53 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
317 |
| GOOD TIMES, BAD TIMES, AND VERTICAL UPSTREAM INTEGRATION |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
328 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
2 |
5 |
8 |
17 |
4 |
14 |
28 |
64 |
| Genetic Tests and Intertemporal Screening in Competitive Insurance Markets |
1 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
3 |
11 |
25 |
45 |
| Good Times, Bad Times, and Vertical Upstream Integration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
27 |
327 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
85 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
1 |
1 |
6 |
49 |
3 |
7 |
35 |
310 |
| Market Power, Uncertainty, and the Level of Trade |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
13 |
179 |
| On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
2 |
6 |
24 |
773 |
| On the limitation of warranty duration |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
17 |
115 |
| Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
6 |
55 |
4 |
13 |
54 |
974 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
1 |
2 |
5 |
24 |
1 |
6 |
21 |
90 |
| Playing it Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
0 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
2 |
8 |
18 |
56 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
2 |
55 |
1 |
7 |
35 |
281 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
26 |
678 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
2 |
4 |
69 |
3 |
8 |
39 |
618 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
2 |
7 |
22 |
150 |
| Subgame Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
201 |
| The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees |
0 |
2 |
10 |
29 |
2 |
11 |
34 |
164 |
| The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees |
3 |
4 |
16 |
116 |
7 |
22 |
96 |
464 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
2 |
5 |
18 |
144 |
2 |
14 |
59 |
646 |
| The Market for Used Cars: A New Test of the Lemons Model |
0 |
2 |
15 |
255 |
2 |
11 |
57 |
1,197 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsfied Testimony |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
88 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
101 |
| The Optimal Amount of Falsified Testimony |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
3 |
6 |
32 |
109 |
| The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
31 |
129 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
1 |
12 |
16 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
75 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts [technical version] |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
2 |
5 |
15 |
81 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
1 |
1 |
5 |
46 |
2 |
2 |
12 |
177 |
| Total Working Papers |
18 |
45 |
194 |
1,490 |
88 |
321 |
1,241 |
11,689 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 12th Annual EALE Conference, Bern, September 6-9, 1995 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
36 |
| A note on the optimal punishment for repeat offenders |
0 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
62 |
| An Introduction to the Legal and Economic Theories of Torts |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| Asset prices and public information: An empirical investigation in the market for automobiles |
0 |
1 |
4 |
16 |
2 |
3 |
9 |
55 |
| Conditional versus contingent fees |
3 |
5 |
13 |
31 |
6 |
20 |
76 |
135 |
| Credence Goods and Fraudelent Experts |
1 |
3 |
13 |
54 |
5 |
8 |
47 |
254 |
| Credence goods monopolists |
0 |
1 |
7 |
79 |
1 |
10 |
37 |
201 |
| Efficient liability rules for an economy with non-identical individuals |
0 |
1 |
5 |
10 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
30 |
| Expertise, contingent fees, and insufficient attorney effort |
0 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
60 |
| Good times, bad times, and vertical upstream integration |
1 |
4 |
7 |
36 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
136 |
| Imperfect Tests and Natural Insurance Monopolies |
1 |
1 |
4 |
21 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
120 |
| Market power, uncertainty, and the level of trade |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
14 |
| On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical |
0 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
2 |
8 |
18 |
59 |
| On the Limitation of Warranty Duration |
0 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
3 |
9 |
28 |
91 |
| Perjury versus Truth Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
28 |
134 |
| Playing It Safe with Low Conditional Fees versus Being Insured by High Contingent Fees |
1 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
2 |
8 |
16 |
46 |
| Product Differentiation and Price Competition Between a Safe and a Risky Seller |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
58 |
| Subgame-Perfect Punishment for Repeat Offenders |
0 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
6 |
14 |
42 |
171 |
| The Theory of Warranty Contracts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
47 |
180 |
| The provision of environmental protection measures under incomplete information: An introduction to the theory of mechanism design |
0 |
3 |
12 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
30 |
69 |
| Truth-Bonding and Other Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
48 |
| Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
20 |
54 |
| US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services |
1 |
3 |
10 |
12 |
3 |
17 |
50 |
60 |
| Warranties, moral hazard, and the lemons problem |
2 |
7 |
20 |
33 |
4 |
13 |
49 |
81 |
| Total Journal Articles |
10 |
41 |
128 |
425 |
58 |
189 |
627 |
2,155 |
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