Access Statistics for Marco Faravelli

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Don't) Make My Vote Count 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 108
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 54
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 48
A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms 0 0 1 161 0 0 11 541
A Prize to Give for: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 307
Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 17
Conflict in the Pool: A Field Experiment 0 0 0 23 0 0 2 68
Costly Voting: A Large-scale Real Effort Experiment 0 0 0 64 0 0 3 119
Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Causal Evidence of Non-Separability 0 0 0 130 0 0 1 227
How Context Matters: A Survey Based Experiment on Distributive Justice 0 0 0 164 0 0 3 646
Looking for Agreement: an Experiment on Distributive Justice 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 204
Mandate and Paternalism: A Theory of Large Elections 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 75
Rank Incentives and Social Learning: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 133
SMOOTH POLITICIANS AND PATERNALISTIC VOTERS: A THEORY OF LARGE ELECTIONS 0 0 0 24 0 2 3 65
Selection, Tournaments, and Dishonesty 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 181
Single versus Multiple Prize Contests to Finance Public Goods: Theory and Experimental Evidence 0 0 0 62 1 2 2 221
Smooth Politicians and Paternalistic Voters: A Theory of Large Elections 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 74
Social Welfare versus Inequality Concerns in an Incomplete Contract Experiment 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 123
Social welfare versus inequality aversion in an incomplete contract experiment 0 0 0 27 1 1 2 114
The Important Thing Is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 375
The Important Thing is not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests 0 0 0 125 1 1 4 1,343
The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47
When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests 0 0 0 4 0 1 3 96
When Less is More: Rationing and Rent Dissipation in Stochastic Contests 0 0 0 91 0 0 0 373
Total Working Papers 0 0 1 1,256 4 12 45 5,559
3 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
(Don’t) Make My Vote Count 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 33
A Prize To Give For: An Experiment on Public Good Funding Mechanisms 0 0 0 56 0 0 1 207
Costly voting: a large-scale real effort experiment 0 0 1 7 0 1 7 54
Economic incentives and social preferences: Causal evidence of non-separability 0 0 0 8 0 1 2 71
Generalized majority rules: utilitarian welfare in large but finite populations 0 0 0 4 1 1 3 12
How context matters: A survey based experiment on distributive justice 0 0 4 92 1 2 9 389
Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections 0 0 0 11 2 4 5 92
Selection, tournaments, and dishonesty 0 0 1 20 1 1 5 174
Single versus multiple-prize all-pay auctions to finance public goods: An experimental analysis 0 0 0 12 0 0 3 141
The Important Thing Is Not (Always) Winning but Taking Part: Funding Public Goods with Contests 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 74
The effect of power imbalances on incentives to make non-contractible investments 0 0 0 7 0 0 2 99
Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing 0 0 1 9 0 1 5 68
When less is more: Rationing and rent dissipation in stochastic contests 0 0 0 9 0 0 2 75
Total Journal Articles 0 0 7 238 5 12 45 1,489

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Statistics updated 2025-06-06