Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 4 11 47 82 12 29 130 216
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 2 7 32 110 2 13 84 328
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 5 10 31 48 11 35 107 178
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 1 5 9 9 2 8 16 16
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 1 1 3 14 66 281
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 6 26 128
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 0 5 15 66 3 11 30 186
An Easier Way to Calibrate 2 4 12 63 4 10 25 400
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 2 6 26 74 3 13 42 108
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 3 8 29 126 5 14 43 361
Competing Auctions 1 5 17 158 1 11 39 272
Competing Auctions 2 7 22 32 4 13 45 75
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 2 9 39 2 6 19 150
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 1 6 61 1 6 19 304
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 2 4 15 38 3 11 39 78
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 4 29 44
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 2 2 2 41 128 1,425
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 9 32 174
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 1 6 21 96 2 13 37 413
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 2 8 32 132 4 18 60 301
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 6 14 27 115
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 2 10 15 83
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 3 3 16 20 5 11 42 57
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 56
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 3 6 9 9 4 11 20 20
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 2 6 15 3 8 26 53
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 3 12 58 2 9 29 105
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 6 21 74 380 7 33 123 1,368
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 2 12 90 1 10 32 159
Interim Rationalizability 0 3 14 26 1 8 28 64
Interim Rationalizability 1 5 14 86 2 10 31 137
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 1 2 9 79 6 14 38 418
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 2 8 53 1 12 33 208
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 5 24 88 261
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 3 12 248
Learning and Belief Based Trading 1 3 6 29 1 5 27 79
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 6 19 208 2 13 38 446
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 3 7 14 152 7 18 33 446
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 3 13 32 4 11 65 112
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 2 8 11 34 4 15 28 102
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 1 6 24 106 1 10 43 257
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 1 4 14 34 4 13 42 82
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 3 7 32 410
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 1 1 7 27 1 1 16 58
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 3 8 57 1 4 12 264
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 1 4 15 134 3 8 28 361
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 2 5 21 82
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 1 3 24 0 1 7 131
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 1 3 7 46 1 3 9 135
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 1 10 37 222
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 2 5 29 77
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 1 1 2 4 26 173
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 1 23 74 318
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 3 3 1 12 67 320
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 3 11 42 140
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 0 3 11 33 2 7 30 171
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 2 5 9 135 2 8 19 299
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 2 6 24 107 4 38 159 431
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 1 2 166 1 7 43 820
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 1 1 1 3 29 239
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 7 11 112 2 11 24 367
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 3 12 45 518
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 5 19 52 280
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 2 7 34 143
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 1 3 13 0 1 4 74
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 3 15 25 2 11 42 75
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 0 10 46 129 1 18 86 275
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 4 14 35 204
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 4 4 4 13 65 836
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 1 4 16 35 2 9 30 47
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 2 10 33 174
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 5 19 97
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 2 11 43 43 3 16 43 43
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 2 14 44 113
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 3 11 47 149 5 20 77 245
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 1 8 22 124
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 1 7 67 1 3 20 173
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 3 15 34 0 5 27 96
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 53
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 1 9 27 69
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 1 8 20 158
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 5 17 44 164
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 1 10 29 147
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 5 6 24 30 8 18 65 74
Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox 2 15 102 102 8 36 113 113
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 5 9 38 3 12 32 125
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 3 12 93
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 5 16 104
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 1 3 10 33 1 9 22 69
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 9 30 120 766
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 3 11 58 0 6 23 162
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 0 0 5 8 2 18 85 168
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 6 9 68 0 6 15 266
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 3 9 42 223 4 18 68 680
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 3 6 64 0 6 22 336
Superstition and Rational Learning 1 4 25 109 7 20 126 715
Superstition and Rational Learning 2 6 32 72 11 35 157 295
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 1 2 5 1 6 14 35
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 8 31 57 241
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 8 16 55 138
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 8 36 176 4 19 68 581
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 2 4 25 200 5 10 53 668
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 1 3 8 2 6 21 48
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 0 2 6 61 2 5 19 173
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 1 1 1 13 43 392
The Theory of Learning in Games 11 22 109 244 18 43 203 437
Topologies on Type 0 2 21 36 7 22 103 127
Topologies on Types 1 3 17 96 4 7 58 281
Topologies on Types 0 1 8 20 30 87 207 251
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 0 3 17 194 1 13 48 521
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 1 3 3 1 11 19 79
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 0 2 5 40 0 4 16 280
When is Reputation Bad 0 3 27 181 0 7 75 466
When is Reputation Bad? 2 9 17 23 5 23 64 104
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 2 107 2 9 23 266
When is Reputation Bad? 1 2 10 19 5 9 61 96
Word of Mouth Learning 1 5 17 162 2 11 38 256
Total Working Papers 99 382 1,500 6,275 374 1,523 5,480 28,846

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 2 3 22 152 7 35 93 492
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 0 0 0 0 5 23 101 101
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 1 2 19 159 2 5 33 454
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 3 10 41 313 13 49 201 1,651
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 1 1 6 24 99 141
An Easier Way to Calibrate 0 0 6 14 0 3 14 38
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 2 5 17 0 4 14 41
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 2 5 34 63 6 16 72 132
Competing Auctions 1 4 24 68 5 14 53 167
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 7 24 0 2 14 56
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 0 9 14 2 4 18 72
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 2 7 39 90 5 22 91 199
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 1 1 22 22 1 6 45 45
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 1 1 9 26 108 701
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 2 12 34 76 2 18 46 118
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 2 29 114 1 5 55 355
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 4 10 15 60 5 18 25 97
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 8 11 3 7 24 31
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 4 9 0 2 13 38
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 1 1 5 52 1 2 12 115
Interim correlated rationalizability 2 4 15 25 2 15 44 73
Knife-Edge Or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 2 18 59 9 34 116 387
Learning Mixed Equilibria 2 14 47 168 2 17 65 260
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 1 3 21 0 2 8 55
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 4 4 1 5 12 24
Learning in games 1 4 12 35 1 9 24 77
Learning to play Bayesian games 2 2 30 168 3 11 65 422
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 1 4 30 161 3 14 62 642
Limit games and limit equilibria 1 1 11 22 1 2 29 56
Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed 1 5 22 69 4 13 46 141
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 2 4 19 102
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 0 1 3 14 64
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 4 8 57 304 8 25 108 730
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 2 2 20 50 3 5 34 80
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 3 5 28 63 3 7 44 102
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 2 6 30 56 6 12 58 107
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 4 13 37 48 8 20 52 77
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 2 6 41 1 6 23 106
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 22 91 267 692 38 160 502 1,303
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 2 15 15 1 11 40 40
Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology 1 3 9 150 3 8 34 395
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 8 23 98 200 11 41 145 294
Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry 3 11 36 176 5 19 101 464
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 2 15 98 5 15 49 320
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 1 20 0 2 5 175
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 3 9 27 64 6 24 53 138
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 2 15 69 0 8 35 126
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 4 25 139 3 14 53 487
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 1 2 14 49 1 8 40 143
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 2 5 27 390 9 22 74 1,622
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 2 5 15 59 5 12 41 232
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 1 9 33 242 2 22 58 408
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 10 34 161 421 22 87 326 733
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 0 10 85 1 7 41 390
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 8 23 66 90 12 29 109 166
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 1 6 18 1 5 16 79
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 0 1 1 1 13 70 91
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 8 46 221 1,135 23 109 476 2,510
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 10 37 162 410 24 118 405 968
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 6 38 177 7 18 84 494
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 1 3 12 19 2 16 47 71
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 0 14 45 369
Topologies on types 2 4 21 67 6 22 120 259
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 4 5 14 173 8 16 56 468
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 0 1 10 46 2 6 31 317
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 0 1 2 15 1 4 13 80
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 7 23 82 668 25 56 239 2,687
Word-of-mouth learning 1 7 43 104 3 16 76 199
Total Journal Articles 139 491 2,141 8,346 358 1,391 5,338 24,577

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 5 23 106 255 15 58 218 524
Total Chapters 5 23 106 255 15 58 218 524

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Statistics updated 2008-08-03