Access Statistics for Drew Fudenberg

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 3 6 30 108 6 16 103 307
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 0 2 20 128 3 8 47 373
A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control 1 4 21 64 5 18 85 252
A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays 0 5 12 20 2 11 30 44
A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games 3 9 50 50 7 24 65 65
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 0 0 0 1 6 23 57 335
AN APPROXIMATIVE FOLK THEOREM WITH IMPERFECT PRIVATE INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 2 8 15 142
An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information 1 2 9 75 3 6 25 208
An Easier Way to Calibrate 1 2 10 71 3 7 25 421
An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning 2 5 19 91 4 10 35 140
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 2 16 139 1 4 29 385
Competing Auctions 0 1 6 163 1 3 25 296
Competing Auctions 0 4 11 41 3 9 36 107
Conditional Universal Consistency 1 3 8 47 5 10 22 170
Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play 0 1 5 66 4 6 18 321
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 2 17 53 3 10 40 115
Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 0 0 0 2 2 18 60
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 2 3 27 133 1,556
EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PLAYERS AND IMPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 1 2 14 187
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 1 2 16 111 2 6 29 440
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 5 18 58 188 9 26 78 375
Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 3 9 63 172
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 5 8 18 18 6 10 21 21
Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 0 3 13 32 113
Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions 0 0 9 26 2 4 39 91
Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 64
Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play 0 1 7 13 0 1 18 34
Imitation Processes with Small Mutations 0 2 6 21 2 6 21 71
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 4 14 24 82 4 20 38 141
Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information 3 11 63 437 7 22 96 1,457
Interim Correlated Rationalizability 0 3 8 98 1 5 21 179
Interim Rationalizability 4 10 17 43 6 14 34 97
Interim Rationalizability 0 0 4 89 0 1 13 148
Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 1 5 83 6 17 53 465
Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip? 0 2 9 62 0 5 32 239
Learning Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 10 37 90 346
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 0 0 1 5 13 261
Learning and Belief Based Trading 1 2 9 37 2 7 18 96
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 0 4 11 218 3 10 31 475
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 2 11 30 179 9 20 55 494
Learning to Play Bayesian Games 1 5 20 51 4 10 49 157
Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis 3 7 29 29 3 7 25 25
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 0 0 5 37 2 4 21 119
Limit Games and Limit Equilibria 1 4 11 116 3 11 30 286
Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents 1 4 14 47 5 9 38 116
MONOPOLY AND CREDIBILITY IN ASSET MARKETS: AN EXAMPLE 0 0 0 0 2 9 27 434
Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent 0 1 8 34 1 3 13 70
Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent 0 1 2 59 1 4 9 272
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 3 9 142 2 6 31 389
Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed 0 0 0 0 1 3 15 95
Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 2 26 1 2 11 142
Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets 0 0 2 47 1 2 5 139
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 0 0 0 0 9 19 44 265
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 2 10 23 98
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 1 3 13 184
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 0 2 13 40 357
Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview 0 0 0 3 1 11 40 359
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 6 14 38 175
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 1 4 11 44 2 6 22 191
On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements 2 8 21 154 3 11 34 331
Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players 2 4 17 122 4 16 104 531
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 1 6 172 7 12 37 856
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 1 3 9 247
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 1 11 122 1 4 20 385
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 1 4 11 36 551
Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 7 13 50 325
Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note 0 0 0 0 6 12 38 179
Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 1 14 0 0 2 76
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient 0 1 10 35 1 6 36 109
Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient 2 6 22 151 5 13 51 325
Predation Without Reputation 0 0 0 0 1 14 35 235
Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good 0 0 0 4 3 17 53 885
Random matching in adaptive dynamics 1 2 12 46 2 4 24 69
Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 3 8 21 193
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 5 9 22 119
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals 1 4 25 66 2 8 45 85
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 7 23 42 153
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 2 14 54 200 4 22 92 332
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player 0 0 0 0 4 10 23 146
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 0 2 5 72 1 5 14 186
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 2 4 12 46 5 16 36 132
Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 58
Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 0 0 2 7 20 88
Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales 0 0 0 0 3 4 13 170
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 4 11 30 189
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 0 0 0 0 6 15 31 177
Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique 6 8 29 54 9 17 61 127
Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox 5 14 55 155 11 33 128 233
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 1 9 46 3 3 18 140
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 2 3 11 103
Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 114
Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games 0 0 3 35 0 0 5 73
Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships 0 0 0 0 10 39 128 885
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 2 6 13 71 5 13 34 196
Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi 1 2 6 14 3 8 74 240
Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality 0 1 2 70 2 4 8 274
Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games 2 5 31 251 3 15 54 730
Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 1 2 7 71 4 5 14 350
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 4 15 123 4 24 114 822
Superstition and Rational Learning 3 15 42 112 18 56 237 521
Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad 0 0 4 9 2 4 20 54
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 2 6 23 256
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 3 15 57 187
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 1 16 191 4 8 41 618
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 3 6 20 218 6 16 43 706
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games 0 1 5 13 2 5 25 71
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games 1 1 6 67 2 2 15 186
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 1 2 8 26 417
The Theory of Learning in Games 10 27 103 336 15 39 169 588
Topologies on Type 0 0 8 44 4 8 55 175
Topologies on Types 3 6 24 119 4 9 43 320
Topologies on Types 2 5 23 43 14 43 205 426
Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks 2 8 26 220 9 26 59 579
When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible? 0 0 0 3 2 5 15 93
When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible 1 2 9 49 2 5 19 299
When is Reputation Bad 2 3 15 196 6 8 27 493
When is Reputation Bad? 3 4 14 35 8 14 51 150
When is Reputation Bad? 0 0 1 108 3 3 15 279
When is Reputation Bad? 0 1 11 29 3 9 40 131
Word of Mouth Learning 1 9 24 185 4 17 43 297
Total Working Papers 105 345 1,358 7,534 452 1,336 4,929 33,401

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation 3 19 59 209 9 44 151 636
A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control 2 6 18 18 4 12 67 163
A Theory of Exit in Duopoly 2 13 44 202 3 18 66 518
A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents 2 8 52 362 9 37 173 1,811
Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics 0 0 0 1 3 17 73 208
An Easier Way to Calibrate 1 2 4 18 2 5 9 47
An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information 0 0 3 20 1 3 13 54
Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility 1 9 52 113 4 19 84 210
Competing Auctions 6 14 35 102 9 20 64 226
Conditional Universal Consistency 0 0 4 28 1 1 10 66
Consistency and cautious fictitious play 0 3 10 24 3 13 29 99
Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 6 27 115 3 20 68 262
Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring" 0 2 5 26 1 7 17 61
Customer Poaching and Brand Switching 0 0 0 1 5 16 77 769
Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 4 7 37 111 5 9 47 163
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 1 7 49 163 3 13 91 445
Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks 2 13 45 101 5 21 73 165
Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions 0 0 3 14 0 0 14 42
Imitation processes with small mutations 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 40
Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities 0 3 15 66 0 7 24 138
Interim correlated rationalizability 1 5 21 44 3 11 43 114
Knife-Edge Or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip? 0 2 18 77 1 9 86 464
Learning Mixed Equilibria 4 13 34 200 6 18 46 304
Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria 0 0 2 23 0 1 6 61
Learning and Belief-Based Trade 0 0 2 6 1 2 8 31
Learning in games 0 2 8 42 2 5 20 96
Learning to play Bayesian games 3 9 20 186 6 13 33 452
Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance 2 6 44 204 5 12 96 735
Limit games and limit equilibria 2 2 5 26 5 7 16 71
Maintaining a Reputation When Strategies Are Imperfectly Observed 2 4 36 104 5 11 70 207
Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised 0 0 0 0 0 3 31 131
Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 72
Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations 0 1 6 6 4 5 25 25
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts 4 12 87 387 10 22 168 890
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 1 2 11 59 4 6 18 95
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 5 12 26 86 10 21 44 143
On the robustness of equilibrium refinements 3 10 22 76 6 17 39 140
Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players 0 6 27 71 1 9 56 125
Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium 1 3 7 48 2 6 13 118
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium 19 76 288 958 35 130 524 1,789
Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient 0 1 11 26 1 4 20 59
Preemption and Rent Equilization in the Adoption of New Technology 0 2 40 189 1 7 137 529
Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races 4 8 52 244 9 22 102 385
Pricing a Network Good to Deter Entry 0 5 26 199 2 17 79 538
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium 4 11 30 128 7 17 65 380
Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction 0 0 1 21 0 0 2 177
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty 5 10 34 95 9 19 65 197
Repeated Games with Frequent Signals-super-* 1 5 7 7 3 15 28 28
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 1 6 21 90 2 12 39 165
Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player 4 7 55 194 6 18 143 627
Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents 0 0 21 69 0 2 42 184
Rules of Thumb for Social Learning 6 19 61 449 12 31 100 1,713
Self-Confirming Equilibrium 3 5 23 80 5 10 46 273
Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information 0 7 39 280 2 16 68 474
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships 13 58 162 573 39 153 459 1,170
Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium 0 2 13 98 2 7 36 425
Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games 1 5 31 113 2 9 46 200
Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction 0 0 5 23 1 2 18 96
Superstition and Rational Learning 0 6 14 15 4 17 64 154
The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look 16 66 257 1,384 43 160 572 3,059
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 12 52 267 667 22 101 526 1,470
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 3 16 56 232 6 23 99 586
The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games 0 0 3 21 0 1 6 75
The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry 0 0 0 0 4 6 30 399
Topologies on types 1 3 22 87 14 25 112 365
Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization 4 4 54 223 5 12 136 596
Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks 3 7 26 72 6 16 51 366
When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible? 1 1 2 17 2 2 10 89
When is reputation bad? 2 4 23 23 4 8 55 55
Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning 7 24 222 883 16 47 587 3,249
Word-of-mouth learning 4 20 49 152 14 36 93 289
Total Journal Articles 166 631 2,754 10,961 419 1,405 6,339 30,558

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview 9 35 83 333 20 71 203 712
Total Chapters 9 35 83 333 20 71 203 712

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Statistics updated 2009-07-03