| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Law and Economics Perspective on Terrorism |
3 |
6 |
12 |
61 |
6 |
13 |
38 |
131 |
| A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid |
0 |
2 |
5 |
44 |
3 |
8 |
23 |
109 |
| A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants |
1 |
3 |
16 |
146 |
8 |
20 |
51 |
381 |
| A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning |
2 |
13 |
62 |
418 |
10 |
54 |
216 |
1,799 |
| A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
34 |
390 |
| An Economic Theory of Church Strictness |
2 |
4 |
25 |
254 |
3 |
12 |
80 |
891 |
| Assessing the Argument for Specialized Courts: Evidence from Family Courts in Spain |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
| CASHING BY THE HOUR: WHY LARGE LAWFIRMS PREFER HOURLY FEES OVER CONTINGENT FEES |
1 |
2 |
5 |
47 |
5 |
8 |
25 |
300 |
| Cashing by the Hour: Why Large Law Firms Prefer Hourly Fees Over Contingent Fees |
1 |
3 |
14 |
158 |
11 |
25 |
89 |
797 |
| Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective |
4 |
7 |
19 |
369 |
14 |
32 |
87 |
900 |
| Crime and Punishment: Further Results |
0 |
3 |
21 |
369 |
0 |
8 |
60 |
1,482 |
| Does Efficient Deterrence Require that the Wealthy Should Be Able to Buy Justice? |
0 |
1 |
5 |
76 |
2 |
6 |
30 |
476 |
| Dynamic Optimal Law Enforcement with Learning |
1 |
3 |
10 |
137 |
2 |
7 |
31 |
502 |
| Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement |
0 |
1 |
16 |
164 |
2 |
5 |
45 |
486 |
| Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defence Expenditure |
0 |
3 |
9 |
118 |
2 |
19 |
57 |
793 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement and Criminal Organization |
2 |
6 |
15 |
206 |
4 |
19 |
63 |
764 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
145 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information |
2 |
5 |
18 |
232 |
6 |
18 |
50 |
673 |
| Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines |
1 |
4 |
16 |
164 |
2 |
7 |
33 |
411 |
| Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis |
0 |
5 |
145 |
323 |
9 |
50 |
577 |
1,471 |
| Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in |
1 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
121 |
| Regulation of Professions in the US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis |
0 |
0 |
3 |
61 |
0 |
4 |
24 |
170 |
| Reputation and Honesty in a Market for Information |
0 |
5 |
10 |
239 |
3 |
19 |
49 |
1,068 |
| Some Reflections on the Economics of Prosecutors: Mandatory v Selective Prosecution |
0 |
8 |
12 |
12 |
1 |
19 |
25 |
25 |
| The Choice of Titling System in Land |
2 |
4 |
16 |
162 |
4 |
10 |
41 |
453 |
| The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement |
3 |
21 |
88 |
903 |
26 |
84 |
311 |
3,372 |
| The Economics of US-Style Contingent Fees and UK-Style Conditional Fees |
1 |
1 |
9 |
28 |
5 |
12 |
30 |
158 |
| The Economics of US-style Contingent Fees and UK-style Conditional Fees |
0 |
2 |
18 |
112 |
9 |
19 |
99 |
451 |
| The Role of Moral Values in the Economic Analysis of Crime: A General Equilibrium Approach |
0 |
3 |
16 |
286 |
6 |
18 |
89 |
1,527 |
| The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: an Economic View and Policy Implications |
4 |
10 |
18 |
18 |
8 |
23 |
39 |
39 |
| The Scope of Punishment: An Economic Theory of Harm-Based vs. Act-Based Sanctions |
3 |
9 |
34 |
58 |
11 |
25 |
101 |
183 |
| The Virtuous Circle of Distrust: A Mechanism to Deter Bribes and Other Cooperative Crimes |
3 |
7 |
13 |
42 |
11 |
25 |
52 |
136 |
| Using machine learning algorithms to find patterns in stock prices |
1 |
4 |
13 |
28 |
5 |
18 |
50 |
102 |
| War and Peace: The European Decolonization Process |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
57 |
159 |
1,857 |
| Why Plea-Bargaining Fails to Achieve Results in So Many Criminal Justice Systems: A New Framework for Assessment |
2 |
15 |
26 |
26 |
10 |
51 |
101 |
101 |
| Why Pro-Defendant Criminal Procedure Might Hurt the Innocent |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
16 |
16 |
16 |
| Total Working Papers |
41 |
164 |
696 |
5,297 |
212 |
736 |
2,806 |
22,696 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| "A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning": Erratum |
0 |
1 |
1 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
84 |
| A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| A Strategic Interpretation of Legal Transplants |
0 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
0 |
5 |
5 |
5 |
| A Theory of International Conflict Management and Sanctioning |
0 |
2 |
13 |
51 |
0 |
13 |
56 |
243 |
| A law and economics perspective on terrorism |
2 |
5 |
9 |
18 |
2 |
5 |
18 |
44 |
| A note on private enforcement and type-I error |
1 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
76 |
| Academic Tenure, Posttenure Effort, and Contractual Damages |
1 |
1 |
6 |
16 |
4 |
8 |
38 |
102 |
| An Economic Theory Of Church Strictness |
1 |
2 |
9 |
66 |
2 |
9 |
51 |
448 |
| Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
10 |
13 |
13 |
| Casual police corruption and the economics of crime |
1 |
5 |
55 |
194 |
7 |
33 |
350 |
963 |
| Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: a managerial perspective |
2 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
7 |
14 |
41 |
43 |
| Corruption and the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions |
0 |
2 |
5 |
17 |
1 |
6 |
18 |
73 |
| Dishonesty and Libel Law: The Economics of the "Chilling" Effect |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
13 |
65 |
130 |
| Dynamic Law Enforcement with Learning |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
51 |
183 |
| Economic analysis of the removal of illegal gains |
0 |
2 |
3 |
19 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
67 |
| Efficient Deterrence does not Require that the Wealthy should be Able to Buy Justice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
12 |
60 |
| Externality and organizational choice in franchising |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
6 |
9 |
80 |
| Further notes on information, corruption, and optimal law enforcement |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
3 |
7 |
23 |
23 |
| Household dissolution, child care and divorce law |
0 |
1 |
3 |
23 |
3 |
12 |
34 |
200 |
| Optimal Deterrence with Legal Defense Expenditure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
29 |
272 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement and Imperfect Information When Wealth Varies among Individuals |
0 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
0 |
5 |
32 |
107 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Dissemination of Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
1 |
7 |
14 |
98 |
| Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking Government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
23 |
304 |
| Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization |
2 |
3 |
14 |
16 |
3 |
10 |
41 |
46 |
| Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements |
0 |
0 |
3 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
86 |
| Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
17 |
59 |
| Optimal magnitude and probability of fines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
106 |
| Paying the Price for Being Caught: The Economics of Manifest and Non-Manifest Theft in Roman Law |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
10 |
10 |
10 |
| Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes: An Economic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
20 |
409 |
605 |
| Portugal-European Union convergence: Some evidence |
1 |
1 |
8 |
45 |
1 |
4 |
31 |
172 |
| Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
5 |
13 |
118 |
| Reputation, Honesty, and Efficiency with Insider Information: an Experiment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
75 |
| The Choice of Titling System in Land |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
18 |
41 |
45 |
| The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
92 |
250 |
895 |
| The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement |
5 |
9 |
38 |
245 |
9 |
19 |
73 |
508 |
| The economics of political dishonesty and defamation |
0 |
0 |
4 |
23 |
2 |
5 |
33 |
136 |
| Twenty-Second Annual Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Ljubljana, Slovenia |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
5 |
12 |
12 |
| US-style contingent fees and UK-style conditional fees: agency problems and the supply of legal services |
2 |
3 |
10 |
11 |
12 |
20 |
48 |
55 |
| Total Journal Articles |
23 |
54 |
220 |
939 |
136 |
409 |
1,929 |
6,549 |
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