Access Statistics for Dino Gerardi

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 1 27 0 3 9 94
A 'Super' Folk Theorem for Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 21 1 4 14 121
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 14 0 2 5 32
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 1 3 55 1 7 25 203
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A Principal-Agent Model of Sequential Testing 0 0 1 21 2 6 12 47
A `Super Folk Theorem' in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 32 1 3 11 97
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 0 1 4 68 0 5 11 191
Aggregation of Expert Opinions 1 2 9 108 1 8 33 448
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 0 0 18 1 1 5 110
Committee Design in the Presence of Communication 0 1 2 95 1 3 8 301
Communication and Learning 0 0 1 29 1 5 16 90
Communication and Learning 1 1 21 74 4 19 143 522
Communication and Learning 0 0 2 31 0 2 13 65
Communication and Learning 0 0 1 28 0 1 32 104
Communication and Learning 0 0 0 26 1 1 9 42
Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication (joint with Roger Myerson) 0 0 2 44 0 0 3 80
Get Out the (Costly) Vote: Institutional Design for Greater Participation 0 1 9 26 7 22 61 129
Information Acquisition in Committees 0 0 5 77 1 6 27 177
Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication* 1 1 2 64 1 1 6 216
Putting Your Ballot Where you Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication 1 2 10 156 3 16 43 584
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 1 1 8 83 3 22 72 532
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 1 34 0 3 18 115
Social Memory and Evidence from the Past 0 0 1 50 1 3 11 122
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 0 37 0 3 8 187
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 2 110 2 5 18 490
The Folk Theorem in Dynastic Repeated Games 0 0 2 62 1 9 18 351
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 12
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 0 23 3 5 15 56
The Role of Commitment in Bilateral Trade 0 0 2 5 1 1 6 19
Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information 1 2 3 69 1 4 17 356
Total Working Papers 6 14 94 1,505 38 171 673 5,896

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A principal-agent model of sequential testing 0 1 4 8 1 2 16 37
A “Super” Folk Theorem for dynastic repeated games 0 0 0 10 0 4 8 44
Aggregation of expert opinions 0 3 4 23 0 5 10 71
Communication and Learning 1 1 10 14 3 4 34 38
Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information 1 3 6 60 1 3 17 214
Costly Expertise 0 0 0 46 0 1 5 96
Deliberative voting 1 6 18 100 4 11 35 232
Information acquisition in committees 0 0 5 28 0 2 15 56
Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication 3 7 10 46 4 14 38 118
Social Memory, Evidence, and Conflict 1 1 4 59 3 6 46 283
Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information 0 0 1 26 0 2 5 141
Total Journal Articles 7 22 62 420 16 54 229 1,330

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Statistics updated 2013-06-03