Access Statistics for Amihai Glazer

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting 0 0 0 18 0 1 1 65
A Signalling Explanation for Private Charity 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 508
A Theory of Compulsory Public Schooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 425
ACCESS Magazine, Fall 1994 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 10
AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 477
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 26
Allies as Rivals: Internal and External Rent Seeking 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 325
Ameliorating Congestion by Income Redistribution 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 26
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 22
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 17
An Information Explanation for the Flypaper Effect 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 692
Appropriation, Human Capital, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 402
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 415
Bequests and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 159
Bequests, Control Rights, and Cost-Benefit Analysis 0 0 1 31 0 0 1 238
Budgets under Delegation 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 35
Bureaucratic Creep 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 568
CANDIDATES SHOULD AVOID SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS IF VOTERS ARE IGNORANT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 373
COMMITMENT PROBLEMS JUSTIFY SUBSIDIES FOR MEDICAL INSURANCE 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 369
Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects 0 0 0 85 0 0 2 654
Capital-intensive projects induce more effort than labor-intensive projects 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 180
Clean on Paper, Dirty on the Road: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 23
Clean or a Day: Troubles with California's Smog Check 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 26
Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 193
Competitive Proposals to Special Interests 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 115
Credibility May Require Discretion, not Rules 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 195
Credit Claiming 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 982
Crowding Out Wasteful Activities by Wasteful Activities 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 214
DELAY IN POLICY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 162
Differential Pricing and Mistake Avoidance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 406
Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy 0 0 0 67 0 0 1 207
Earmarking: Bundling to Signal Quality 0 0 1 83 0 0 3 269
Election Surprises and Exchange rate Uncertainty 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 575
Electoral Incentives, Government Popularity, and Commitment of Policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 158
Evidence for the Irrationality of Governmental Policy 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 391
Externalities, Social Pressures, and Political Parties 0 0 0 81 1 1 2 313
Firms' Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 1 83 1 2 4 309
Firms’ Ethics, Consumer Boycotts, and Signalling 0 0 0 53 1 1 5 292
Firms’ ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 47
Forward Markets to Spur Innovation 0 1 1 40 0 1 3 72
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 197 1 2 2 1,268
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 20
Governmental Provision of Public Goods Need Not Crowd Out Private Provision 0 0 1 35 0 2 9 205
Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 145
Governmental Transfers and Altruistic Private Transfers 0 0 0 35 1 1 1 101
Handicaps on Timing to Improve Reputation 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 76
Help Not Needed? Optimal Host Country Regulation of Expatriate NGO Workers 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 25
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 160 1 1 1 971
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 179
How An Agenda Setter Induces Legislators to Adopt Policies They Oppose 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 60
How Regulations Can Succeed Where Taxes Do Not: An Examination of Automobile Fuel Efficiency 0 0 0 322 0 1 2 1,674
How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 158
How a Firm Can Induce Legislators to Adopt a Bad Policy 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 74
How to Commit to a Future Price 0 0 0 191 0 0 3 470
IMPERFECT INFORMATION MY ALLEVIATE AGENCY PROBLEMS 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 285
Imperfect Competition, Clubs, and Two-Part Tariffs 0 0 0 11 1 1 1 80
Income Taxes, Property Values and Migration 0 0 0 76 1 1 1 378
Income Taxes, Property Values, and Migration 0 0 0 83 1 2 3 373
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 0 1 3 3 38
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 9
Inducing political action by workers 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 30
Inequality when People Produce Best what they Consume 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 289
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 0 25 0 0 0 175
Informational Benefits of International Environmental Agreements 0 0 1 102 0 2 7 1,091
Informational benefits of international environmental agreements 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 175
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 54 0 1 2 299
Initial Luck, Status-Seeking and Snowballs Lead to Corporate Success and Failure 0 0 0 49 1 1 1 304
Innovation and Imitation Across Jurisdictions 0 0 0 41 0 0 0 141
Innovation of Network Goods: A Non-Innovating Firm Will Gain 0 0 0 74 0 0 0 277
Insufficient Experimentation Because Agents Herd 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 54
Integration, Segregation and Discrimination in Clubs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 357
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 253
Intertemporal commitment problems and voting on redistributive taxation 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 23
Investment in Human Capital, Appropriation, and Mandatory Schooling 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 515
Legislative turnover, fiscal policy, and economic growth: evidence from U.S. state legislatures 0 0 0 54 1 2 7 180
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 145
Lobbying of Firms by Voters 0 0 0 27 0 0 1 91
MYOPIA, MISPERCEPTIONS, AND SOCIAL SECURITY 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 452
Markets Can Solve the Hold-Up Problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 590
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 0 15 2 2 3 126
Markets and regulatory hold-up problems 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 35
Migration in Search of Good Government 0 0 0 42 0 0 0 209
ON THE INCENTIVES TO ESTABLISH AND PLAY RENT-SEEKING GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 324
OPTIMAL SALES TO CONSUMERS WHO HOLD INVENTORY 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 397
Obtaining information by diversifying projects or why specialization is inefficient 0 0 0 18 0 0 0 82
Old Money, the Nouveau Riche and Brunhilde's Marriage Dilemma 0 0 0 2 0 3 3 63
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde's Marriage Strategy 0 0 1 23 0 1 8 108
Old Money, the Nouveaux Riches and Brunhilde’s Marriage Strategy 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 24
Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss 0 0 0 74 0 0 1 368
Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss 0 0 0 160 0 0 0 527
Optimal Promotion and Span of Control 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2,617
Optimal Term Length when Misinformation Increases with Experience 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 112
POLICY PROPOSALS UNDER CONTESTABILITY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 224
POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM UNDER GROUP IDENTIFICATION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 336
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 0 47 0 0 0 117
Peer Group Effects, Sorting, and Fiscal Federalism 0 0 0 52 0 1 1 186
Political Biases Against Public Investment and Growth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 337
Politicians Avoid Tax Increases Around Elections 0 0 0 29 0 0 6 85
Predicting Committee Action 0 0 2 44 1 1 3 245
Principal-Agent Problems When Principal Allocates a Budget 0 0 1 56 0 0 4 197
Reducing Current Taxes to Raise Future Revenue 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 146
Reducing Rent Seeking by Providing Wide Public Service 0 0 0 44 0 0 0 129
Reducing rent seeking by providing wide public service 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 75
Regulation by Price or by Command 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 63
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 22
Regulation with Budget Constraints Can Dominate Regulation by Price and by Quantity 0 0 1 56 0 0 2 192
Repeated Agenda Setting and the Unanimous Approval of Bad Policies 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 70
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 0 190 0 0 0 784
Reputation in Team Production 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 355
Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 55
Signaling Commitment by Excessive Spending 0 0 1 40 0 0 1 273
Strategic Contributions to Induce Private Provision of the Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 539
Strategic Positioning and Campaining 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,191
Strategies of the Political Opposition 0 0 0 384 0 0 1 1,641
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 77 0 1 1 413
Subordinates as Threats to Leaders 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 258
Subsidizing Consumption to Signal Quality of Workers 0 0 0 14 0 0 1 103
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 0 0 1 323
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 74 2 3 4 358
Subsidizing consumption to signal quality of workers 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 86
THE EVALUATION OF RISKY PROJECTS BY VOTERS 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 230
THE SOCIAL DISCOUNT RATE UNDER MAJORITY VOTING 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 721
THEORY OF PARKING 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 919
TURNOUT AND THE RATIONAL VOTER MODEL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,492
Tax Rage 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 439
Taxation When Consumers Value Freedom 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 294
Taxation of Emissions and Induce Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 661
Taxation of Rent-Seeking Activities 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 679
Term Length and the Quality of Appointment 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 174
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 19 0 1 1 161
Term Length and the Quality of Appointments 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 202
The CAFE Standards Worked 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 30
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 188
The Desire for Impact 0 0 0 36 0 0 0 290
The Economics of the Brass Paradox 0 0 0 2 0 1 2 547
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 207
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 22 0 0 1 123
The Effects of Employment Protection on the Choice of Risky Projects 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 183
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 202
The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 153
The Politics of Delay 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 85
The Politics of State Gasoline Taxes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 715
The Preferences of Voters Over Road Tolls and Road Capacity 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 205
The Profit-maximizing Non-profit 0 1 1 59 0 2 8 225
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 1 3 239 0 1 8 1,083
Theories of Delegation in Political Science 0 0 0 4 0 1 8 1,269
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 495
Time Consistency of Congestion Tolls 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 10
Urban Extremism 0 0 0 71 0 0 0 267
WHY REPRESENTATIVES ARE IDEOLOGISTS THOUGH VOTERS ARE NOT 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 294
WHY VOTERS MAY PREFER CONGESTED PUBLIC CLUBS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 204
What Drives Gasoline Prices? 0 0 0 74 1 2 3 397
What drives gasoline taxes? 0 0 0 54 0 0 0 182
When Do Consumers Favor Price Increases: With Applications to Congestion and to Regulation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
Which Consumers Benefit from Congestion Tolls? 0 0 1 71 1 1 2 279
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 14
Which consumers benefit from congestion tolls? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Why Governments Commit to Unpopular Policies 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 201
Why High-level Executives Earn Less in the Government Than in the Private Sector 0 0 0 27 0 1 2 56
Why Voters May Prefer Congested Public Clubs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 14
private Proposition of Public Goods, Limited Tax Deductibility, and Crowding Out 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 287
Total Working Papers 0 3 18 4,919 42 88 209 51,012

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
?/M/1: On the equilibrium distribution of customer arrivals 1 1 2 42 3 3 5 93
A Neo-Downsian Model of Group-Oriented Voting and Racial Backlash 0 0 0 6 1 1 1 81
A Signaling Explanation for Charity 0 1 4 702 0 1 21 1,948
A carrot and stick approach to agenda-setting 0 0 0 9 0 0 4 57
A positive correlation between turnout and plurality does not refute the rational voter model 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 10
A strategic model of job arrivals to a single machine with earliness and tardiness penalties 0 0 0 5 2 2 3 20
Advertising, Information, and Prices-A Case Study 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 251
Air traffic control regulation with union bargaining in Europe 11This paper presents results of the ACCHANGE consortium – SESAR project E02.31 – whose support we gratefully acknowledge. We thank the guest editor and two anonymous referees for their useful comments. We also thank Nicole Adler and Eef Delhaye, as well as seminar participants at EUROCONTROL, OPTION (Amsterdam), ITEA (Oslo), and the USA-Europe ATM conference (Lisbon) for comments on the previous versions 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 35
Allies as rivals: internal and external rent seeking 0 0 2 59 0 1 3 179
Ameliorating congestion by income redistribution 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 68
Amend the Old or Address the New: Broad-Based Legislation When Proposing Policies Is Costly 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 72
An Expressive Voting Theory of Strikes 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 156
Bargaining with Rent Seekers 0 0 0 29 0 0 0 101
Bargaining within the family can generate a political gender gap 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 37
Bequests, control rights, and cost-benefit analysis 0 0 0 7 1 2 2 75
Commitment Problems Justify Subsidies for Medical Insurance 0 0 0 7 1 1 1 64
Congestion Tolls and Consumer Welfare 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 136
Consumption variety and urban agglomeration 0 0 0 49 0 1 1 276
Credibility may require discretion, not rules 0 0 0 39 0 0 0 102
Credit claiming 0 0 0 19 0 0 4 181
Does Electoral Uncertainty Cause Economic Fluctuations? 0 0 0 52 1 2 3 186
Editorial 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 30
Editorial announcement 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 45
Editorial introduction 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 43
Editors' introduction 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 248
Efficiency, equilibrium and exclusion when the poor chase the rich 0 0 0 16 1 2 4 185
Election Surprises and Exchange Rate Uncertainty 0 0 2 55 0 0 4 270
Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates 0 0 1 19 0 0 4 99
Equilibrium Arrivals in Queues with Bulk Service at Scheduled Times 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 12
Esteem and ignorance 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 141
Federal grants and yardstick competition 0 0 0 70 0 1 2 170
Firms' ethics, consumer boycotts, and signalling 0 1 2 38 1 2 7 146
Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 21
Governmental Failures in Evaluating Programs 0 0 0 8 1 1 1 57
Governmental failures in evaluating programs 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 57
Governmental transfers and altruistic private transfers 0 0 0 4 0 1 1 52
Handicaps to improve reputation 0 0 0 3 1 2 4 39
Help not needed? Optimal host country regulation of expatriate NGO workers 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 20
High Compensation Creates a Ratchet Effect 0 0 0 61 1 1 1 325
How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 64
How elections matter: A study of U.S. senators 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 8
How to avoid transferring a valuable asset 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 51
Ideological externalities, social pressures, and political parties 0 0 0 19 0 0 0 48
Income taxes, property values, and migration 0 0 0 32 1 2 3 162
Increased capacity may exacerbate rationing problems: with applications to medical care 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 44
Inducing investments and regulating externalities by command versus taxes 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 23
Inducing search by periodic advertising 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 49
Informational Benefits of International Treaties 0 1 1 16 1 2 7 435
Intertemporal Commitment Problems and Voting on Redistributive Taxation 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 74
Introduction 0 0 0 10 0 0 1 71
Introduction 0 0 0 14 1 1 1 84
LEGISLATIVE TURNOVER, FISCAL POLICY, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EVIDENCE FROM U.S. STATE LEGISLATURES 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 69
Limitations of the spatial model 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
Local regulation may be excessively stringent 0 0 0 29 1 2 3 123
Markets and Regulatory Hold-Up Problems 0 0 0 80 1 3 8 288
Measuring the benefits derived from a transportation investment -- a comment 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 46
Migration in search of good government 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 88
More monitoring can induce less effort 0 0 0 78 0 0 1 156
Motivating devoted workers 0 0 0 133 0 0 0 330
Must Liberals Always Vote for Liberals and Need the More Competent Candidate Always Be Preferred? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Old money, the nouveaux riches and Brunhilde’s marriage strategy 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 58
On the Incentives to Establish and Play Political Rent-Seeking Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 69
On the economics of subscriptions 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 92
On the uses of club theory: Preface to the club theory symposium 0 0 0 103 0 1 2 290
Optimal Contests 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 344
Optimal Contracts When a Worker Envies His Boss 0 0 1 45 0 0 1 233
Optimal allocation of quotas 0 0 0 5 2 3 3 62
Optimal sales to users who hold inventory 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 57
POLITICS WITH AND WITHOUT POLICY† 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 39
Parking fees and congestion 0 0 4 532 1 2 11 1,234
Performance when misinformation increases with experience 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 32
Politics and the Choice of Durability 1 1 1 89 2 3 4 238
Politics and the Choice of Durability: Reply 0 0 1 14 0 0 1 86
Preference heterogeneity, wage inequality, and trade 0 0 0 48 0 0 0 194
Pricing by the Firm Under Regulatory Threat 0 0 1 100 0 1 2 305
Public opinion and regulatory behavior 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 7
RENT SEEKING CAN PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS* 0 0 1 51 0 2 13 121
Rational Response to Irrational Attitudes: The Level of the Gasoline Tax in the United States 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 29
Regulation by Prices and by Command 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 90
Regulatory tune-ups 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 67
Rewarding Successes Discourages Experimentation 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 26
Rivalry among agents seeking large budgets 0 0 3 5 0 0 6 17
STRATEGIC LOBBYING BY POTENTIAL INDUSTRY ENTRANTS* 0 0 2 9 0 0 2 37
Sequential Rent Seeking 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 47
Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience 0 0 0 46 0 1 2 168
Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments 0 0 0 13 0 1 1 187
Signaling, network externalities, and subsidies 0 0 0 15 0 0 2 69
Ski-Lift Pricing with Applications to Labor and Other Markets: Comment 0 0 0 148 0 1 4 881
Social security and conflict within the family 1 1 1 24 1 1 1 116
Special Issue on Social Conflict – Preface 0 0 0 38 1 2 2 258
Stability and Centrality of Legislative Choice in the Spatial Context 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Strategic Investment by a Regulated Firm 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 159
Subsidizing Enjoyable Education 0 0 0 21 0 0 2 112
Support and opposition to a Pigovian tax: Road pricing with reference-dependent preferences 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 104
THE ELECTORAL COSTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS WHEN VOTERS ARE IGNORANT* 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 15
Taxation and pricing when consumers value freedom 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 49
Taxation of rent-seeking activities 0 0 2 46 0 3 20 166
The Advantages of Being First 0 0 1 152 1 1 5 743
The Calculus of Stonewalling 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 13
The Client Relationship and a "Just" Price 0 0 0 10 1 1 1 73
The Electoral Politics of Extreme Policies 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 223
The Social Discount Rate under Majority Voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 38
The Strategy of Candidate Ambiguity 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 18
The desire for impact 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 142
The evaluation of risky projects by voters 1 1 1 29 1 1 1 97
Trade protection to reduce redistribution 0 0 0 22 1 1 1 112
Up-or-out policies when a worker imitates another 0 0 1 14 0 0 2 63
Urban Extremism 0 0 0 15 1 1 1 155
Using corrective taxes to remedy consumer misperceptions 0 0 0 28 0 1 1 60
Voting and campaigning under incomplete information 0 0 0 13 1 1 1 51
Voting to anger and to please others 0 0 0 70 0 0 1 242
Wages and Employment in Public-Sector Unions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 273
When a Loser Gains: Free Riding in the Innovation of Network Goods 0 0 0 34 2 3 3 104
When users of congested roads may view tolls as unjust 0 0 3 22 0 0 4 73
Why principals tolerate biases of inaccurate agents 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 24
Why representatives are ideologists though voters are not 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
Why voters may prefer congested public clubs 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 65
Total Journal Articles 4 7 38 3,927 40 76 233 16,953

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Regulatory policy 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 11
Total Chapters 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 11

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03