| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Theory of the Theory of Public Goods |
0 |
2 |
8 |
132 |
2 |
10 |
34 |
564 |
| A note on seniority and political competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
24 |
| A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics |
0 |
0 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Absence of Envy Does Not Imply Fairness: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
| Advancing economic analysis beyond the equilibrium framework |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
88 |
| An Empirical Test of the Median Voter Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
9 |
401 |
| Andreas Bergh and Rolf Höijer, eds., Institutional Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
| Applied Fairness Theory: Comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
123 |
| Are There Ratchets in the Growth of Federal Government Spending? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
52 |
| Arye L. Hillman, Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
199 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
561 |
| Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: a political economy perspective on the responsibilities and limitations of government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
45 |
| Arye L. Hillman: Public finance and public policy: responsibilities and limitations of government |
0 |
0 |
1 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
326 |
| Autocratic, Democratic, and Optimal Government: Fiscal Choices and Economic Outcomes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
| Barriers to Entry and Political Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Barry G. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Eds.). The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| Book Review: Explorations into Constitutional Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
| Book review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
| Capital and labor, Past and present, in the context of Piketty’s Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
83 |
| Checks and Balances: Enforcing Constitutional Constraints |
1 |
3 |
4 |
23 |
5 |
8 |
18 |
161 |
| Committees in Legislatures: A Property Rights Perspective |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
80 |
| Constitutions as constraints: A case study of three american constitutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
37 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
101 |
| Consumption Externalities and Economic Welfare |
0 |
0 |
3 |
88 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
356 |
| Contractarian ideology and the legitimacy of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
25 |
| Contractarian model of the decline in classical liberalism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
18 |
| Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Corrective Taxes and Auctions of Rights in the Control of Externalities: A Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
| Corruption and destructive entrepreneurship |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
201 |
| Creative destruction: getting ahead and staying ahead in a capitalist economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
3 |
4 |
11 |
40 |
| Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson: the narrow corridor: states, societies, and the fate of liberty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
91 |
| David F. Prindle, The Paradox of Democratic Capitalism: Politics and Economics in American Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006. USD 49.95 (cloth) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
291 |
| David Reisman: James Buchanan |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
| Does restricting choice in referenda enable governments to spend more? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
75 |
| Does the invisible hand hold or lead? Market adjustment in an entrepreneurial economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
176 |
| Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast: Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
88 |
| Echoes of Henry George in Modern Analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
78 |
| Economic Freedom and the Environment for Economic Growth |
2 |
2 |
7 |
691 |
2 |
3 |
16 |
2,502 |
| Economic Freedom, Institutional Quality,and Cross-Country Differences in Income and Growth |
0 |
2 |
14 |
203 |
1 |
4 |
30 |
533 |
| Economic Institutions and the Durability of Democracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
| Elite Influence on General Political Preferences |
0 |
0 |
3 |
19 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
102 |
| Empirical Evidence on the Publicness of State Legislative Activities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
180 |
| Entrepreneurial Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
84 |
| Equilibrium versus the Invisible Hand |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
373 |
| Evidence on voter preferences from unrestricted choice referendums |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
115 |
| Factors Underlying the Growth of Local Government in the 19th Century United States |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
384 |
| Firms as knowledge repositories |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
| Francesco Forte: Principles of public economics: a public choice approach |
0 |
0 |
1 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
192 |
| Fred S. McChesney: In Memoriam |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
| Government By Contract |
0 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
29 |
| Government growth in the twenty-first century |
0 |
1 |
8 |
177 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
401 |
| Growth Management in Florida: Lessons for the National Economy |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
40 |
| HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION AND LABOUR SUPPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
| Institutional quality and the tenure of autocrats |
1 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
83 |
| Institutions and the Impact of Investment on Growth |
0 |
1 |
8 |
228 |
0 |
4 |
20 |
562 |
| Interest group support for non-group issues |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
25 |
| Interests Versus Ideology in the Ratification of the 16th and 17th Amendments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
916 |
| Is Revenue-Neutral Tax Reform Revenue Neutral? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
50 |
| Is institutional improvement possible? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
37 |
| James M. Buchanan and Liberal Political Economy: A Rational Reconstruction |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
| James M. Buchanan’s constitutional project: past and future |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
33 |
| John Meadowcroft: James M. Buchanan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
| Karl Wennberg and Christian Sandström (Eds.), Questioning the Entrepreneurial State: Status-quo, Pitfalls, and the Need for Credible Innovation Policy. Cham: Springer, 2022. xi + 367 Pages. USD 59.99 (hardback) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
9 |
| Lawrence H. White: The clash of economic ideas: the great policy debates and experiments of the last hundred years |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
113 |
| Les fondations comportementales de l’analyse économique autrichienne |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
| Magnus Henrekson and Robin Douhan: The political economy of entrepreneurship, 2 vols |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
86 |
| Malinvestment |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
1 |
4 |
11 |
169 |
| Market institutions and income inequality |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
106 |
| Measuring the Growth and Variability of Tax Bases Over the Business Cycle |
1 |
1 |
8 |
97 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
237 |
| National Income Accounting and Public Policy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
512 |
| Nicolaus Tideman: Collective decisions and voting: The potential for public choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
356 |
| Non-optimal unanimous agreement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
21 |
| Non-optimal unanimous agreement under majority rule: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
27 |
| Omar Azfar and Charles A. Cadwell (Eds.), Market-Augmenting Government: The Institutional Foundations for Prosperity; Stephen Knack (Ed.), Democracy, Governance, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
250 |
| On the distribution of federal taxes and expenditures, and the new war between the states |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
| Optimality and the institutional structure of bureaucracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| Pluralism and heterodoxy in economic methodology |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
80 |
| Pluralism versus Heterodoxy in Economics and the Social Sciences |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
104 |
| Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
84 |
| Political Capitalism |
0 |
0 |
4 |
42 |
2 |
10 |
46 |
379 |
| Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
305 |
| Political incentives for rent creation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
112 |
| Politics and Deficit Finance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| Politics as exchange: the classical liberal economics and politics of James M. Buchanan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
373 |
| Principles and politics: Like oil and water |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
| Progressive Democracy: the ideology of the modern predatory state |
0 |
2 |
2 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
7 |
85 |
| Public Policy Toward Pecuniary Externalities |
0 |
0 |
4 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
134 |
| Public choice in a local government setting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
78 |
| Rational choice and the taxation of sin |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
112 |
| Rational choice and the taxation of sin: Reply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
62 |
| Regulation and corruption |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
149 |
| Review |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
| Reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
22 |
| Roger D. Congleton, Arye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad (eds.): 40 years of research on rent seeking 1 and 2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
105 |
| Roger D. Congleton: Perfecting parliament: constitutional reform, liberalism, and the rise of Western democracy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
| Rule of law and the size of government |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
140 |
| South Korea's economic future: Industrial policy, or economic democracy? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
2 |
2 |
9 |
390 |
| Specification Search and Levels of Significance in Econometric Models |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
268 |
| THE GROWTH OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1820 TO 1870 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
173 |
| THE NATIONAL DEBT CONTROVERSY |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
588 |
| THE NATIONAL DEBT CONTROVERSY: A REPLY |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
| Tax Policy From a Public Choice Perspective |
1 |
1 |
4 |
40 |
2 |
3 |
11 |
139 |
| Tax Referenda and the Voluntary Exchange Model of Taxation: a Suggested Implementation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| Tax shares and government spending in a median voter model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
35 |
| The Austrian Episode |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
| The Effect of Changes in the Tax Structure on the Reported Income of High-Income Individuals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
49 |
| The Effect of State Income Taxation on Per Capita Income Growth |
0 |
0 |
4 |
69 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
175 |
| The Effects of Public Investment on Private Investment in Developing Economies |
0 |
1 |
6 |
132 |
1 |
4 |
17 |
323 |
| The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
155 |
| The Impact of Population Density on Municipal Government Expenditures |
0 |
0 |
4 |
51 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
133 |
| The Linkage Between Public and Private Investment: A Co-integration Analysis of a Panel of Developing Countries |
0 |
1 |
3 |
268 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
669 |
| The National Research Council Ranking of Research Universities: Its Impact on Research in Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
370 |
| The New Urbanism Versus the Market Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
276 |
| The Origins of Entrepreneurial Opportunities |
0 |
1 |
4 |
268 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
1,073 |
| The Ramsey Rule Reconsidered |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
210 |
| The Regulation of Lobbyists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
195 |
| The Return To the Federal Government From Investment in Higher Education |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| The Scope of Government and the Wealth of Nations |
0 |
2 |
16 |
195 |
0 |
7 |
34 |
475 |
| The Size and Significance of the Pareto Set in Spatial Voting Models |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
207 |
| The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
410 |
| The Unanimous Voting Rule Is Not the Political Equivalent to Market Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
510 |
| The appeal of minimum wage laws: A dynamic analysis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
| The behavioral foundations of Austrian economics |
0 |
0 |
3 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
239 |
| The cartelization of local governments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| The common pool of transitional profits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
| The contractual alternative to patents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
69 |
| The economic theory of rights |
0 |
0 |
22 |
71 |
3 |
24 |
121 |
702 |
| The median voter model in public choice theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
222 |
| The social sub-optimality of competitive elections: comment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
52 |
| The transformative impact of rent-seeking theory on the study of public choice |
0 |
2 |
6 |
14 |
0 |
5 |
18 |
38 |
| Thomas Piketty: Capital in the twenty-first century |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
69 |
| Transitional gains and rent extraction |
0 |
1 |
5 |
22 |
2 |
3 |
13 |
75 |
| Unions, Economic Freedom, and Growth |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
| Using Matched Border Counties for Policy Analysis: The Effects of Entitlement Programs on Female-Headed Households and Female Labor-Force Participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
189 |
| Veterans Interests and the Transition to Government Growth: 1870-1915 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
162 |
| Vibert's vision: Constitutional theory in search of a constitution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| What Stiglitz and Stockman Have in Common |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
63 |
| Why does government produce national defense? |
0 |
0 |
3 |
81 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
264 |
| Wilfried Ver Eecke. Ethical Dimensions of the Economy: Making Use of Hegel and the Concepts of Public and Merit Goods |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
89 |
| Total Journal Articles |
7 |
27 |
195 |
5,612 |
69 |
188 |
838 |
25,150 |
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