Access Statistics for Giovanna Iannantuoni

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria 0 0 5 34 3 8 29 187
A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria 0 1 2 4 0 5 28 351
Divided government and dominance solvability 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 486
EXTREME VOTING UNDER PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION:THE MULTIDIMENSIONAL CASE 0 2 14 72 1 9 20 90
Electing a Parliament 1 1 1 1 1 3 6 6
Electing a parliament 0 0 3 20 0 1 21 50
Extreme Voting under Proportional Representation: The Multidimensional Case 0 1 13 89 1 7 27 232
MEETINGS WITH COSTLY PARTICIPATION: A COMMENT 1 2 8 73 1 2 14 139
ON ASYMMETRIC BEHAVIORS IF VOTING IS COSTLY 0 0 1 21 1 1 7 46
ON THE GENERIC STRATEGIC STABILITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IF VOTING IS COSTLY 0 1 7 56 0 3 24 207
On Asymmetric Behaviors if Voting is Costly 0 0 7 76 1 1 15 153
On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly 0 0 2 20 2 6 24 108
SOME RESULTS ON STRATEGIC VOTING AND PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION WITH MULTIDIMENSIONAL POLICY SPACE 0 1 4 56 0 3 13 149
Sincere and strategic voters in a model of proportional representation 1 2 2 2 2 3 15 90
Subgame perfection in a Òdivided governmentÓ model 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 384
Total Working Papers 3 11 69 525 13 52 258 2,678

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A purely non-cooperative model of divided government 0 0 3 10 0 0 9 40
A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria 0 3 7 17 0 4 13 42
Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting 0 0 3 7 1 2 9 26
Divided government and dominance solvability 0 0 0 10 0 0 3 62
Extreme voting under proportional representation: the multidimensional case 0 2 7 8 0 3 16 20
Meetings with Costly Participation: Comment 0 0 2 13 2 2 7 62
On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly 0 0 0 9 0 0 3 60
Total Journal Articles 0 5 22 74 3 11 60 312

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Statistics updated 2009-07-03