Access Statistics for Bettina Klaus

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair Marriages:" An Impossibility 2 6 60 73 6 17 116 131
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems 6 10 44 44 20 37 108 108
A Note on Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin's (1979) Domain Richness Condition 0 2 20 77 5 9 54 157
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked 1 1 6 64 7 12 32 352
Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 1 2 9 53 8 12 37 179
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 0 1 10 43 1 4 26 89
Competition and Resource Sensitivity in Marriage and Roommate Markets 1 5 21 21 4 12 38 38
Consistency and Monotonicity in One-Sided Assignment Problems 7 17 29 29 15 38 59 59
Consistent House Allocation 1 3 8 31 1 3 18 128
Consistent House Allocation 0 0 8 65 2 3 22 212
Corrigendum to "Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems" 2 8 20 20 3 15 37 37
Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] 0 0 4 63 2 4 21 270
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 2 9 73 5 11 30 270
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 2 3 13 57 3 10 42 141
Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples 0 0 1 19 3 5 14 69
Dynamic Recontracting processes with Multiple Indivisible Goods 0 1 13 66 6 12 54 166
Dynamic recontracting processes with multiple indivisible goods 0 0 0 0 1 3 11 11
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 2 35 0 0 13 199
Efficient Priority Rules 0 0 3 24 0 1 15 176
Efficient Priority Rules 3 5 27 189 16 40 203 1,029
Employment by Lotto Revisited 1 1 12 59 5 9 51 378
Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples 0 2 8 58 9 30 71 374
Farsighted House Allocation 4 12 27 27 5 17 32 32
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets 3 13 36 36 5 16 34 34
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 3 6 13 109 6 12 42 375
Median Stable Matching for College Admission 1 5 36 180 6 18 118 704
Monotonicity and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Contracts 6 7 32 179 9 13 72 468
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 2 4 9 9 3 6 15 15
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples 1 3 8 103 12 20 63 481
Probabilistic Assignements of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 153
Probabilistic Assignments of Identical Indivisible Objects and Uniform Probabilistic Rules 0 1 5 30 3 4 22 205
Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching 1 6 16 149 4 13 47 537
Reallocation of an infinetely divisible good 0 1 2 10 4 6 13 124
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 1 5 28 118 4 13 104 536
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 2 12 0 1 5 126
Resource-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems 0 0 1 28 2 2 7 181
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 2 12 46 1 4 28 122
Smith and Rawls Share a Room 0 0 4 62 3 4 18 116
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 1 12 55 105 3 23 117 171
Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians 2 6 49 49 2 9 46 46
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 0 4 12 213 15 24 70 800
Stability and Nash Implementation in Matching Markets with Couples 4 5 24 27 4 10 52 58
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples 2 3 20 20 5 6 23 23
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 2 10 39 55 2 12 59 66
Stable Many-to-Many Matchings with Contracts 2 3 13 59 3 4 27 137
Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets 1 4 36 86 3 12 77 138
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and initial endowments 1 1 5 42 2 5 21 173
The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second-Best Incentive Compatible 0 0 6 76 4 15 41 263
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 1 3 6 49 6 13 31 155
The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) 0 0 4 42 2 7 31 141
The Role of Replication-Invariance: Two Answers Concerning the Problem of Fair Division when Preferences are Single-Peaked 1 2 5 30 6 10 28 108
Total Working Papers 66 187 832 3,114 246 586 2,321 11,061

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Fair marriages": An impossibility 1 1 1 1 4 6 6 6
A Note on the Separability Principle in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences 1 2 2 7 1 2 3 38
Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods 1 1 3 5 1 1 5 37
Choice correspondences for public goods 1 1 1 15 1 1 2 152
Coalitional Strategy-Proofness in Economies with Single-Dipped Preferences and the Assignment of an Indivisible Object 1 1 4 24 2 3 10 78
Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems 1 1 3 14 1 2 7 62
Consistent House Allocation 1 2 5 12 1 2 9 39
Corrigendum to "Stable matchings and preferences of couples" [J. Econ. Theory 121 (1) (2005) 75-106] 1 1 1 1 2 3 3 3
Corrigendum to “On randomized matching mechanisms” [Economic Theory 8(1996)377–381] 1 1 3 8 1 2 5 83
Efficient priority rules 1 1 6 20 1 1 12 76
Fair and efficient student placement with couples 1 1 2 5 1 1 7 24
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods 1 1 2 11 1 1 5 50
Median Stable Matching for College Admissions 1 1 3 25 1 2 17 114
Monotonicity and Nash implementation in matching markets with contracts 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Paths to stability for matching markets with couples 1 1 2 7 1 1 4 36
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Procedurally fair and stable matching 1 1 1 12 2 5 10 88
Reallocation of an infinitely divisible good 2 2 6 41 4 8 30 350
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems 2 2 8 11 2 4 16 77
Solidarity and Probabilistic Target Rules 1 1 2 18 1 1 12 116
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 1 1 2 2 1 3 8 10
Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts 1 2 2 2 1 3 3 3
Stable matchings and preferences of couples 3 6 17 34 4 10 30 108
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped 0 0 7 21 0 0 14 94
Strategy-proof division with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments 0 1 7 75 7 9 29 445
Strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity for house allocation problems 1 1 15 51 1 2 32 176
Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems 1 1 7 53 1 2 14 258
Target Rules for Public Choice Economies on Tree Networks and in Euclidean Spaces 2 2 5 5 2 2 9 11
The coordinate-wise core for multiple-type housing markets is second-best incentive compatible 1 1 6 9 3 3 13 20
original papers: Uniform allocation and reallocation revisited 1 1 2 32 2 2 19 266
Total Journal Articles 35 42 129 525 54 86 339 2,825

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04