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Abstract Views |
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3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Characterization of the Coordinate-Wise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets |
1 |
1 |
7 |
80 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
175 |
| A Characterization of the Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Housing Markets via Respecting-Improvement |
0 |
0 |
15 |
15 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
21 |
| A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
70 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
315 |
| A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
32 |
| A Cooperative Approach to Queue Allocation of Indivisible Objects |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
| A Dual Egalitarian Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| A Dual Egalitarian Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
| A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
102 |
| A Many-to-Many 'Rural Hospital Theorem' |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
129 |
| A dual egalitarian solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| A game theoretic approach to assignment problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
| Academic Integrity in On-line Exams: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
59 |
| Affirmative Action through Minority Reserves: An Experimental Study on School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
157 |
| Almost Mutually Best in Matching Markets: Rank-Fairness and Size of the Core |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
45 |
| Assignment games satisfy the CoMa property |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
| Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
101 |
| Asymmetrically Fair Rules for an Indivisible Good Problem with a Budget Constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint |
0 |
0 |
0 |
59 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
211 |
| Balanced Exchange in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
20 |
| Balancedness of Permutation Games and Envy-Free Allocations in Indivisible Good Economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
| Balancedness of permutation games and envy-free allocations in indivisible good economies |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Characterizations of a Multi-Choice Value |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
| Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
| Characterizations of the Egalitarian Solution for Convex Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
| Characterizing the Typewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
| Constrained Allocation of Projects to Heterogenous Workers with Preferences over Peers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| Constrained School Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
192 |
| Constrained School Choice |
0 |
1 |
1 |
193 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
595 |
| Constrained School Choice: An Experimental QRE Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
| Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
1 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
189 |
| Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
199 |
| Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
386 |
| Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study |
1 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
76 |
| Core Stability and Strategy-Proofness in Hedonic Coalition Formation Problems with Friend-Oriented Preferences |
0 |
0 |
2 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
| Corrigendum to ''On Randomized Matching Mechanisms'' [Economic Theory 8(1996)377-381] |
0 |
0 |
0 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
350 |
| Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
331 |
| Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
108 |
| Corrigendum: Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
48 |
| Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
258 |
| Distribution Center Consolidation Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
| Distribution Center Consolidation Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
202 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
719 |
| Employment by Lotto Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
436 |
| Employment by Lotto Revisited |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
17 |
| Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
| Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Objects: An Algorithm and an Application |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
28 |
| Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
| Equilibria of Deferred Acceptance with Complete Lists |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
43 |
| Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
86 |
| Equilibria under Deferred Acceptance: Dropping Strategies, Filled Positions, and Welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
| Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
14 |
| Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
54 |
| Fair and Efficient Student Placement with Couples |
0 |
0 |
1 |
70 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
485 |
| Farsighted House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
95 |
| Farsighted House Allocation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
121 |
| Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
201 |
| Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
55 |
| Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
| Improving Schools through School Choice: An Experimental Study of Deferred Acceptance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
| Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
79 |
| Local and Global Consistency Properties for Student Placement |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
170 |
| Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
85 |
| Manipulability in Matching Markets: Conflict and Coincidence of Interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
| Manipulation of Optimal Matchings via Predonation of Endowment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
319 |
| Matching with Couples: a Multidisciplinary Survey |
1 |
1 |
3 |
145 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
359 |
| Median Stable Matching for College Admission |
0 |
0 |
0 |
225 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
862 |
| Median Stable Matching for College Admission |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
65 |
| Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
105 |
| Minimal-Access Rights in School Choice and the Deferred Acceptance Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
| Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Neighbour Games and the Leximax Solution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
| Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
37 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
| Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
101 |
| Non-Revelation Mechanisms for Many-to-Many Matching: Equilibria versus Stability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
52 |
| On Games corresponding to Sequencing Situations with Precedence Relations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
493 |
| On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
| On a New Class of Parallel Sequencing Situations and Related Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
| On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| On the Balancedness of M-Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
| On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
1 |
52 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
66 |
| On the Exhaustiveness of Truncation and Dropping Strategies in Many-to-Many Matching Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
117 |
| On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
| On the Nucleolus of Neighbour Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
125 |
| On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
| On the extreme points of the core of neighbour games and assignment games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
| Online Academic Exams: Does Multiplicity of Exam Versions Mitigate Cheating? |
0 |
0 |
6 |
14 |
1 |
1 |
12 |
21 |
| Outsourcing with Identical Suppliers and Shortest-First Policy: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
34 |
| Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
619 |
| Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
49 |
| Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
145 |
| Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
| Preference Intensities and Risk Aversion in School Choice: A Laboratory Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
245 |
| Price of Anarchy in Sequencing Situations and the Impossibility to Coordinate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
24 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
64 |
| Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
49 |
| Procedurally Fair and Stable Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
184 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
670 |
| Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
75 |
| Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
46 |
| Rank Gaps and the Size of the Core for Roommate Problems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
39 |
| School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
55 |
| School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
48 |
| School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
81 |
| Sequencing Games without Initial Order |
0 |
0 |
0 |
84 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
986 |
| Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
| Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
| Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets: Respecting Improvement, Integer Programming, and Kidney Exchange |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
38 |
| Smith and Rawls Share a Room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
154 |
| Smith and Rawls Share a Room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
43 |
| Smith and Rawls Share a Room: Stability and Medians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
141 |
| Smith and Rawls share a room |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
210 |
| Smith and Rawls share a room: stability and medians |
0 |
0 |
0 |
203 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
455 |
| Some Things Couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
56 |
| Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
253 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
983 |
| Stable Matchings and Preferences of Couples |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
56 |
| Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
110 |
| Static versus Dynamic Deferred Acceptance in School Choice: Theory and Experiment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
46 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
150 |
| Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets |
1 |
1 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
63 |
| Stochastic stability for roommate markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
133 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
289 |
| The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
| The Evolution of Roommate Networks: A Comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
| The egalitarian solution for convex games: Some characterizations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
| The evolution of roommate networks: a comment on Jackson and Watts JET (2002) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
212 |
| Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
| Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
24 |
| Total Working Papers |
5 |
7 |
50 |
4,408 |
13 |
66 |
259 |
17,008 |
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