Access Statistics for Laurent Lamy

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry? 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 67
"Upping the ante": How to design efficient auctions with entry? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 14
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
"Upping the ante": how to design efficient auctions with entry? 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 55
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 18
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis 0 0 0 45 0 1 1 167
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 20
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis 0 0 1 23 0 2 3 19
A mechanism design approach to the Tiebout hypothesis 0 0 0 39 0 3 3 57
Absolute auctions and secret reserve prices: Why are they used? 0 0 1 41 1 2 4 158
Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 52
Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: Evidence from Cross-Border Capacity Auctions 0 1 1 6 0 1 1 32
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 26
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3
Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 21
Correcting for Sample Selection From Competitive Bidding, with an Application to Estimating the Effect of Wages on Performance 0 0 0 42 3 3 3 43
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 6
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 12
Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts 0 0 4 29 0 1 7 60
Distinguishing Incentive from Selection Effects in Auction-Determined Contracts 0 0 1 4 1 1 2 11
Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions 0 1 1 16 0 1 1 68
Identification and estimation of sequential English auctions 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 9
Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 26
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling ? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 9
Markets and Allotments: Bundling or Unbundling? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Mechanism design with partially-specified participation games 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 45
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 0 2 2 3 12
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 30
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices 1 1 1 1 2 3 4 33
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 56
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 5
On discrimination in procurement auctions 0 0 0 31 0 0 0 84
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
On the Benefits of Set-Asides 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
On the Benefits of Set-Asides 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
On the Comparative Statics of the Optimal Reserve Price: A Comment on "Reserve price Signaling" 0 1 1 12 1 2 2 57
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 44
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 1 15 1 1 2 81
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 53
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 19
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 25
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 34 0 2 3 48
On the benefits of set-asides 0 0 0 23 0 1 1 15
On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9
On the benefits of set-asides (joint work with Philippe Jehiel) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 14
The 'Shill Bidding Effect' Versus the 'Linkage Principle' 0 0 1 25 1 3 11 122
The Ausubel-Milgrom Proxy Auction with Final Discounts 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 83
The Econometrics of Auctions with Asymmetric Anonymous Bidders 0 0 1 9 0 0 1 54
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
The Econometrics of Auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 7
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders 0 0 0 1 1 1 3 13
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders 0 0 0 6 0 3 5 69
Total Working Papers 1 4 14 447 25 56 99 1,978
5 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Mechanism Design Approach to the Tiebout Hypothesis 0 0 1 26 1 6 12 212
Core-selecting package auctions: a comment on revenue-monotonicity 0 0 0 25 1 1 1 102
Corrigendum to "Reserve price signaling" [J. Econ. Theory 135 (1) (2007) 253-268] 0 0 0 24 1 1 2 91
Distinguishing incentive from selection effects in auction-determined contracts 0 0 1 2 0 3 5 12
Marchés et allotissement: regroupement ou dégroupement ? 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 17
Modulation of Saturn’s radio clock by solar wind speed 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3
On Discrimination in Auctions with Endogenous Entry 0 0 0 26 0 0 2 155
On absolute auctions and secret reserve prices 0 0 0 7 2 3 5 71
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts 0 0 0 3 2 3 4 60
On the Benefits of Set-Asides 0 0 1 5 1 3 12 41
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle 0 0 1 46 2 2 3 258
The auroral footprint of Enceladus on Saturn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
The econometrics of auctions with asymmetric anonymous bidders 0 0 2 41 0 1 3 175
“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry? 0 0 0 3 2 2 4 103
Total Journal Articles 0 0 6 210 12 26 57 1,301

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03