| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Alexander J. Field (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN0-472-11224-4. x-373 pp |
0 |
0 |
4 |
35 |
4 |
4 |
15 |
130 |
| An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition |
1 |
3 |
11 |
11 |
2 |
7 |
31 |
31 |
| An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization |
2 |
3 |
16 |
106 |
30 |
44 |
122 |
576 |
| Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best |
0 |
2 |
8 |
25 |
0 |
9 |
42 |
124 |
| Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation |
0 |
0 |
2 |
27 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
98 |
| Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
70 |
| Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse |
2 |
3 |
13 |
85 |
11 |
17 |
68 |
404 |
| C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264Â +Â xxi pp., index, $35.00 |
2 |
2 |
11 |
57 |
4 |
5 |
28 |
202 |
| Chicken Soup for the Out-of-Step Scholar's Soul |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
9 |
9 |
| Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy |
0 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
| Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
104 |
| Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order |
1 |
2 |
2 |
25 |
3 |
7 |
11 |
67 |
| Costly price discrimination |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
0 |
2 |
10 |
49 |
| Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence |
0 |
1 |
1 |
26 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
85 |
| Does the market self-correct? Asymmetrical adjustment and the structure of economic error |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
1 |
6 |
14 |
171 |
| Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice |
0 |
0 |
4 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
132 |
| Efficient anarchy |
1 |
1 |
4 |
33 |
4 |
9 |
22 |
115 |
| Endogenizing fractionalization |
0 |
0 |
1 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
91 |
| Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0 |
4 |
8 |
20 |
222 |
13 |
30 |
80 |
707 |
| Good for the Goose, Bad for the Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development |
0 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
60 |
| Government intervention and the structure of social capital |
0 |
0 |
2 |
46 |
1 |
5 |
21 |
113 |
| Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis |
0 |
1 |
2 |
135 |
6 |
12 |
56 |
630 |
| Government, clubs, and constitutions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
10 |
10 |
| Hate groups and hate crime |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
12 |
20 |
20 |
| Hooligans |
1 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
4 |
8 |
16 |
16 |
| How Important is State Enforcement for Trade&quest |
0 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
32 |
| Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics |
0 |
0 |
6 |
132 |
3 |
6 |
54 |
374 |
| Is the transition to the market too important to be left to the market? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
143 |
| Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
15 |
30 |
253 |
| Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
118 |
| Ordeals |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
7 |
12 |
12 |
12 |
| Pirates |
0 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
31 |
| Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices |
0 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
2 |
9 |
20 |
38 |
| Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how productive entrepreneurial activities, such as innovation, influence unproductive entrepreneurial activities, such as regulatory rent seeking. Design/methodology/approach – To investigate the argument the authors consider Bavaria's brewing industry in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries using an analytic narrative approach. Findings – The example of Bavaria's brewing industry suggests that productive entrepreneurial activities may increase unproductive entrepreneurial activities. Confronted with a situation in which innovation erodes their monopoly returns, legally protected producers and policymakers reregulate industry to recapture lost rents. Regulation policy under such reregulation tends to be more encompassing, and thus produces more unproductive entrepreneurial activity, than pre-innovation regulation policy. This reflects the greater number or variety of producers that new regulation policy must encompass for reregulation to recreate rents. Originality/value – The paper builds on Thomas’ work, which suggests that innovation can undermine existing regulatory institutions and result in deregulation. This paper identifies an alternative channel through which productive entrepreneurial innovation may influence unproductive entrepreneurial rent seeking. It argues that productive entrepreneurial innovation by legally unprotected producers in an industry can also increase, rather than decrease, the extent of unproductive entrepreneurship in that industry |
0 |
3 |
11 |
11 |
10 |
34 |
77 |
77 |
| Quasimarket failure |
1 |
2 |
4 |
5 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
20 |
| Racial Fractionalization and School Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
41 |
| Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution |
0 |
2 |
2 |
7 |
5 |
10 |
21 |
70 |
| Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development |
2 |
5 |
38 |
543 |
10 |
27 |
185 |
1,975 |
| Robust political economy |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
70 |
| Sassywood |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
12 |
12 |
| Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective |
0 |
1 |
4 |
46 |
0 |
3 |
18 |
242 |
| Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States |
0 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
| Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
85 |
| Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
58 |
| Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange |
0 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
3 |
10 |
18 |
51 |
| The Laws of Lawlessness |
1 |
1 |
2 |
20 |
4 |
4 |
8 |
88 |
| The Many Faces of the Market |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
5 |
6 |
10 |
21 |
| The New Comparative Political Economy |
0 |
0 |
6 |
80 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
241 |
| The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
| The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
104 |
| The Unimportance of Spending: How Fractionalization Affects School Performance |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
| The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract |
1 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
6 |
7 |
18 |
57 |
| The irrelevance of normative considerations for founding an Austrian law and economics: Reply to Marciano |
2 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
10 |
11 |
11 |
| The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
43 |
| Think tanks |
2 |
4 |
8 |
8 |
3 |
8 |
23 |
23 |
| Trading with Bandits |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
6 |
8 |
20 |
85 |
| Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development |
1 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
9 |
13 |
24 |
80 |
| Was Mises right? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
128 |
| Was privateering plunder efficient? |
0 |
0 |
7 |
9 |
11 |
41 |
120 |
139 |
| Weathering Corruption |
0 |
1 |
3 |
36 |
0 |
6 |
21 |
126 |
| What Aid Can't Do: Reply to Ranis |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| What Can Aid Do? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Wisdom, Alterability, and Social Rules |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
11 |
| Total Journal Articles |
31 |
67 |
245 |
2,150 |
202 |
471 |
1,483 |
8,941 |
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