Access Statistics for Peter T. Leeson

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Billionaires 0 0 8 36 0 1 13 17
Billionaires 0 0 5 57 0 3 30 78
Comparing Apples: Normalcy, Russia, and the Remaining Post-Socialist World 0 0 1 47 1 2 13 161
Contagious Capitalism 0 0 0 101 3 8 22 318
Quasimarket failure 0 0 1 27 0 0 6 46
The Political Economy of FEMA: Did Reorganization Matter? 1 2 6 87 4 9 38 265
The Use of Knowledge in Natural Disaster Relief Management 0 0 3 83 3 6 32 447
Weathering Corruption 0 0 2 63 0 4 22 279
Total Working Papers 1 2 26 501 11 33 176 1,611


Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Alexander J. Field (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN0-472-11224-4. x-373 pp 0 0 0 35 1 3 10 136
An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition 1 3 11 21 2 5 27 56
An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization 1 6 23 127 13 31 199 745
Anarchy and Development: An Application of the Theory of Second Best 0 0 1 26 2 7 25 149
Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation 0 2 2 29 0 3 10 107
Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity 0 0 1 10 1 4 7 77
Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse 2 2 9 92 4 9 60 453
Billionaires 0 0 2 2 0 2 19 19
C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264Â +Â xxi pp., index, $35.00 2 2 11 66 4 8 44 242
Chicken Soup for the Out-of-Step Scholar's Soul 1 1 2 3 1 2 7 15
Comparative historical political economy 0 9 19 19 0 17 36 36
Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy 1 2 3 5 2 6 16 20
Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation 0 0 0 26 0 0 4 108
Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order 0 1 5 29 1 2 11 75
Costly price discrimination 0 0 1 19 0 1 6 55
Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence 1 1 3 29 1 3 9 93
Does the market self-correct? Asymmetrical adjustment and the structure of economic error 0 0 2 17 1 1 8 178
Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice 0 1 2 40 0 3 11 143
Efficient anarchy 0 1 3 35 0 2 14 125
Endogenizing fractionalization 0 0 0 32 0 2 3 94
Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0 2 4 13 231 10 18 106 800
Good for the Goose, Bad for the Gander: International Labor Standards and Comparative Development 0 0 0 7 0 0 5 64
Government intervention and the structure of social capital 1 1 2 48 1 1 6 118
Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis 0 0 1 136 1 5 24 648
Government, clubs, and constitutions 0 0 1 2 0 3 19 28
Gypsy law 0 0 2 2 0 0 12 12
Hate groups and hate crime 2 4 11 13 7 17 41 57
Hooligans 1 2 9 11 1 2 17 29
How Important is State Enforcement for Trade&quest 0 0 0 8 0 0 4 35
Human Sacrifice 0 3 3 3 7 17 17 17
Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics 0 0 8 140 1 7 30 401
Is the transition to the market too important to be left to the market? 0 0 0 26 0 1 3 146
Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation 0 0 11 11 2 2 28 276
Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement 0 0 2 28 0 1 6 124
Ordeals 0 2 8 8 0 7 27 32
Pirates 0 1 4 16 0 1 6 37
Pirational choice: The economics of infamous pirate practices 1 2 3 12 3 6 23 59
Purpose – This paper seeks to examine how productive entrepreneurial activities, such as innovation, influence unproductive entrepreneurial activities, such as regulatory rent seeking. Design/methodology/approach – To investigate the argument the authors consider Bavaria's brewing industry in the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries using an analytic narrative approach. Findings – The example of Bavaria's brewing industry suggests that productive entrepreneurial activities may increase unproductive entrepreneurial activities. Confronted with a situation in which innovation erodes their monopoly returns, legally protected producers and policymakers reregulate industry to recapture lost rents. Regulation policy under such reregulation tends to be more encompassing, and thus produces more unproductive entrepreneurial activity, than pre-innovation regulation policy. This reflects the greater number or variety of producers that new regulation policy must encompass for reregulation to recreate rents. Originality/value – The paper builds on Thomas’ work, which suggests that innovation can undermine existing regulatory institutions and result in deregulation. This paper identifies an alternative channel through which productive entrepreneurial innovation may influence unproductive entrepreneurial rent seeking. It argues that productive entrepreneurial innovation by legally unprotected producers in an industry can also increase, rather than decrease, the extent of unproductive entrepreneurship in that industry 0 0 5 16 4 18 101 168
Quasimarket failure 0 0 2 6 0 1 5 24
Racial Fractionalization and School Performance 0 0 1 5 0 1 5 46
Rational choice, Round Robin, and rebellion: An institutional solution to the problems of revolution 0 0 0 7 0 3 22 87
Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development 3 4 22 563 8 18 142 2,107
Robust political economy 0 0 1 14 0 2 10 77
Sassywood 0 0 6 6 1 4 31 38
Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective 0 0 5 51 2 2 14 256
Scott Gehlbach: Representation Through Taxation: Revenue, Politics, and Development in Postcommunist States 0 0 0 9 0 0 1 36
Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups 0 0 1 12 1 5 9 94
Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy 0 0 0 16 0 0 3 61
Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange 0 0 0 10 1 3 15 63
The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions 4 6 18 18 5 12 35 35
The Laws of Lawlessness 0 0 2 21 2 5 23 107
The Many Faces of the Market 0 0 0 5 1 3 11 27
The New Comparative Political Economy 0 0 1 81 0 0 9 249
The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries 0 0 2 2 0 3 17 17
The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 112
The Unimportance of Spending: How Fractionalization Affects School Performance 0 0 1 7 0 1 5 31
The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract 0 2 4 22 4 8 18 69
The costs of conflict 1 3 3 3 3 6 6 6
The irrelevance of normative considerations for founding an Austrian law and economics: Reply to Marciano 0 0 2 4 0 3 24 31
The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform 0 0 0 10 0 1 6 48
Think tanks 0 1 6 12 3 7 24 44
Trading with Bandits 0 3 3 25 3 7 25 104
Two-tiered entrepreneurship and economic development 0 1 5 22 2 6 30 101
Vermin Trials 0 5 5 5 3 21 30 30
Was Mises right? 0 0 1 32 0 1 10 138
Was privateering plunder efficient? 0 2 8 17 6 32 151 279
Weathering Corruption 0 1 5 41 0 3 19 145
What Aid Can't Do: Reply to Ranis 0 0 1 1 0 0 6 6
What Can Aid Do? 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 3
Wisdom, Alterability, and Social Rules 0 0 0 0 1 4 13 24
Total Journal Articles 24 78 289 2,408 116 381 1,733 10,472


Statistics updated 2014-04-04