| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Alexander J. Field (2001) Altruistically Inclined? The Behavioral Sciences, Evolutionary Theory, and the Origins of Reciprocity. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. ISBN0-472-11224-4. x-373 pp |
1 |
2 |
4 |
28 |
3 |
8 |
15 |
95 |
| An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization |
1 |
7 |
19 |
19 |
8 |
23 |
66 |
66 |
| Anarchy, Monopoly, and Predation |
2 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
3 |
6 |
22 |
51 |
| Balkanization and assimilation: Examining the effects of state-created homogeneity |
0 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
42 |
| Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse |
0 |
1 |
14 |
25 |
7 |
24 |
68 |
107 |
| C.C. Gibson, K. Andersson, E. Ostrom and S. Shivakumar, The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2005) ISBN 0-19-927884-9 264Â +Â xxi pp., index, $35.00 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
11 |
42 |
42 |
| Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation |
0 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
1 |
4 |
13 |
63 |
| Coordination without command: Stretching the scope of spontaneous order |
1 |
4 |
10 |
11 |
2 |
8 |
19 |
25 |
| Costly price discrimination |
0 |
3 |
8 |
8 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
16 |
| Democratic Constitutional Design and Public Policy: Analysis and Evidence |
1 |
4 |
8 |
20 |
1 |
5 |
17 |
66 |
| Does the market self-correct? Asymmetrical adjustment and the structure of economic error |
0 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
129 |
| Edward P. Stringham, ed., Anarchy and the Law: The Political Economy of Choice |
1 |
3 |
7 |
20 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
69 |
| Efficient anarchy |
1 |
2 |
9 |
17 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
51 |
| Endogenizing fractionalization |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
13 |
46 |
| Gary H. Stern and Ron J. Feldman, Too Big To Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC (2004) 230 + xiii pp., index, US$ 32.95, ISBN 0-8157-8152-0 |
2 |
14 |
51 |
76 |
2 |
43 |
168 |
311 |
| Government intervention and the structure of social capital |
0 |
2 |
17 |
18 |
2 |
7 |
41 |
44 |
| Government's response to Hurricane Katrina: A public choice analysis |
1 |
7 |
18 |
91 |
6 |
24 |
90 |
363 |
| How Important is State Enforcement for Trade&quest |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| Institutional Stickiness and the New Development Economics |
23 |
29 |
51 |
51 |
49 |
57 |
94 |
94 |
| Is the transition to the market too important to be left to the market? |
1 |
2 |
3 |
23 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
123 |
| Media Freedom, Political Knowledge, and Participation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
25 |
100 |
100 |
| Media as a Mechanism of Institutional Change and Reinforcement |
0 |
2 |
8 |
8 |
1 |
9 |
28 |
28 |
| Read All About It! Understanding the Role of Media in Economic Development |
9 |
30 |
97 |
247 |
28 |
97 |
284 |
725 |
| Robust political economy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
42 |
| Saving government failure theory from itself: recasting political economy from an Austrian perspective |
1 |
4 |
14 |
25 |
4 |
13 |
68 |
144 |
| Self-Enforcing Arrangements and Heterogeneous Groups |
0 |
2 |
3 |
8 |
1 |
6 |
20 |
61 |
| Self-enforcing arrangements in African political economy |
1 |
1 |
5 |
12 |
2 |
4 |
11 |
48 |
| Social Distance and Self-Enforcing Exchange |
0 |
1 |
4 |
4 |
1 |
4 |
10 |
10 |
| The New Comparative Political Economy |
0 |
5 |
9 |
56 |
9 |
17 |
31 |
154 |
| The Political, Economic, and Social Aspects of Katrina |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
32 |
32 |
| The calculus of piratical consent: the myth of the myth of social contract |
2 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| The reformers’ dilemma: media, policy ownership, and reform |
0 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
14 |
| Trading with Bandits |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
8 |
| Was Mises right? |
0 |
2 |
6 |
18 |
0 |
5 |
25 |
84 |
| Weathering Corruption |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
14 |
| Total Journal Articles |
50 |
141 |
400 |
875 |
151 |
452 |
1,419 |
3,274 |
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