| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
1 |
2 |
33 |
2 |
4 |
13 |
89 |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
5 |
| Bank Funding Risk, Reference Rates, and Credit Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
24 |
| Bank Funding during the Current Monetary Policy Tightening Cycle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
54 |
| Bank Liquidity Provision Across the Firm Size Distribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
135 |
| Bank Liquidity Provision across the Firm Size Distribution |
0 |
0 |
0 |
18 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
60 |
| Banks, Shadow Banking, and Fragility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
| Banks, shadow banking, and fragility |
0 |
0 |
1 |
168 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
427 |
| Deposit Betas: Up, Up, and Away? |
5 |
6 |
21 |
79 |
12 |
21 |
88 |
236 |
| Deposits and the March 2023 Banking Crisis—A Retrospective |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
14 |
| Did QE Lead Banks to Relax Their Lending Standards? Evidence from the Federal Reserve's LSAPs |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
183 |
| Digitizing Historical Balance Sheet Data: A Practitioner's Guide |
0 |
1 |
1 |
42 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
22 |
| Employment Effects of Unconventional Monetary Policy: Evidence from QE |
0 |
0 |
1 |
66 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
236 |
| Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
7 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
19 |
| Failing Banks |
11 |
11 |
11 |
11 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
3 |
| Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
17 |
17 |
1 |
7 |
25 |
25 |
| Fight the Pandemic, Save the Economy: Lessons from the 1918 Flu |
0 |
0 |
3 |
798 |
1 |
4 |
26 |
2,362 |
| How (Un-)Informed Are Depositors in a Banking Panic? A Lesson from History |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
43 |
| How Do Interest Rates (and Depositors) Impact Measures of Bank Value? |
1 |
1 |
7 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
19 |
63 |
| How the LIBOR Transition Affects the Supply of Revolving Credit |
1 |
3 |
6 |
41 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
84 |
| Implications of the COVID-19 Disruption for Corporate Leverage |
0 |
0 |
2 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
95 |
| Inflating Away the Debt: The Debt-Inflation Channel of German Hyperinflation |
0 |
1 |
3 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
24 |
| Insights from Newly Digitized Banking Data, 1867-1904 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
15 |
| Micro-evidence from a System-wide Financial Meltdown: The German Crisis of 1931 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
34 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
38 |
| Outside Liquidity, Rollover Risk, and Government Bonds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
56 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Pandemics Depress the Economy, Public Health Interventions Do Not: Evidence from the 1918 Flu |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
34 |
| Sovereign Defaults, Bank Runs, and Contagion |
0 |
1 |
1 |
73 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
134 |
| Ten years later – Did QE work? |
1 |
2 |
5 |
34 |
1 |
2 |
11 |
73 |
| The Banking Industry and COVID-19: Lifeline or Life Support? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
110 |
| The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German (Hyper-)Inflation |
2 |
3 |
5 |
12 |
3 |
6 |
16 |
29 |
| The Debt-Inflation Channel of the German Hyperinflation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
41 |
| Weathering the Storm: Who Can Access Credit in a Pandemic? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
74 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
29 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
40 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
63 |
| Who Can Tell Which Banks Will Fail? |
0 |
0 |
4 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
35 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? Bank Runs Versus Solvency |
0 |
1 |
27 |
27 |
1 |
7 |
23 |
23 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? The Predictability of Bank Failures |
0 |
0 |
14 |
14 |
1 |
4 |
30 |
30 |
| Why Do Banks Fail? Three Facts About Failing Banks |
0 |
0 |
13 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
6 |
| test anna templatetype feb 14 Once Upon a Time in the Banking Sector: Historical Insights into Banking Competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
| Total Working Papers |
21 |
31 |
163 |
2,234 |
38 |
87 |
411 |
5,189 |
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