Access Statistics for Jordi Masso

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Maximal Domain of Preferences for Tops-only Rules in the Division Problem 0 0 1 46 14 23 88 507
AN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE THE SET OF MANY-TO-MANY STABLE MATCHINGS 1 3 9 63 2 4 16 163
Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem 0 0 3 66 8 13 49 526
Efficient and Stable Collective Choices under Gregarious Preferences 0 1 3 21 3 9 21 66
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games 0 0 0 0 1 2 12 97
MAXIMAL DOMAIN OF PREFERENCES IN THE DIVISION PROBLEM 0 0 1 40 1 3 13 190
MEMORY STARTEGIES IN NONATOMIC REPEATED GAMES 0 0 0 0 0 1 10 164
Matching Markets under (In)complete Information 3 4 17 44 4 6 30 64
On Exiting after Voting 0 1 2 43 2 6 12 143
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 0 5 14 105 0 11 48 396
Stability of Matchings when Individuals Have Preferences Over Colleagues 0 0 0 0 2 8 23 350
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 0 1 14 254
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 954
THE CHI-COMPROMISE VALUE FOR NON-TRANSFERABLE UTILITY GAMES 2 5 7 36 3 7 14 113
Voting Under Constraints 0 0 0 0 0 1 8 101
Voting by Committees Under Constraints 1 1 3 52 1 1 15 174
Voting by Committees under Constraints 0 1 3 68 0 1 13 349
Voting by Committees with Exit 0 0 0 44 0 0 1 275
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model 0 2 12 78 0 3 32 569
Weighted Approval Voting 2 3 12 69 5 9 36 212
Weighted Approval Voting 1 2 5 37 3 6 13 67
Total Working Papers 10 28 92 812 50 116 479 5,734

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox 1 1 5 51 2 2 15 162
A maximal domain of preferences for strategy-proof, efficient, and simple rules in the division problem 0 0 2 12 1 2 5 59
An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings 3 4 13 33 5 7 26 102
An undominated Nash equilibrium for voting by committees with exit 0 0 6 13 0 1 16 33
Bribe-proof rules in the division problem 0 0 4 7 0 1 13 32
Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences 0 0 1 1 2 3 8 8
Equilibrium Payoffs of Dynamic Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 118
Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets 1 2 10 29 1 2 14 47
Maximal Domain of Preferences in the Division Problem 0 0 0 8 0 0 2 48
Maximal domains of preferences preserving strategy-proofness for generalized median voter schemes 0 0 0 28 1 1 4 223
More on the "anti-folk theorem" 2 2 5 8 4 8 20 41
On Exiting After Voting 0 0 1 7 1 2 7 54
On group strategy-proof mechanisms for a many-to-one matching model 1 2 7 18 3 7 20 115
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles 0 0 3 6 0 0 7 14
On two basic properties of equilibria of voting with exit 0 0 1 2 0 0 6 12
Single Agents and the Set of Many-to-One Stable Matchings 1 4 15 37 2 8 34 117
Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) 1 1 2 2 1 3 8 10
Stability and voting by committees with exit 0 0 1 5 2 3 6 40
Stability of Matchings When Individuals Have Preferences over Colleagues 1 4 12 36 1 4 16 78
Strategy-Proof Voting on Compact Ranges 0 0 2 18 1 2 9 52
Undiscounted equilibrium payoffs of repeated games with a continuum of players 0 0 0 7 0 0 3 37
Voting by committees under constraints 0 0 1 13 0 0 4 65
Voting under Constraints 0 0 2 20 0 1 7 67
Weak stability and a bargaining set for the marriage model 0 1 5 14 0 1 9 72
Weighted approval voting 1 1 8 16 6 7 31 54
Total Journal Articles 12 22 106 391 33 65 298 1,660

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04