Access Statistics for Eric S. Maskin

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, 1: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs 0 0 3 52 1 3 24 92
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs 0 0 0 0 3 9 33 570
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 515
A Walrasian Theory of Money 0 0 0 1 2 6 22 1,012
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract 0 0 0 0 3 5 20 72
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 164
Auction Theory with Private Values* 2 3 10 301 4 6 24 469
Auctions and Efficiency 0 5 22 245 3 14 58 425
Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs 1 2 4 162 1 2 24 416
Autobiography 0 3 12 76 2 5 22 125
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 0 1 2 166 4 6 14 464
Centralized credit and long-term investment 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 24
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information 0 0 0 0 3 3 19 42
Contractual contingencies and renegotiation 0 0 0 0 2 3 9 35
Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots: A Note 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 126
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies 0 0 0 0 10 14 34 114
Credit and efficiency in centralized and decentralized economies 0 0 0 0 13 20 58 125
Efficient Auctions 0 0 0 2 2 5 22 971
Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information' 0 1 8 70 1 3 23 109
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 4 14 62 1 6 26 92
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games (based on work with D. Fudenberg) 0 1 12 289 0 4 35 364
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions 1 1 5 236 1 2 13 344
Implementation Theory 2 12 47 432 19 89 241 957
Implementation Theory 2 3 4 58 6 9 25 150
Implementation and Renegotiation 0 0 0 2 7 11 31 705
Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.) 0 0 0 137 0 0 13 429
Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 0 1 18 469
Incentives 0 0 1 15 3 3 10 39
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 1 3 7 495 5 12 39 1,439
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 0 0 0 17 1 2 37 960
Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form 0 0 0 0 2 2 14 149
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form 2 2 6 170 2 3 18 388
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form - (Now published in Economics of Transition (2201)) 0 0 0 0 2 3 15 1,285
Income v. Leisure 0 0 2 134 2 7 22 327
Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes* 3 8 19 210 8 18 64 439
Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson 1 2 14 235 2 7 50 401
Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back 0 3 16 254 1 16 54 608
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions 0 0 0 5 8 13 63 2,059
Mechanism Design for the Environment 2 8 23 299 11 23 76 570
Mechanism Design for the Environment 0 0 5 17 2 2 22 43
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 0 4 12 290 4 36 64 473
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 3 10 53 909 10 26 130 1,462
Multi-unit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling 0 2 7 247 2 4 22 396
Nash Equilibrium and Mechanism Design 1 8 23 383 4 15 49 411
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality 0 0 0 1 6 10 60 2,499
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 2 2 15 159
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 1 2 2 22 260
On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts 0 1 8 131 3 9 44 343
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 2 3 20 284
On the Efficiency of Keynesian Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 1 2 34 379
On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium 5 7 27 412 6 10 55 606
On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules 1 2 8 129 3 5 32 366
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers 0 0 0 0 4 7 35 381
Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 139
Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits 3 4 22 281 9 20 78 745
Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits 0 0 4 10 0 0 11 34
Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits 0 2 15 415 3 7 52 777
Rational Expectations With Market Power: The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 168
Rational Expectations with Market Power - The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff on Oil 0 0 0 0 1 4 32 69
Renegotiation in Repeated Games 0 0 0 5 7 20 51 741
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 3 7 41 278
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 0 7 315 3 5 39 553
Roy Radner and Incentive Theory 0 2 21 296 13 45 192 1,567
Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality 0 0 0 0 1 2 20 790
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 4 13 45 614 13 35 263 1,500
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation 4 6 17 543 5 9 47 831
Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market 1 1 9 343 10 34 78 1,096
Soft budget constraints and transition 0 0 0 0 1 1 7 30
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 6 7 38 354
The Arrow Impossibility Theorem: Where Do We Go From Here? 1 3 24 228 5 14 68 313
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.1-26.) 0 0 0 0 1 2 11 140
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.1-26.) 0 0 0 0 0 1 16 113
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2: Applications (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.27-41.) 0 0 0 0 1 5 15 119
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 268
The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information 0 1 3 7 1 4 21 29
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 3 8 221 6 11 30 712
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 2 6 241 9 13 41 805
The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions 0 0 1 51 0 1 8 130
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 1 4 14 402 3 8 48 878
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 6 19 75 460 28 59 185 1,202
The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey 0 0 0 0 1 5 25 691
The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass 1 2 11 299 2 10 41 594
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting 2 3 15 235 9 14 63 617
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 5 25 93 606 28 130 356 1,244
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 38 1 4 18 314
Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts 0 0 0 1 2 5 16 1,256
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions 3 5 16 220 4 9 47 408
Voting Schemes for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 120
Wage Inequality and Segregation 0 0 0 1 1 4 18 935
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill 2 6 20 690 10 20 91 2,074
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill 0 0 0 0 9 14 43 1,457
Total Working Papers 62 197 800 13,167 382 999 4,064 50,197

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods 0 0 0 20 0 3 18 99
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 0 9 120 0 2 27 343
A Theorem on Utilitarianism 0 0 5 196 1 2 34 561
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs 0 3 12 630 6 16 54 1,401
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles 1 6 16 767 10 24 97 3,492
A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter 2 6 17 212 2 13 59 872
A celebration of Robert Aumann's achievements on the occasion of his 80th birthday 0 0 3 20 0 2 15 57
A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures 0 0 0 19 0 1 18 74
A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III: Cournot competition 0 0 10 368 1 7 35 608
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States 0 0 5 168 1 4 20 673
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria 2 2 9 103 2 4 39 368
An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract II. A non-steady state example 0 1 6 97 0 3 39 234
Asymmetric Auctions 0 0 0 0 6 14 65 735
Auction Theory with Private Values 2 4 14 360 4 9 35 687
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers 0 0 12 135 1 3 39 288
Bargaining and Destructive Power 1 2 6 29 3 4 47 125
Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments 0 0 0 44 0 1 34 182
Commentary: Nash equilibrium and mechanism design 1 7 16 48 5 14 53 108
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information 2 6 14 242 4 13 59 457
Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation 0 0 4 72 2 4 24 282
Correlated equilibria and sunspots 0 0 3 53 0 1 28 140
Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4) 1 1 3 53 2 2 23 139
Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies 9 23 64 1,412 30 85 277 3,917
Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency 0 0 0 22 2 9 32 572
Efficient Auctions 0 1 11 420 2 7 96 922
Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games 1 1 2 42 2 3 20 109
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions 0 0 0 2 2 5 26 450
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 2 5 9 199 5 14 48 588
Implementation and Renegotiation 2 5 24 289 8 15 58 521
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 0 0 0 0 9 21 63 473
Input versus output incentive schemes 2 3 11 104 8 13 44 273
Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back 0 0 4 108 0 0 23 299
Long-term investment by Japanese and American firms 0 0 1 22 0 0 14 90
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions 7 14 48 959 17 41 131 1,672
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 1 4 21 245 1 11 55 511
Monopoly with Incomplete Information 2 3 12 863 4 10 52 2,089
Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality: Behavior and regulation 3 4 6 98 4 10 39 250
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality 2 6 40 954 19 54 223 2,523
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments 0 1 5 78 0 4 37 432
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 0 5 87 0 3 20 181
On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control 0 2 13 245 0 4 28 692
On The Robustness of Majority Rule 1 1 4 72 2 7 35 182
On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts 1 2 10 104 3 6 38 283
On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information about Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 0 31 146
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 2 3 7 143 5 8 29 263
On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium 0 0 6 37 1 3 35 141
On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium 1 2 18 115 4 7 40 214
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers 6 9 32 551 8 20 86 1,029
Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction 0 0 3 120 0 1 35 309
Public-private partnerships and government spending limits 0 1 13 132 1 7 46 356
Rational expectations with imperfect competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example 0 1 2 43 0 3 23 141
Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint 0 1 6 184 1 4 23 627
Renegotiation in repeated games 2 9 35 570 4 19 90 933
Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply 0 1 8 90 0 4 45 243
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 0 1 3 146 9 13 29 328
Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation 6 15 57 238 14 35 135 515
Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market 0 0 3 88 2 3 26 285
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market 0 1 13 578 10 17 71 1,832
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory 1 5 23 578 2 14 80 1,110
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications 2 3 10 188 6 9 41 432
The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms 0 0 6 113 0 2 32 459
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 4 9 29 1,036 16 27 111 2,241
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 0 2 15 371 10 14 81 914
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 2 4 31 454 7 15 81 797
The Invisible Hand and Externalities 1 1 6 169 3 8 34 458
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 3 12 40 498 5 22 91 1,104
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values 2 7 31 452 6 22 89 1,130
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values 2 5 17 436 11 24 68 1,363
The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios 0 1 2 192 0 2 27 486
The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass 0 1 4 130 0 5 28 305
The value of victory: social origins of the winner's curse in common value auctions 0 1 2 35 0 7 25 111
Theories of the soft budget-constraint 1 3 7 96 2 7 34 237
Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature 1 1 3 187 4 5 42 538
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting 1 2 9 253 3 9 56 662
Uncertainty and entry deterrence 0 0 2 152 0 0 22 633
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 0 0 0 0 1 6 81 606
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 2 8 9 12 12 56 350 4,082
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 0 0 0 0 5 32 86 466
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks 0 0 0 31 1 5 32 155
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts 2 3 15 447 9 16 75 994
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions 3 6 16 158 5 9 49 312
WHY HAS INEQUALITY INCREASED IN CHINA? TOWARD A THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL MATCHING 0 0 5 47 0 2 30 136
Total Journal Articles 89 231 942 19,151 335 930 4,610 56,047

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Implementation theory 1 7 24 462 6 20 136 1,752
Mechanism design for the environment 2 5 17 429 8 12 62 1,143
Total Chapters 3 12 41 891 14 32 198 2,895

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Statistics updated 2013-05-03