Access Statistics for Eric S. Maskin

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large-Fixed Costs 0 0 0 0 3 19 83 330
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition 0 0 0 0 2 11 53 300
A Walrasian Theory of Money 0 0 1 1 4 7 44 877
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I 0 0 0 0 2 4 17 107
Auction Theory with Private Values* 1 10 42 197 4 17 65 280
Auctions and Efficiency 1 14 70 100 7 24 101 148
Auctions with Asymmetric Beliefs 1 7 27 93 4 11 51 302
Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information 2 7 30 123 4 11 46 356
Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots: A Note 0 0 0 0 0 2 18 87
Efficient Auctions 0 0 2 2 3 14 66 808
Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games (based on work with D. Fudenberg) 4 27 127 127 4 40 72 72
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions 2 11 36 151 4 14 51 223
Implementation Theory 7 22 129 176 13 40 204 293
Implementation and Renegotiation 0 0 2 2 2 19 65 568
Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.) 2 9 45 92 6 19 69 326
Implementation and Strong Nash Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 4 19 81 227
Incentives 0 8 35 183 1 14 57 834
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 2 10 57 369 6 27 109 1,123
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 0 0 1 17 1 9 44 809
Incentives, Scale Economies and Organizational Form 0 0 0 0 0 5 15 79
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form 1 9 34 125 6 23 59 292
Incentives, Scale Economies, and Organizational Form - (Now published in Economics of Transition (2201)) 0 0 0 0 2 5 23 1,214
Income v. Leisure 1 5 24 86 3 12 48 155
Input Versus Output Incentive Schemes* 1 7 30 91 5 15 61 161
Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back 1 6 71 95 13 29 152 205
Markov Perfect Equilibrium, I: Observable Actions 0 0 5 5 11 29 125 1,651
Mechanism Design for the Environment 2 23 131 147 4 38 207 240
Mechanism Design for the Environment 1 21 128 270 4 50 220 483
Mechanism Design: How to Implement Social Goals 26 88 179 179 38 123 160 160
Multi-unit Auctions, Price Discrimination and Bundling 0 11 31 157 7 21 53 226
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality 0 0 1 1 5 32 166 2,114
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains 0 0 0 0 1 6 28 75
Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 1 1 1 5 25 171
On Indescribable Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts 0 8 41 58 5 19 83 132
On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games 0 0 0 0 3 11 40 137
On the Efficiency of Keynesian Equilibrium 0 0 0 0 4 18 65 259
On the Fundamental Theorems of General Equilibrium 4 21 157 228 8 27 211 312
On the Rationale for Penalty Default Rules 3 7 49 67 7 19 91 131
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers 0 0 0 0 2 10 43 189
Optimal Bayesian Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 1 21 80
Public-Private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits 8 27 71 92 18 57 164 197
Public-private Partnerships and Government Spending Limits 6 23 127 246 12 43 239 440
Rational Expectations With Market Power: The Paradox of the Disadvantageous Tariff 0 0 0 0 1 6 19 114
Renegotiation in Repeated Games 0 0 5 5 20 53 140 398
Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players 0 0 0 0 5 14 46 111
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 1 11 44 146 6 22 72 240
Roy Radner and Incentive Theory 5 18 86 115 27 84 268 378
Segregation by Skill and the Rise in Inequality 0 0 0 0 10 24 79 572
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation 17 48 150 233 35 85 285 421
Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Innovation 4 24 162 300 7 35 231 418
Soft Budget Constraint Theories: From Centralization to the Market 1 11 40 272 7 28 124 742
THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION 0 0 0 0 15 25 52 233
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.1-26.) 0 0 0 0 1 4 22 73
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 1: Theory (Revised version now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.1-26.) 0 0 0 0 1 3 15 64
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, 2: Applications (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, LIII (1986), pp.27-41.) 0 0 0 0 2 3 17 61
The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 4 13 48 130
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 9 35 175 6 18 64 577
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 1 3 25 198 3 8 54 663
The Gains to Making Losers Pay in High Bid Auctions 0 4 13 33 2 6 22 75
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 3 10 59 279 7 17 110 556
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 6 18 72 111 22 63 228 328
The Theory of Implementation in Nash Equilibrium: A Survey 0 0 0 0 8 36 113 375
The Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass 4 22 93 132 10 45 155 216
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting 2 14 87 106 8 26 173 245
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 7 34 126 185 10 47 182 293
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks 0 1 5 21 3 10 26 178
Unforseen Contingencies, Property Rights, and Incomplete Contracts 0 0 1 1 3 14 57 1,128
Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High-Bid Auctions 2 11 57 77 6 22 92 137
Voting Schemes for Public Alternatives: Some Notes on Majority Rule 0 0 0 0 0 2 12 65
Wage Inequality and Segregation 0 0 1 1 2 15 58 799
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill 11 23 70 546 19 49 144 1,730
Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill 0 0 0 0 14 50 164 1,173
Total Working Papers 141 642 2,815 6,417 497 1,746 6,667 29,666

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterization of Strongly Locally Incentive Compatible Planning Procedures with Public Goods 0 0 5 10 1 3 20 46
A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms 0 2 13 56 0 7 35 183
A Theorem on Utilitarianism 1 6 25 98 5 14 52 276
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, I: Overview and Quantity Competition with Large Fixed Costs 2 15 65 336 4 30 134 741
A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles 4 14 69 507 21 65 289 2,720
A Walrasian Theory of Money and Barter 2 6 13 122 7 17 52 586
A progress report on Kelly's majority conjectures 0 0 5 10 0 0 12 22
A theory of dynamic oligopoly, III: Cournot competition 7 19 69 112 12 36 111 172
An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States 1 4 28 80 4 10 56 374
An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria 1 3 26 73 5 18 102 226
An equilibrium analysis of search and breach of contract II. A non-steady state example 2 4 18 26 4 7 37 49
Asymmetric Auctions 0 0 0 0 6 24 69 311
Auction Theory with Private Values 2 7 32 192 4 18 74 356
Auctions, development, and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity-constrained buyers 3 5 16 50 4 9 28 107
Bargaining, Production, and Monotonicity in Economic Environments 0 0 7 22 0 1 23 77
Contract renegotiation in models of asymmetric information 3 6 33 118 5 10 49 164
Contractual Contingencies and Renegotiation 0 2 7 28 5 12 26 130
Correlated equilibria and sunspots 0 1 8 11 1 2 13 24
Corrigendum to 'A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, III, Cournot Competition' (vol. 31, no. 4) 1 2 18 21 1 2 29 38
Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies 9 33 121 801 12 53 221 2,237
Disadvantageous Oil Tariffs and Dynamic Consistency 0 0 0 22 12 38 78 390
Efficient Auctions 5 10 51 296 8 20 93 540
Efficient renegotiation--proof equilibria in repeated games 1 2 11 13 1 4 23 30
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions 0 0 2 2 7 13 42 286
Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games 0 2 30 114 0 10 60 354
Implementation and Renegotiation 3 10 32 112 4 18 61 213
Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form 0 0 0 0 3 12 64 207
Input versus output incentive schemes 1 3 12 21 2 5 30 56
Jean-Jacques Laffont: A Look Back 0 5 21 64 1 10 45 147
Long-term investment by Japanese and American firms 0 0 3 7 0 0 10 32
Markov Perfect Equilibrium: I. Observable Actions 9 30 149 581 15 54 250 915
Monopoly with Incomplete Information 2 9 57 428 5 22 109 1,302
Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality: Behavior and regulation 0 3 22 41 7 14 40 74
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality 12 48 215 392 34 131 499 913
Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments 0 5 20 26 1 24 73 106
Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games 0 1 20 48 1 6 33 77
On Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control 2 7 21 95 6 20 64 328
On indescribable contingencies and incomplete contracts 1 2 24 54 5 10 62 138
On the Difficulty of Attaining Distributional Goals with Imperfect Information about Consumers 0 0 0 0 0 1 19 65
On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games 2 8 25 60 3 12 42 99
On the efficiency of fixed price equilibrium 0 0 4 7 0 2 13 19
On the fundamental theorems of general equilibrium 3 10 22 22 8 20 37 37
Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers 1 10 50 291 1 15 80 552
Optimal reservation price in the Vickery auction 5 14 35 61 10 28 76 126
Rational expectations with imperfect competition: A Bertrand-Edgeworth Example 0 4 14 19 1 8 32 49
Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint 0 2 22 124 2 15 62 399
Renegotiation in repeated games 10 27 122 202 18 43 179 299
Renegotiation-proof equilibrium: Reply 2 4 17 25 3 6 31 49
Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players 1 4 15 69 2 11 35 126
Soft budget constraint theories: From centralization to the market 1 7 26 33 3 15 72 90
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market 1 16 55 401 14 67 236 1,167
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory 0 11 55 235 4 27 117 525
The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, II: Applications 2 4 14 60 5 15 47 150
The Existence of Equilibrium with Price-Setting Firms 2 4 17 52 6 18 80 169
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 6 38 154 400 52 134 389 944
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information 2 8 38 176 5 16 83 487
The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility 4 15 85 188 9 25 134 341
The Invisible Hand and Externalities 0 2 24 112 1 10 52 251
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government 2 12 49 187 6 27 136 472
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values 4 16 54 206 7 27 98 581
The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values 0 13 37 271 4 26 90 904
The Simple Economics of Research Portfolios 1 7 25 99 2 9 41 237
The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass 0 3 13 97 2 6 33 195
Theories of the soft budget-constraint 1 7 13 55 1 8 17 97
Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature 1 7 25 112 4 18 60 293
Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting 1 6 73 136 6 21 151 299
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 0 0 0 0 1 16 70 290
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 0 0 3 3 37 186 600 1,800
Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint 0 0 0 0 3 14 52 169
Unemployment with Observable Aggregate Shocks 0 2 6 14 1 4 16 54
Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts 7 17 59 241 10 30 110 511
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions 3 7 25 76 6 15 46 137
research articles: Uncertainty and entry deterrence 1 3 18 126 3 10 51 522
Total Journal Articles 137 554 2,462 9,149 453 1,654 6,455 27,452

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Implementation theory 10 28 101 214 19 66 287 579
Mechanism design for the environment 4 24 132 195 14 76 322 473
Total Chapters 14 52 233 409 33 142 609 1,052

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Statistics updated 2008-07-03