Access Statistics for Ines Macho-Stadler

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing with Signals 0 0 5 203 0 3 14 350
Auditing with Signals 0 0 0 0 1 4 18 198
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazad Environment 0 0 0 0 4 6 18 315
Commercial Incentives in Academia 1 5 33 44 1 14 54 55
Comparing Organizational Structures in Health Services 0 0 0 0 4 16 64 2,193
Competition for Managers and Market Efficiency 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 406
Competition from Managers Mroduct Market Efficiency 0 0 0 0 5 12 24 707
Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities 0 1 33 33 2 12 49 49
Double risque moral et délégation 0 0 0 0 1 5 34 419
ENDOGENOUS FORMATION OF PARTNERSHIPS WITH MORAL HAZARD 0 0 2 100 3 5 17 311
Efficient Bidding with Externalities 0 3 9 95 3 11 25 237
Endogenous Formation of Competing Partnership with Moral Hazard 1 2 4 61 4 5 17 205
Endogenous Formation of Partnership with Moral Hazard 1 1 8 132 2 3 30 436
Environmental Regulation: Choice of Instruments under Imperfect Compliance 6 14 37 128 11 36 89 322
Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development 2 8 17 38 6 23 55 141
Financial Incentives in Academia: Research versus Development 5 7 21 88 14 38 128 398
Incentives in University Technology Transfers 6 64 64 64 6 19 19 19
Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation 1 1 6 173 4 5 34 376
Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation 1 3 5 64 1 3 20 270
Mergers, Investment Decisions and Internal Organisation 2 4 18 314 13 28 131 1,107
Moral Hazard with Several Agents: The Gains From Cooperation 0 0 0 0 9 13 50 519
Optimal Auditing when Some Individuals are Tax-return Exempt 0 0 0 0 0 4 8 429
Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income Sources 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 111
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms' Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes 3 6 20 131 8 22 69 519
Optimal Enforcement Policy and Firms’ Emissions and Compliance with Environmental Taxes 1 2 4 38 1 2 17 173
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random 0 1 4 20 5 11 40 62
Optimal Monitoring to Implement Clean Technologies when Pollution is Random 0 1 6 19 0 1 14 52
Optimal monitoring to implement clean technologies when pollution is random 1 3 13 55 3 15 47 194
POLÍTICAS DE INSPECCIÓN ÓPTIMAS Y CUMPLIMIENTO FISCAL 0 0 1 5 1 2 11 31
Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Acces to Credit Markets 0 0 0 2 3 20 57 675
Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment, and the Access to Credit Markets 0 0 0 0 4 18 58 336
Réflexions sur trois dimensions du problème de risque moral 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 71
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements 0 0 1 166 1 3 7 438
Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting 1 3 6 73 2 9 28 168
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution 1 2 5 160 3 19 60 953
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution 1 3 3 28 3 10 23 188
Sharing the surplus: A just and efficient proposal for environments with externalities 1 2 12 102 2 9 43 301
Strategic Managerial Incentives and Cross Ownership Structure: A Note 0 0 0 0 2 9 28 144
The Role of Information in Licensing Contract Design 0 0 0 0 6 13 80 589
WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM THE GRADUAL FORMATION OF TRADING BLOCS 1 3 13 47 2 7 25 112
Total Working Papers 36 139 350 2,383 140 437 1,520 14,579

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auditing with Signals 0 5 10 61 1 12 29 238
Centralized and Decentralized Contracts in a Moral Hazard Environment 3 4 13 64 3 7 27 238
Comparing organizational structures in health services 1 2 9 78 1 5 23 195
Competition for Managers and Product Market Efficiency 0 0 0 19 0 1 5 242
Contratos de pesca desde la perspectiva de la teoría de la agencia 1 4 18 25 1 8 42 80
Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information 1 2 3 3 5 9 11 11
Contrats de travail répétés: le rôle de la mémoire 0 0 1 1 0 2 5 5
Designing Contracts for University Spin-offs 2 8 15 26 6 17 38 78
Efficient bidding with externalities 0 0 2 8 0 1 5 38
Endogenous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard 0 1 6 27 0 4 12 85
Endogenous mergers and endogenous efficiency gains: The efficiency defence revisited 2 5 9 28 3 8 21 56
Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance 1 4 11 21 2 8 23 51
Licensing of university inventions: The role of a technology transfer office 2 5 15 53 4 8 30 126
Moral hazard and cooperation 0 1 6 30 2 4 10 75
Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation 6 10 39 119 8 13 69 208
Optimal Auditing with Heterogeneous Income 0 0 0 0 1 6 26 200
Optimal enforcement policy and firms' emissions and compliance with environmental taxes 1 2 4 43 3 6 20 117
Optimal inspection policy and income-tax compliance 3 5 18 36 5 16 58 125
Optimal tax auditing when some individuals need not file 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 6
Repeated moral hazard: The role of memory, commitment, and the access to credit markets 4 14 45 288 6 19 70 468
Sequential Formation of Coalitions Through Bilateral Agreements in a Cournot Setting 0 0 4 12 0 2 9 47
Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution 0 0 0 12 1 1 8 138
Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities 1 4 9 13 1 6 18 35
Stable Multilateral Trade Agreements 0 1 3 11 1 2 6 88
Strategic entry deterrence through spatial price discrimination 0 1 7 45 3 6 21 186
Strategic managerial incentives and cross ownership structure: A note 2 3 9 9 2 3 12 12
Tax Amnesties in a Dynamic Model of Tax Evasion 4 4 11 81 4 5 25 235
The role of information in licensing contract design 2 6 23 124 3 8 38 380
Winners and Losers from the Gradual Formation of Trading Blocs 0 0 3 8 0 3 19 46
Total Journal Articles 36 91 294 1,246 67 191 686 3,809

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Statistics updated 2009-12-07