Access Statistics for George J. Mailath

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 18 35 62 223
A positive analysis of bank closure 0 0 0 0 3 12 48 376
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 3 13 28 116 17 47 158 492
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms 0 1 5 30 1 5 27 135
Class Systems and the Enforcement of Social Norms' 0 0 3 70 0 1 14 415
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 2 21 87 4 22 88 556
Common Learning 1 4 20 21 3 15 51 77
Common Learning 3 7 12 16 5 16 30 35
Common Learning 0 1 12 13 2 9 33 37
Common Learning 0 0 2 12 1 3 10 41
Contemporaneous Perfect Epsilon-Equilibria 0 4 12 39 3 13 40 126
Contemporaneous perfect Epsilon-equilibria 0 0 3 25 0 2 16 131
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 1 23 1 2 12 75
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 4 21 2 5 18 96
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 2 30 2 4 13 92
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 3 31 3 15 36 164
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 1 5 34 3 6 34 206
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 2 5 31 0 5 22 90
Coordination Failure in Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 1 4 49 0 3 14 141
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 1 2 10 144 2 4 22 524
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 1 1 4 16 1 2 10 69
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions 0 2 7 44 1 6 13 164
Correlated Equilibria and Local Interactions' 1 2 7 53 2 5 18 178
Correlated equilibria as network equilibria 0 0 0 0 0 1 15 389
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 1 2 25 0 8 13 82
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 2 4 8 23 4 13 28 113
Disappearing Private Reputations in Long-Run Relationships 0 0 2 16 0 3 10 43
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 1 1 10 0 4 13 44
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons From Evolutionary Game Theory' 0 0 0 0 3 15 55 628
Does Competitive Pricing Cause Market Breakdown under Extreme Adverse Selection? 2 2 36 36 9 16 111 111
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 4 14 53 192
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL FORM GAMES 0 0 0 0 1 1 15 162
EXTENSIVE FORM REASONING IN NORMAL GAMES 0 0 0 0 15 53 81 427
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments 1 2 3 11 4 7 11 56
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 1 1 3 6 18 187
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 0 0 4 19 1 5 19 92
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 2 3 4 33 5 11 25 185
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 1 1 2 40 2 4 10 289
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in a Finite Economy 1 1 2 8 1 3 12 58
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments' 0 0 0 0 2 5 13 126
Efficient non-contractible investments 1 4 12 50 4 23 54 472
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search 0 0 4 28 1 2 13 74
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-sided Search' 0 1 3 45 0 2 5 131
Endogenous Interactions 1 2 9 90 2 3 27 302
Endogenous inequality in integrated markets with two-sided research 0 0 1 58 0 2 16 616
Evolution and Endogenous Interactions 0 3 17 242 2 7 32 843
Evolution and Endogenous Interations 0 0 0 0 2 8 20 134
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 1 8 29 66 19 63 175 307
Extreme Adverse Selection, Competitive Pricing, and Market Breakdown 0 1 6 24 2 9 38 81
FINANCING LOSERS IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 294
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 1 1 11 403
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 0 0 0 1 12 156
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring 2 2 2 2 4 10 10 10
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring 4 10 10 10 3 6 6 6
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 302
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 0 0 0 1 4 9 241
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium 0 3 8 158 3 11 32 1,054
How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium? 0 1 2 2 0 1 6 64
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 0 3 48 1 7 22 150
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 1 3 9 29 2 13 27 83
Imperfect monitoring and impermanent reputations 0 0 2 64 0 6 18 181
Incorporating Concern for Relative Wealth into Economic Models' 0 0 1 1 3 12 57 257
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 101
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 2 17 0 3 10 69
Investment and Concern for Relative Position 0 0 6 41 2 4 16 198
Is there Always a 'Right' Extensive Form? 0 0 2 3 0 1 3 146
Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games 0 0 1 1 7 16 72 499
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 2 4 13 53 2 6 16 91
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 2 2 16 139 4 6 28 375
Market Selection and Asymmetrick Information 0 0 0 0 3 4 11 245
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 1 3 28 33 10 37 136 512
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 2 11 129
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 0 1 5 8 1 6 16 28
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma 0 0 2 22 4 12 57 123
Purification in the Infinitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 2 4 7 48 6 11 30 209
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 6 33 2 7 35 266
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 4 35 2 7 35 282
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 2 3 13 29 9 24 77 153
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma 0 0 8 33 3 8 35 204
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 4 16 16 3 11 55 55
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Second Version 0 0 0 0 0 6 18 18
Repeated Games With Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 0 0 0 4 10 28 573
Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring 0 0 0 30 0 2 8 163
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 3 54 1 4 20 231
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 3 28 0 2 15 134
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 1 1 6 48 2 6 24 212
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 1 4 0 1 7 58
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 0 2 41 0 1 10 234
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring' 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 137
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 1 4 13 129 3 30 61 456
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective 0 1 5 22 1 5 16 82
Repeated Games with Imperfect Private Monitoring: Notes on a Coordination Perspective' 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 102
Reputation Effects 1 5 54 54 5 10 53 53
Social Assets 0 2 9 62 4 14 44 253
Social Assets 0 0 2 31 3 11 31 108
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 1 5 6 0 3 14 149
Structural Indifference in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 2 10 147
Structural indifference in normal form games 0 0 0 0 1 3 14 340
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 1 2 8 2 7 21 70
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 0 3 28 0 3 12 100
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices (Second Version) 0 0 1 8 0 4 12 82
Sunk investments lead to unpredictable prices 0 0 0 14 2 5 13 88
Surplus Sharing and Pricing in Matching Markets 0 0 0 0 1 2 13 97
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 2 7 24 0 3 17 116
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 0 1 10 136 1 10 35 490
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 2 5 22 181
When do regulators close banks? When should they? 0 0 0 0 2 4 12 127
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 3 4 7 23 4 10 32 150
When the Punishment Must Fit the Crime: Remarks on the Failure of Simple Penal Codes in Extensive-Form Games 2 3 7 37 7 15 66 346
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 5 9 74 1 7 29 213
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 4 11 18 249 7 21 53 721
Who Wants a Good Reputation?' 0 0 2 2 3 8 30 249
Who wants a good reputation? 3 7 14 189 9 15 36 489
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 0 1 7 39 0 4 19 97
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be 1 9 26 264 6 25 78 611
Your Reputation Is Who You're Not, Not Who You'd Like To Be' 0 0 0 0 1 3 16 184
Your reputation is who you're not, not who you'd like to be 0 2 12 214 0 5 39 585
extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 0 0 0 0 0 5 21 198
Total Working Papers 54 177 710 4,373 308 1,039 3,510 26,117

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Positive Analysis of Bank Closure 1 2 15 119 4 9 60 341
An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling--Existence of separating equilibria 1 4 16 19 3 11 32 57
Aristocratic Equilibria: Response 0 1 4 15 0 4 15 93
Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents 0 5 23 129 2 10 45 379
Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games 3 14 34 79 3 18 48 124
Business Strategy, Human Capital, and Managerial Incentives 3 6 16 146 5 18 73 561
Class systems and the enforcement of social norms 0 2 9 35 2 24 125 226
Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders 9 24 73 148 14 42 105 215
Contemporaneous perfect epsilon-equilibria 0 2 7 12 1 5 18 44
Coordination failure in repeated games with almost-public monitoring 1 4 8 24 1 9 30 90
Correlated equilibria and local interactions (*) 0 0 0 0 1 3 8 282
Corrigenda [Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory] 0 0 2 68 2 9 16 310
Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships 0 3 10 11 2 13 33 39
Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from Evolutionary Game Theory 6 15 51 633 12 49 164 2,213
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Finite Economies 0 0 0 0 3 4 9 9
Efficient Non-Contractible Investments in Large Economies 2 3 4 20 3 6 17 92
Endogenous Inequality in Integrated Labor Markets with Two-Sided Search 0 0 3 35 3 5 15 149
Endogenous Sequencing of Firm Decisions 1 2 16 50 2 7 26 94
Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games 1 3 14 88 1 6 54 554
Financing Losers in Competitive Markets 0 0 2 18 0 1 8 79
How Proper Is Sequential Equilibrium? 1 1 3 14 1 2 10 63
Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations 0 1 5 72 0 7 22 321
Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types 1 8 31 171 1 16 75 542
Incorporating concern for relative wealth into economic models 2 5 21 33 6 20 57 115
Introduction: Symposium on evolutionary game theory 5 17 61 158 12 36 129 347
Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games 3 13 71 418 19 59 187 1,550
Market Selection and Asymmetric Information 1 2 15 67 1 4 26 218
Normal Form Structures in Extensive Form Games 1 1 7 30 2 2 12 65
On the behavior of separating equilibria of signaling games with a finite set of types as the set of types becomes dense in an interval 0 0 2 2 0 2 5 11
Perpetual randomness in evolutionary economics 0 0 0 4 0 1 4 28
Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring 1 1 11 69 2 16 50 320
Purification in the Infinitely-Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 3 15 19 19 10 44 91 91
Repeated Games with Almost-Public Monitoring 0 2 10 31 0 4 16 78
SOCIAL ASSETS 0 0 4 13 3 16 45 85
Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model 1 1 7 44 2 4 19 131
Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth 1 4 31 246 4 13 100 1,300
Sunk Investments Lead to Unpredictable Prices 0 3 4 17 2 9 22 108
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 4 23 0 1 10 72
The Social Context of Economic Decisions 1 2 4 14 4 7 24 58
The impact of asymmetric information on entry deterrence: An example 0 2 4 19 0 2 16 90
Who Wants a Good Reputation? 0 0 0 0 2 11 43 318
Who Wants a Good Reputation? Erratum 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 51
Workers versus Firms: Bargaining over a Firm's Value 0 1 7 20 0 2 11 80
original papers: Investment and concern for relative position 0 0 4 28 1 2 16 154
Total Journal Articles 49 169 632 3,161 136 535 1,897 12,147

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Statistics updated 2008-08-03