Access Statistics for Claudio Mezzetti

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auction Design with Interdependent Valuations: The Generalized Revelation Principle, Efficiency, Full Surplus Extraction and Information Acquisition 0 1 5 46 1 6 25 171
Auctions in which Losers Set the Price 0 1 9 40 0 4 27 75
Auctions in which Losers Set the Price 1 3 5 42 2 4 23 145
Aversion to Price Risk and the Afternoon Effect 1 3 18 43 9 19 68 127
Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals: Regulating a Multinational Firm to extract Rent from Abroad 0 0 0 0 3 3 15 146
DOMESTIC UNIONIZATION AND IMPORT COMPETITION 0 0 0 2 1 4 16 287
INVESTMENT, EMPLOYMENT AND WAGES: A NONCOOPERATIVE SEQUENTIAL BARGAINING APPROACH 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 235
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 0 0 2 2 5 10 20 20
Implementation in Mixed Nash Equilibrium 4 17 39 39 14 32 59 59
Intellectual Property Disclosure as 'Threat' 1 3 61 61 6 15 61 61
Intellectual Property Disclosure as “Threat” 0 2 15 64 2 8 52 156
LABOR CONTRACTS UNDER ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION WHEN WORKERS HAVE POSITIVE BARGAINING POWER 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 284
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction 1 3 14 73 5 12 42 243
On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions 1 2 10 42 2 10 85 271
On the Lowest-Winning-Bid and the Highest-Losing-Bid Auctions 0 0 8 19 6 22 64 120
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions 0 0 4 70 0 0 22 251
Sequential vs. Single-Round Uniform-Price Auctions 1 2 17 67 12 22 101 290
THE POSSIBILITY OF EFFICIENT MECHANISMS FOR TRADING IN INDIVISIBLE OBJECT 0 0 0 0 2 7 24 239
Trust-Based Mechanisms for Robust and Efficient Task Allocation in the Presence of Execution Uncertainty 2 3 26 26 5 6 36 36
Total Working Papers 12 40 233 636 75 187 746 3,216

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Auctions in which losers set the price 0 0 0 0 3 3 3 3
Bayesian and Weakly Robust First Best Mechanisms: Characterizations 0 0 13 34 0 0 18 66
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games 0 0 4 38 0 0 10 68
Bounded rationality, dynamic oligopoly, and conjectural variations 0 1 10 48 0 1 19 104
Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals 1 1 13 58 1 2 26 151
Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race 0 0 0 0 9 12 54 133
Domestic unionization and import competition 0 8 29 98 1 12 65 241
Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions 1 1 9 35 1 1 16 78
Games with Partially Enforceable Agreements 0 0 0 4 0 1 5 40
Gathering information before signing a contract with a privately informed principal 0 0 0 28 2 3 7 78
Incentive Auctions and Information Revelation 0 0 0 0 1 3 11 230
Learning in Games by Random Sampling 4 7 30 85 8 15 78 211
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency 1 4 16 75 1 5 33 256
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Surplus Extraction 0 1 5 23 0 2 11 64
On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions 0 0 4 5 7 9 30 38
Politicians' decision making with re-election concerns 0 2 17 54 0 3 37 140
Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard 4 10 32 114 6 15 46 166
Prosecutorial Resources, Plea Bargaining, and the Decision to Go to Trial 0 0 0 0 2 7 74 1,193
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games 0 0 2 24 0 0 8 60
Rawlsian distributive justice and rights 0 1 3 10 1 3 11 42
Sequential vs. single-round uniform-price auctions 0 1 6 6 0 3 20 25
The Possibility of Efficient Mechanisms for Trading an Indivisible Object 0 0 10 45 1 4 21 99
Total Journal Articles 11 37 203 784 44 104 603 3,486

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04