Access Statistics for David A. Miller

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A Steady State Approach to a Network Externality Market With Switching Costs	0	1	8	113	2	5	21	105
Efficiency in Repeated Trade with Hidden Valuations	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	138
Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry	0	2	6	160	5	19	33	481
Need I remind you? Monitoring with collective memory	0	0	0	28	0	0	1	47
Optimally Empty Promises and Endogenous Supervision	1	1	2	4	2	3	10	15
The dynamic cost of ex post incentive compatibility in repeated games of private information	0	1	4	140	3	7	23	488
We study optimal contracting in team settings, featuring stylized aspects of production environments with complex tasks. Agents have many opportunities to shirk, task-level monitoring is needed to provide useful incentives, and because it is difficult to write individual performance into formal contracts, incentives are provided informally, using wasteful sanctions like guilt and shame, or slowed promotion. These features give rise to optimal contracts with "empty promises" and endogenous supervision structures. Agents optimally make more promises than they intend to keep, leading to the concentration of supervisory responsibility in the hands of one or two agents	0	0	4	35	1	4	42	89
Total Working Papers	1	5	24	535	13	38	130	1,363

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Efficiency in repeated trade with hidden valuations	0	0	0	24	0	2	3	129
Invention under uncertainty and the threat of ex post entry	0	0	1	9	1	1	4	95
Was there too little entry during the Dot Com Era?	0	4	12	38	6	12	67	178
Total Journal Articles	0	4	13	71	7	15	74	402

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Statistics updated 2013-05-03