Access Statistics for Benny Moldovanu

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Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Nazi 'Killer' Amendment 0 0 0 18 0 0 2 34
A Nazi †Killer†Amendment 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 53
A Note on Revenue Maximization and Efficiency in Multi-Object Auctions 0 0 0 199 0 0 1 1,133
A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction 0 0 0 141 0 0 0 468
A Theory of Auctions With Endogenous Valuations 0 0 1 13 0 0 1 50
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 0 0 0 26 0 0 0 25
A note on revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 25
A stylized model of the German UMTS auction 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 20
Abortions, Brexit and Trees 0 0 0 7 0 1 1 31
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 62 0 0 3 224
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 1 1 2 118 1 4 12 445
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 90 0 0 2 235
Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms 0 0 0 115 0 0 3 351
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 132 0 1 1 498
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 16
Auctions with Downstream Interaction 0 0 0 29 0 1 2 202
Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 464
Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 138
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 320
Bid costs and endogenous bid caps 0 0 0 4 0 0 3 32
Brexit: Dynamic Voting with an Irreversible Option 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 15
CONTESTS FOR STATUS 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 45
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 241
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 41 0 2 3 229
Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests 0 0 0 12 0 1 2 147
Coarse Matching and Price Discrimination 0 0 0 121 0 1 3 362
Contest Architecture 0 0 0 115 0 1 2 762
Contest Architecture (jointly with Benny Moldovanu) 0 0 0 125 0 1 2 477
Contest architecture 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 30
Contests for Status 0 0 0 106 0 0 3 325
Dynamic Assignment of Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 88 0 1 1 165
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 98 0 0 2 676
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 220 0 0 0 778
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 572
Efficient design with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 47
Ex-post Implementation with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 82 0 0 0 231
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 53
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 14
Ex-post implementation with interdependent valuations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications 1 2 4 18 1 3 19 68
Goethe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 600
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 29
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 341 0 0 1 1,189
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 183 0 1 3 855
License auctions and market structure 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 28
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 8
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 91 1 1 7 324
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 63 36 36 41 375
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 46
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 5
Mixed Bundling Auctions 0 0 1 49 0 105 142 401
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 14
Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 16
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 32
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 845
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 50 0 0 3 214
Optimal Mechanism Design without Money 0 1 8 170 1 3 14 435
Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation 0 0 0 43 0 0 2 107
Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments 0 0 1 117 0 0 1 453
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 0 43 0 1 2 76
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 1 91 0 0 3 156
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 65
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 143 1 1 6 500
Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 611
Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade 0 0 2 8 0 0 5 43
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 11
Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 330
Posterior Implementation Versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 20 0 1 1 130
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 23
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Posterior Implementation versus Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 60 0 0 1 165
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 67 1 1 2 377
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 18
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 71 0 2 3 531
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 527
Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 239
Search Committees 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 80
The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic 0 0 0 17 0 1 3 49
The Dimensions of Consensus 0 0 0 20 0 1 3 60
The Dynamic Assignment of Heterogenous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 182
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions 0 0 0 168 0 0 1 717
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions 0 0 0 370 0 0 1 1,120
The European UMTS/IMT-2000 license auctions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 26
The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 0 1 80
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 88 0 0 0 367
The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory 0 0 0 210 0 1 2 799
The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 24 0 0 1 211
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 104 0 0 1 333
The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 39
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets With Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 23 0 0 0 45
The Multiplier Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments 0 0 0 29 0 0 3 51
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 0 0 280 0 0 1 979
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 97 0 1 1 359
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 2 151 0 1 4 468
The Trade-off Between Fast Learning and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 6 1 2 3 40
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 20
The multiplier effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 13 0 0 0 28
The optimal allocation of prizes in contests 0 0 1 9 0 1 4 95
Understanding Strategic Interaction: Essays in Honour of Reinhard Selten 0 0 1 2 0 1 2 8
Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice 0 0 0 24 0 1 1 33
Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot? 0 0 0 30 0 0 2 63
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie - Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 961
Total Working Papers 2 4 24 5,664 45 186 382 27,016
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze [Cooperative Games with Coalition Structures] 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 190
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations 1 1 3 17 2 2 13 91
A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions 0 0 1 236 0 1 7 901
Abstimmungen im Bundestag und in der Weimarer Republik: Gewissen oder Strategie? 0 0 1 7 0 0 1 16
An economic perspective on auctions 0 0 1 89 0 2 5 288
An experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations 0 0 2 49 0 2 5 168
Auctions with Downstream Interaction Among Buyers 0 0 0 0 0 2 9 381
Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps 0 0 0 1 0 1 5 276
Book reviews 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 34
Book reviews 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 26
CARROTS AND STICKS: PRIZES AND PUNISHMENTS IN CONTESTS 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 122
Coalition-proof nash equilibria and the core in three-player games 0 0 1 115 0 1 4 285
Coarse matching with incomplete information 0 0 1 30 0 0 2 108
Competing auctions with endogenous quantities 0 0 0 48 0 0 1 194
Content-Based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting 0 0 0 11 0 1 2 137
Contest architecture 0 0 1 154 0 1 3 466
Contests for Status 0 0 0 235 2 2 6 715
Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation 0 0 0 33 0 3 4 114
Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities 0 0 0 60 0 1 2 212
Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach 0 0 0 94 1 1 1 301
Dynamic allocation and pricing: A mechanism design approach 0 0 0 85 0 0 5 236
Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations 0 0 0 2 0 1 3 588
Efficient sequential assignment with incomplete information 0 0 1 30 1 2 4 120
Ex-post implementation and preference aggregation via potentials 0 0 0 32 0 1 2 106
Goethe's Second-Price Auction 0 0 1 156 1 2 5 389
How (Not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons 1 1 4 586 1 4 15 2,197
How to Dissolve a Partnership 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 1,508
Learning about the Future and Dynamic Efficiency 0 0 0 71 0 1 2 319
License Auctions and Market Structure 0 0 0 120 1 2 5 310
Locally robust implementation and its limits 0 0 0 13 0 1 3 64
Mixed bundling auctions 0 0 0 64 2 3 8 207
Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 11
Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities 0 0 2 304 0 2 7 621
Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation 0 1 3 118 0 2 6 551
Non-Bayesian optimal search and dynamic implementation 0 0 0 9 0 1 1 82
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation 0 0 0 21 0 1 3 130
On the importance of uniform sharing rules for efficient matching 0 0 0 8 0 1 4 121
Optimal Voting Rules 0 0 2 32 2 3 9 167
Optimal search, learning and implementation 0 0 2 24 0 0 3 88
Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments 0 0 1 18 0 0 3 99
Order Independent Equilibria 0 0 0 57 0 1 1 161
Partnerships, lemons, and efficient trade 0 1 1 88 0 3 6 248
Patent licensing to Bertrand competitors 0 0 0 53 0 1 2 153
Posterior implementation vs ex-post implementation 0 0 0 22 0 1 1 83
Price indeterminacy and bargaining in a market with indivisibilities 0 0 1 17 0 2 3 64
Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines That Depend on Processing Time 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 49
Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights 0 0 1 88 0 1 3 635
Revenue maximization in the dynamic knapsack problem 0 0 0 42 0 1 2 266
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 13
Reviews and Comments 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 36
Specialization and partisanship in committee search 0 0 1 17 0 0 2 124
Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 77
Strategic Nonparticipation 0 0 0 127 0 1 2 355
The Design of an Efficient Private Industry 0 0 0 22 0 2 2 115
The Limits of ex post Implementation 0 0 0 166 0 1 2 567
The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests 0 1 2 335 1 5 10 1,110
The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 229
The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals 0 0 0 75 1 1 6 274
The failure of a Nazi “killer” amendment 0 0 0 4 0 1 2 36
The feedback effect in two-sided markets with bilateral investments 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 48
The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good (*) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 227
Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot? 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 14
William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie: Anmerkungen zum Nobelpreis 1996 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 13
Total Journal Articles 2 5 33 4,030 15 77 220 17,836

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Statistics updated 2025-05-12