| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Dynamic Microeconomic Model with Durable Goods and Adaptive Expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
184 |
| A General Theory of Cooperative Solutions for Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
160 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
1 |
1 |
2 |
371 |
4 |
7 |
27 |
772 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
216 |
| An Algorithm for Computing Equilibria in a Linear Monetary Economy |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
77 |
| An Axiomatic Derivation of Subjective Probability |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
| An Experiment on Coordination in Multi-Candidate Elections: The Importance of Polls and Election Histories |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
423 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three- Way Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
422 |
| An Extension of the Kakutani Fixed Point Therorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
209 |
| An Introduction to Game Theory |
1 |
1 |
4 |
658 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
1,645 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
247 |
| Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
1 |
1 |
3 |
167 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
346 |
| Autobiography |
0 |
1 |
1 |
101 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
266 |
| Axiomatic Derivation of Scoring Rules Without the Ordering Assumption |
0 |
0 |
2 |
87 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
255 |
| Axiomatic Foundations of Bayesian Decision Theory |
0 |
0 |
1 |
360 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
673 |
| Bargaining |
0 |
0 |
1 |
64 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
232 |
| Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive-Compatibility: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,179 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
1,900 |
| Campaign Spending with Impressionable Voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
305 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
1 |
1 |
148 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
632 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
104 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
314 |
| Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules |
0 |
0 |
1 |
230 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
553 |
| Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
298 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
495 |
| Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
389 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
0 |
0 |
5 |
194 |
1 |
1 |
15 |
893 |
| Dynamic Matching Problems With Incentive Constraints |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
| Economic Analysis of Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
400 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
844 |
| Economic Analysis of Political Institutions: An Introduction |
0 |
0 |
1 |
211 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
751 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
671 |
1 |
3 |
12 |
1,861 |
| Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,276 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
2,177 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
218 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
485 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
0 |
0 |
227 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
656 |
| Fictitious-Transfers in Cooperative Game Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
121 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
377 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
0 |
1 |
1 |
459 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
920 |
| Graphs and Cooperation in Games |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1,193 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
2,257 |
| Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem |
1 |
1 |
2 |
256 |
2 |
3 |
12 |
740 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
315 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
788 |
| Informational Origins of Political Bias Towards Critical Groups of Voters |
0 |
0 |
2 |
69 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
275 |
| Interview with the 2007 Laureates in Economics Eric S. Maskin and Roger B. Myerson |
0 |
1 |
4 |
294 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
686 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,317 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8,051 |
| Large Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
513 |
0 |
4 |
8 |
1,767 |
| Linear Functionals of Convex Sets with Applications to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
91 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
390 |
| Linearity, Concavity, and Scale Invariance in Social Choice Functions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
145 |
| Lobbying and Incentives for Legislative Organization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
138 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
704 |
| Local foundations for better governance: A Review of Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao's Localizing Development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
120 |
| Mechanism Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
446 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
791 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
251 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
565 |
| Moral hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
1 |
1 |
118 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
202 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
0 |
143 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
367 |
| Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview |
0 |
0 |
1 |
153 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
343 |
| OLIGARCHIC PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION TO A MARKET ECONOMY IN RUSSIA |
0 |
1 |
1 |
140 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
370 |
| Oligarchic Property Rights and Investment |
0 |
1 |
1 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
248 |
| Optimal Auction Design |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,861 |
4 |
5 |
19 |
3,541 |
| Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems |
0 |
1 |
2 |
285 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
496 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
1 |
2 |
4 |
588 |
3 |
7 |
15 |
1,009 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
0 |
1 |
203 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
668 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
1 |
2 |
167 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
472 |
| Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
320 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
1,046 |
| Prices and Market Imbalance Indexes in a General Equilibrium Model |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
176 |
| Proportional Representation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
581 |
| Refinement of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
2 |
2 |
147 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
210 |
| Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept |
0 |
0 |
1 |
646 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
1,326 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
0 |
0 |
2 |
335 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
667 |
| Sequential Equilibria in Bayesian Games with Communication |
0 |
2 |
3 |
194 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
776 |
| Solutions for Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
189 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
163 |
| Tenable strategy blocks and settled equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
| The Past, Present, and Future of Economics: A Celebration of the 125-Year Anniversary of the JPE and of Chicago Economics |
3 |
5 |
19 |
554 |
6 |
12 |
41 |
1,006 |
| The strength of American federal democracy: lessons for global development |
0 |
0 |
0 |
100 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
163 |
| Theoretical Comparisons of Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
377 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,184 |
| Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
130 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
58 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
172 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Infonnation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
359 |
| Value of Games in Partition Function Form |
0 |
0 |
3 |
166 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
368 |
| Values of Games Without Sidepayments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
196 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
543 |
| Viscous Population Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
112 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
747 |
| Working Paper 300 - Village Communities and Global Development |
1 |
3 |
4 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
142 |
| Total Working Papers |
9 |
28 |
104 |
20,666 |
37 |
97 |
352 |
55,055 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Field Manual for the Cradle of Civilization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
| A Model of Moral-Hazard Credit Cycles |
0 |
0 |
1 |
122 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
451 |
| A Theory of Voting Equilibria |
0 |
1 |
7 |
31 |
3 |
4 |
18 |
91 |
| A dynamic microeconomic model with durable goods and adaptive expectations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
95 |
| A macroeconomic model of Russian transition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
450 |
| Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
3 |
190 |
| An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
0 |
115 |
0 |
3 |
4 |
458 |
| An Experimental Study of Voting Rules and Polls in Three-Candidate Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
412 |
| Analysis of Democratic Institutions: Structure, Conduct and Performance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
497 |
| Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures |
0 |
0 |
2 |
241 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
1,175 |
| Bipolar Multicandidate Elections with Corruption |
0 |
1 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
116 |
| Campaign Finance Levels as Coordinating Signals in Three‐way, Experimental Elections |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
135 |
| Capital and growth with oligarchic property rights |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
449 |
| Capitalist investment and political liberalization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
166 |
| Comments on "Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, I--III Harsanyi's Games with Incoplete Information" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
23 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
130 |
| Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
197 |
| Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
184 |
| Construction de l'Etat, leadership et démocratie locale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
26 |
| Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans |
0 |
0 |
1 |
100 |
0 |
4 |
7 |
271 |
| Decisiveness of contributors’ perceptions in elections |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
74 |
| Dual Reduction and Elementary Games |
2 |
2 |
6 |
70 |
3 |
6 |
13 |
220 |
| Economic Effects of Constitutions |
0 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
| Economics and Ethics: Altruism, Justice, Power: Discussion |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
199 |
| Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis |
0 |
0 |
4 |
417 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
961 |
| Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
2 |
747 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
1,598 |
| Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading |
0 |
2 |
9 |
1,393 |
1 |
7 |
32 |
2,634 |
| Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem |
0 |
1 |
1 |
85 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
243 |
| Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy |
1 |
1 |
4 |
30 |
4 |
5 |
17 |
201 |
| Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz |
0 |
0 |
0 |
53 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
181 |
| Fundamentals of Social Choice Theory |
0 |
0 |
2 |
213 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
450 |
| Game Theory and the First World War |
0 |
2 |
10 |
63 |
0 |
5 |
27 |
131 |
| Game-Theoretic Models of Politics |
0 |
0 |
2 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
160 |
| Game-theoretic Consistency and International Relations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
39 |
| Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem |
2 |
3 |
13 |
1,295 |
6 |
11 |
38 |
3,716 |
| Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
23 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
58 |
| Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
110 |
| John Nash's Contribution to Economics |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
682 |
| Large Poisson Games |
2 |
3 |
5 |
206 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
492 |
| Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi |
0 |
0 |
3 |
98 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
335 |
| Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict |
0 |
0 |
1 |
138 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
521 |
| Linking the best and worst of global trends |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
| Local agency costs of political centralization |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
| Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
589 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,162 |
| Moral Hazard in High Office and the Dynamics of Aristocracy |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
70 |
| Moral-hazard credit cycles with risk-averse agents |
0 |
0 |
0 |
28 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
87 |
| Multistage Games with Communication |
0 |
0 |
1 |
532 |
0 |
5 |
9 |
1,448 |
| Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory |
1 |
1 |
3 |
4 |
3 |
4 |
9 |
10 |
| Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory |
0 |
0 |
7 |
1,528 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
4,874 |
| On the Value of Game Theory in Social Science |
0 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
1 |
2 |
8 |
96 |
| Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1,380 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
2,369 |
| Outlook for democracy and democratic institutions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
| Perfect Conditional ε‐Equilibria of Multi‐Stage Games With Infinite Sets of Signals and Actions |
0 |
0 |
1 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
64 |
| Perspectives on Mechanism Design in Economic Theory |
1 |
2 |
5 |
308 |
1 |
4 |
12 |
628 |
| Political Economics and the Weimar Disaster |
0 |
0 |
1 |
57 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
384 |
| Political Economics in the Journal of Political Economy: Six Landmark Papers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
211 |
| Population uncertainty and Poisson games |
0 |
1 |
4 |
352 |
0 |
4 |
10 |
1,085 |
| Population uncertainty in contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
256 |
| Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs |
1 |
1 |
4 |
1,320 |
1 |
3 |
20 |
2,354 |
| Rethinking the Principles of Bank Regulation: A Review of Admati and Hellwig's The Bankers' New Clothes |
0 |
0 |
2 |
113 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
466 |
| Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication |
0 |
1 |
1 |
67 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
232 |
| Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
| Tenable Strategy Blocks and Settled Equilibria |
0 |
0 |
3 |
14 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
87 |
| The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State |
1 |
1 |
1 |
20 |
2 |
4 |
4 |
59 |
| Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems |
0 |
0 |
2 |
135 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
338 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility |
0 |
0 |
0 |
102 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
268 |
| Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
247 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
575 |
| Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems |
0 |
0 |
4 |
175 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
657 |
| Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information |
0 |
1 |
1 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
371 |
| Viscous population equilibria |
0 |
0 |
1 |
35 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
134 |
| Total Journal Articles |
12 |
26 |
129 |
13,794 |
40 |
126 |
463 |
36,954 |
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