Access Statistics for Ichiro Obara

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 147
Approximate Implementability with Ex Post Budget Balance (Joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 220
Asymptotic Value of Monitoring Structures in Stochastic Games 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 9
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 79 0 1 1 306
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 107 0 1 3 420
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 70 0 0 0 204
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 58 1 1 1 219
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 52 0 0 0 207
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies* 0 0 0 102 0 0 1 328
Endogenous Monitoring 0 0 0 84 0 0 2 361
Endogeous Monitoring 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 339
Finite State Equilibria in Dynamic Games 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 31
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration 0 0 0 17 0 2 16 134
Firm Reputation and Horizontal Integration (with H. Cai) 0 0 0 158 0 0 1 526
Firm Reputation and Horizontanl Integration 0 0 0 55 0 0 0 234
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 176
Folk Theorem with Communication 0 0 0 94 0 0 0 248
Informational Smallness and Privae Momnitoring in Repeated Games, Second Version 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 42
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 34 0 0 0 139
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 179
Informational Smallness and Private Monitoring in Repeated Games (with R. McLean and A. Postlewaite) 0 0 0 8 1 1 1 99
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games (with M. Kandori) 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 271
Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 173
Less is more: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Games 0 0 0 58 0 0 0 160
Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited 0 0 0 136 0 0 0 548
Repeated Games with General Discounting 0 0 1 42 0 0 1 54
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 1 21 0 0 1 71
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 103
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 162
Secret Contracts for Efficient Partnerships (joint with D. Rahman) 0 0 1 17 0 0 2 73
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 46 0 0 0 312
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 19 2 3 3 133
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 181
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 69 1 2 2 294
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 227
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Private Monitoring: a N-player case 0 0 0 129 0 0 0 446
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 6
Uniformly Strict Equilibrium for Repeated Games with Private Monitoring and Communication 0 0 1 8 0 1 3 7
Weighted Garbling 0 16 16 16 0 6 9 9
Total Working Papers 0 16 20 1,824 6 22 61 7,798

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring 0 0 0 88 1 2 3 264
Collusion and heterogeneity of firms 0 0 1 5 0 0 1 35
Efficiency in Repeated Games Revisited: The Role of Private Strategies 0 0 0 124 0 0 0 416
Firm reputation and horizontal integration 0 0 1 108 0 0 2 441
Folk theorem with communication 0 0 0 33 0 0 1 115
Less is more: an observability paradox in repeated games 0 0 0 44 1 1 1 134
Mechanism design with information acquisition 0 1 4 11 0 2 6 71
Mediated Partnerships 0 0 0 46 0 0 2 189
Repeated games with general discounting 0 0 3 15 0 0 3 56
Robustness of public equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 44
The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions 0 0 1 31 1 1 3 204
The Maximum Efficient Equilibrium Payoff in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma 0 0 0 63 1 1 1 180
Total Journal Articles 0 1 10 576 4 7 23 2,149

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03