Access Statistics for Wojciech Olszewski

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games	1	5	12	37	5	12	31	107
Falsifiability	0	4	14	33	6	18	71	86
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring	0	0	8	8	1	5	20	26
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version	0	4	14	14	1	10	21	21
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring	0	1	16	22	2	5	31	34
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests	0	0	14	21	5	8	41	50
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests	0	1	9	18	3	6	30	39
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests	0	0	1	15	3	3	21	73
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring	1	3	8	35	1	5	16	83
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring	1	2	5	37	2	6	21	159
Total Working Papers	3	20	101	240	29	78	303	678

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A Simple Exposition of Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games	1	4	20	29	2	9	38	57
A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence	1	1	9	12	4	6	32	64
A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem	1	2	7	57	1	4	24	170
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games	4	11	40	104	6	21	93	372
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods	0	1	5	15	1	2	10	46
Contracts and uncertainty	0	1	15	38	1	4	37	110
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645	0	2	14	35	0	6	40	91
Informal communication	3	5	17	92	9	27	110	463
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests	0	0	6	6	9	13	29	29
Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?	0	0	2	35	0	1	8	212
Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods	0	0	4	25	0	1	16	79
Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries	0	2	18	50	4	13	47	128
Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria	0	2	9	36	0	3	21	81
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring	1	4	18	61	5	11	51	165
Total Journal Articles	11	35	184	595	42	121	556	2,067

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

LogEc is hosted by the Swedish Business School at Örebro University.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2009-07-03