Access Statistics for Wojciech Olszewski

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Belief-free Equilibria in Repeated Games	0	0	0	61	0	0	1	201
Falsifiability	0	0	0	122	0	0	4	451
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring	0	0	0	20	0	0	1	161
Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under (Almost) Perfect Monitoring, Second Version	0	0	0	25	0	1	2	107
Folk theorems with Bounded Recall under(Almost) Perfect Monitoring	0	0	1	47	0	0	1	224
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests	0	0	0	49	0	0	0	166
Pareto Improvements in the Contest for College Admissions	0	0	1	4	0	0	1	8
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests	0	0	0	44	0	0	0	145
Strategic Manipulation of Empirical Tests	0	0	0	24	0	1	3	162
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private, Almost-Perfect Monitoring	0	0	0	46	0	1	2	145
The folk theorem for all games with almost perfect monitoring	0	0	0	43	0	1	3	265
Total Working Papers	0	0	2	485	0	4	18	2,035

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A non-differentiable approach to revenue equivalence	0	0	2	71	0	0	5	340
A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem	0	1	2	119	0	2	5	445
Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games	0	0	0	180	0	0	0	571
Coalition strategy-proof mechanisms for provision of excludable public goods	0	1	1	31	0	1	3	98
Contracts and uncertainty	0	0	0	51	0	0	1	263
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson, Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships, Oxford University Press, New York, NY (2006) ISBN 978-0-19-530079-6 pages i-xviii and 1-645	0	0	0	105	1	1	1	305
Informal communication	0	0	3	181	0	2	5	816
Manipulability of Future-Independent Tests	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	133
Note Perfect folk theorems. Does public randomization matter?	0	0	0	43	0	1	1	245
Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods	0	0	0	43	0	0	0	140
Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria	0	0	0	56	0	0	1	138
The Folk Theorem for Games with Private Almost-Perfect Monitoring	0	0	1	139	0	0	2	328
Total Journal Articles	0	2	9	1,038	1	7	24	3,822

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Statistics updated 2025-05-12