| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Polycentric Approach For Coping With Climate Change |
0 |
2 |
6 |
70 |
1 |
4 |
23 |
261 |
| A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
4 |
4 |
| A polycentric approach for coping with climate change |
0 |
1 |
1 |
624 |
1 |
4 |
18 |
1,495 |
| ANALYZING COLLECTIVE ACTION |
0 |
3 |
9 |
407 |
5 |
10 |
43 |
883 |
| An institutional analysis approach: Findings from the NIIS on irrigation performance |
0 |
1 |
1 |
50 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
104 |
| Autobiography |
1 |
2 |
3 |
181 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
366 |
| Beyond Formality and Informality |
0 |
2 |
3 |
184 |
0 |
3 |
5 |
393 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems |
1 |
6 |
20 |
1,135 |
4 |
16 |
63 |
2,776 |
| Bosses and Kings: Asymmetric Power in Paired Common Pool and Public Good Games |
0 |
2 |
4 |
461 |
0 |
4 |
12 |
944 |
| Des individus rationnels sont-ils désespérement piégés dans des dilemmes sociaux ? L’analyse d’Elinor Ostrom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
| Des individus rationnels sont-ils désespérement piégés dans des dilemmes sociaux ? L’analyse d’Elinor Ostrom |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
14 |
| Design principles and the performance of farmer-managed irrigation systems in Nepal |
1 |
2 |
2 |
63 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
149 |
| Façonner des outils d'analyse pour étudier le changement institutionnel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
102 |
| From farmers' fields to data fields and back: A Synthesis of Participatory Information Systems for Irrigation and other Resources: Proceedings of an International Workshop held at the Institute of Agriculture and Animal Science, Rampur, Nepal, 21-26 March 1993 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
67 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
128 |
| Groundwater Irrigation in North India: Institutions and Markets |
1 |
2 |
3 |
46 |
2 |
4 |
10 |
182 |
| In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action |
0 |
1 |
3 |
208 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
666 |
| Indigenous Communities, Cooperation, and Communication: Taking Experiments to the Field |
0 |
1 |
1 |
56 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
139 |
| Interview with Nobel Prize Laureates Elinor Ostrom and Oliver Williamson |
1 |
1 |
3 |
326 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
800 |
| The Working Parts of Rules and How They May Evolve Over Time |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
612 |
| The challenge of self-governance in complex, globalizing economies: Collection of revised papers of a PhD seminar |
0 |
0 |
0 |
137 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
288 |
| Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments |
0 |
1 |
1 |
437 |
0 |
4 |
9 |
817 |
| Understanding collective action |
0 |
2 |
8 |
598 |
1 |
5 |
25 |
1,098 |
| Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies |
0 |
2 |
3 |
347 |
1 |
7 |
12 |
650 |
| Unlocking Public Entrepreneurship and Public Economies |
0 |
3 |
4 |
136 |
0 |
9 |
13 |
307 |
| Use of case studies and structural coding in a relational database for storage and analysis of irrigation institutions and systems in Nepal |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
60 |
| What do people bring into the game: experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons |
0 |
0 |
3 |
259 |
0 |
2 |
20 |
828 |
| What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons |
0 |
1 |
2 |
46 |
0 |
3 |
13 |
197 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
37 |
82 |
5,943 |
23 |
97 |
323 |
14,269 |
| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| 1. Introduction |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
| 6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action |
2 |
3 |
9 |
114 |
2 |
5 |
16 |
225 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 |
2 |
2 |
33 |
415 |
5 |
10 |
98 |
1,205 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997 |
5 |
7 |
31 |
167 |
8 |
17 |
92 |
482 |
| A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations |
0 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
13 |
| A Grammar of Institutions |
2 |
5 |
26 |
124 |
4 |
12 |
73 |
357 |
| A Polycentric Approach For Coping With Climate Change |
2 |
4 |
12 |
332 |
5 |
12 |
36 |
922 |
| A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
0 |
1 |
73 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
225 |
| AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON DEMOCRATIC DILEMMAS |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
120 |
| An agenda for the study of institutions |
1 |
3 |
17 |
263 |
1 |
7 |
36 |
714 |
| Analyzing collective action |
2 |
4 |
17 |
334 |
7 |
14 |
55 |
833 |
| Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a polycentric perspective |
0 |
0 |
10 |
348 |
1 |
5 |
31 |
892 |
| Analyzing the dynamic complexity of development interventions: lessons from an irrigation experiment in Nepal |
0 |
1 |
2 |
124 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
292 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems |
2 |
7 |
26 |
1,049 |
8 |
28 |
97 |
2,729 |
| Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems (Excerpt) |
1 |
3 |
7 |
49 |
4 |
7 |
21 |
174 |
| Beyond the tragedy of the Commons |
0 |
1 |
4 |
309 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
686 |
| Book Review: Municipal Output and Performance in New York City |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis |
1 |
1 |
7 |
285 |
2 |
4 |
14 |
506 |
| Coevolving Relationships between Political Science and Economics |
0 |
1 |
3 |
96 |
0 |
2 |
8 |
431 |
| Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms |
0 |
1 |
8 |
1,532 |
2 |
11 |
51 |
4,813 |
| Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal |
0 |
1 |
6 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
16 |
74 |
| Collective Action. By Russell Hardin. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. Pp. xvi + 248. $24.00, cloth; $9.00, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
1 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
85 |
| Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems |
0 |
1 |
4 |
77 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
141 |
| Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play |
1 |
1 |
1 |
106 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
503 |
| Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work |
1 |
2 |
3 |
288 |
2 |
4 |
9 |
699 |
| Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible |
1 |
3 |
17 |
179 |
1 |
7 |
37 |
494 |
| Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change |
1 |
3 |
13 |
233 |
2 |
6 |
33 |
480 |
| Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed Equilibria Games |
0 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
| Crossing the great divide: Coproduction, synergy, and development |
3 |
4 |
33 |
570 |
13 |
34 |
129 |
1,695 |
| Deliberation, learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
79 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
207 |
| Development betrayed. The end of progress and a coevolutionary revisioning of the future: Richard B. Norgaard. Routledge, London. Hardback [UK pound]40.00, ISBN 0415 06861 4, Paperback [UK pound]12.99, ISBN 0 415 0682 2 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
181 |
2 |
4 |
12 |
511 |
| Dilemma games: game parameters and matching protocols |
0 |
0 |
1 |
87 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
380 |
| Disturbance, response, and persistence in self-organized forested communities: Analysis of robustness and resilience in five communities in Southern Indiana |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
18 |
| Do institutions for collective action evolve? |
0 |
1 |
9 |
248 |
2 |
5 |
23 |
537 |
| Dépasser le dilemme du Samaritain dans l'aide au développement. Overcoming the Samaritan's Dilemma in Development Aid |
0 |
0 |
1 |
27 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
103 |
| Façonner des outils d’analyse pour étudier le changement institutionnel |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
96 |
| Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research |
1 |
1 |
3 |
185 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
462 |
| Generalizing the core design principles for the efficacy of groups |
0 |
0 |
6 |
247 |
0 |
1 |
18 |
741 |
| Graham R. Marshall, Economics for Collaborative Environmental Management: Renegotiating the Commons, Earthscan;, London (2005) ISBN: 1844070956171, 184 pp |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
235 |
| Grandfathering: Environmental Uses and Impacts |
1 |
1 |
6 |
39 |
1 |
3 |
17 |
113 |
| Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
144 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
378 |
| How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action |
0 |
0 |
6 |
107 |
3 |
4 |
31 |
263 |
| Human-ecosystem interactions: a dynamic integrated model |
0 |
1 |
2 |
233 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
721 |
| INSTITUTIONS AND THE ENVIRONMENT |
1 |
2 |
3 |
209 |
1 |
4 |
14 |
453 |
| In Memoriam |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
47 |
| In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
133 |
| Institutional Capacity And The Resolution Of A Commons Dilemma |
0 |
1 |
7 |
131 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
333 |
| Institutions and Common-Pool Resources |
0 |
1 |
3 |
83 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
151 |
| La reglas que no se hace cumplir son mera palabrería |
0 |
0 |
0 |
103 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
218 |
| Learning from Gal Oya: Possibilities for Participatory Development and Post-Newtonian Social Science. By Norman Uphoff. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 448p. $34.50 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
18 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
55 |
| Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development |
1 |
1 |
2 |
62 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
145 |
| Local Enforcement and Better Forests |
0 |
0 |
1 |
163 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
502 |
| Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
63 |
| Modeling the Criminal Justice System. Edited by Stuart S. Nagel. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977. Pp. 319. $17.50, cloth; $7.50, paper.) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
| Nested externalities and polycentric institutions: must we wait for global solutions to climate change before taking actions at other scales? |
0 |
1 |
7 |
211 |
3 |
7 |
19 |
521 |
| New Horizons in Institutional Analysis - Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe. By Ellen M. Immergut. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 336p. $49.95. - Institutions and Social Conflict. By Jack Knight. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 234p. $59.95 cloth, $17.95 paper. - Governments at Work: Canadian Parliamentary Federalism and Its Public Policy Effects. By Mark Sproule-Jones. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993. 291p. $45.00 cloth, $18.95 paper. - Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Edited by Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. 257p. $54.95 cloth, $18.95 paper. - Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad. Edited by R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman. Washington: Brookings, 1993. 498p. $36.95 cloth, $16.95 paper |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
0 |
2 |
6 |
35 |
| Note from the Editors |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
| On the meaning and measurement of output and efficiency in the provision of urban police services |
0 |
0 |
0 |
77 |
1 |
2 |
5 |
196 |
| Organizational economics: applications to metropolitan governance |
0 |
0 |
0 |
139 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
220 |
| Panarchy: understanding transformations in human and natural systems: Lance H. Gunderson and C.S. Holling (Eds.), Island Press, Washington, DC, 2002, ISBN: 1559638575, 450 pp |
1 |
6 |
38 |
940 |
1 |
10 |
76 |
2,454 |
| Par-delà les marchés et les États. La gouvernance polycentrique des systèmes économiques complexes |
1 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
156 |
| Playing safe in coordination games:: the roles of risk dominance, payoff dominance, and history of play |
0 |
0 |
1 |
269 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
619 |
| Privatizing Public Lands. By Scott Lehmann. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. 248p. $45.00 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
15 |
| Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis |
5 |
8 |
34 |
465 |
8 |
18 |
70 |
1,649 |
| Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas |
0 |
0 |
2 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
| RECIPROCITY, TRUST, AND THE SENSE OF CONTROL |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
8 |
88 |
| Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity |
1 |
2 |
14 |
119 |
1 |
2 |
27 |
268 |
| Reflections on "Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
126 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
390 |
| Rent dissipation in a limited-access common-pool resource: Experimental evidence |
1 |
1 |
4 |
351 |
1 |
2 |
7 |
793 |
| Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
192 |
| Response to Comments by Anthony Scott and Gary Libecap |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
13 |
| Response to Zakir Husain and Rabindra Bhattacharya's "Common pool resources and contextual factors: Evolution of a fishermen's cooperative in Calcutta" |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
281 |
| Revising theory in light of experimental findings |
0 |
0 |
0 |
224 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
445 |
| Rules and Games |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
295 |
| Scale misperceptions and the spatial dynamics of a social-ecological system |
0 |
0 |
1 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
7 |
240 |
| Self-organization and Social Capital |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
9 |
437 |
| Some postulated effects of learning on constitutional behavior |
0 |
0 |
2 |
13 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
44 |
| TURFS in the lab: Institutional Innovation in Real-Time Dynamic Spatial Commons |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
22 |
| Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
| Tenure alone is not sufficient: monitoring is essential |
0 |
0 |
0 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
62 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
47 |
| The Comparative Study of Public Economies |
0 |
0 |
2 |
17 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
79 |
| The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence from Community Forestry in Nepal |
1 |
1 |
5 |
308 |
3 |
4 |
15 |
870 |
| The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p. $55.00 cloth, $24.95 paper |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
| The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems |
2 |
5 |
15 |
121 |
4 |
8 |
30 |
275 |
| The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice |
0 |
1 |
8 |
142 |
1 |
3 |
19 |
537 |
| The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global change: a survey |
0 |
2 |
12 |
446 |
3 |
9 |
38 |
1,183 |
| The evolution of norms within institutions: comments on Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich's, ‘Population, development, and human nature’ |
0 |
0 |
0 |
119 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
241 |
| The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources |
0 |
0 |
0 |
69 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
235 |
| The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources |
1 |
1 |
6 |
177 |
1 |
2 |
12 |
408 |
| Titles, Conflict, and Land Use: The Development of Property Rights and Land Reform on the Brazilian Amazon Frontier. By Lee J. Alston, Gary D. Libecap, and Bernardo Mueller. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. Pp. xiv, 227. $49.50 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
74 |
| Traditions et évolutions dans l’étude des communs |
0 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
33 |
| Trust in Private and Common Property Experiments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
14 |
| What do people bring into the game? Experiments in the field about cooperation in the commons |
1 |
1 |
4 |
160 |
1 |
1 |
11 |
584 |
| ¿Qué traen las personas al juego? Experimentos de campo sobre la cooperación en los recursos de uso común |
0 |
0 |
3 |
199 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
1,313 |
| ¿Teoría económica, ciencia política, teoría social? Lo que yo hago podría llamarse economía política o estudio de los dilemas sociales |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
76 |
| Total Journal Articles |
45 |
98 |
518 |
14,770 |
116 |
322 |
1,529 |
42,139 |
LogEc is hosted by the
Örebro University School of Business.