| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Accountability and Flexibility in Public Schools: Evidence from Boston's Charters and Pilots |
0 |
0 |
0 |
83 |
3 |
3 |
5 |
388 |
| Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
135 |
| Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
13 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
48 |
| Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
| Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
53 |
| Breaking Ties: Regression Discontinuity Design Meets Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
137 |
| Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism |
0 |
1 |
2 |
126 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
577 |
| Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
0 |
51 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
308 |
| Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism |
0 |
1 |
8 |
177 |
6 |
13 |
46 |
1,087 |
| Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston |
0 |
0 |
0 |
31 |
3 |
3 |
9 |
127 |
| Charters Without Lotteries: Testing Takeovers in New Orleans and Boston |
0 |
0 |
0 |
30 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
124 |
| Choice and Consequence: Assessing Mismatch at Chicago Exam Schools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
126 |
| Conflicts of Interest and the Realtor Commission Puzzle |
0 |
0 |
1 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
99 |
| Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism |
0 |
0 |
1 |
16 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
| Demand Modeling, Forecasting, and Counterfactuals, Part I |
0 |
1 |
2 |
38 |
1 |
2 |
4 |
140 |
| Do Black and Indigenous Communities Receive their Fair Share of Vaccines Under the 2018 CDC Guidelines |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
| Do Black and Indigenous Communities Receive their Fair Share of Vaccines Under the 2018 CDC Guidelines? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
16 |
| Do Black and Indigenous Communities Receive their Fair Share of Vaccines Under the 2018 CDC Guidelines? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
30 |
| Do Parents Value School Effectiveness? |
0 |
0 |
2 |
39 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
145 |
| Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
| Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
22 |
| Explaining Charter School Effectiveness |
0 |
0 |
2 |
110 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
290 |
| Explaining Charter School Effectiveness |
0 |
0 |
0 |
147 |
1 |
3 |
9 |
487 |
| Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
68 |
| Explicit vs. Statistical Preferential Treatment in Affirmative Action: Theory and Evidence from Chicago’s Exam Schools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
65 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
249 |
| Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing |
0 |
1 |
2 |
97 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
357 |
| Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
| Forced Sales and House Prices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
45 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
294 |
| Forced Sales and House Prices |
0 |
0 |
1 |
184 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
729 |
| Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement? |
1 |
1 |
1 |
61 |
2 |
3 |
4 |
124 |
| From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England |
0 |
0 |
1 |
12 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
29 |
| From immediate acceptance to deferred acceptance: effects on school admissions and achievement in England |
0 |
1 |
3 |
21 |
0 |
2 |
9 |
44 |
| Gentrification and the Amenity Value of Crime Reductions: Evidence from Rent Deregulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
1 |
2 |
9 |
157 |
| Group Versus Individual Decision-Making: Is there a shift? |
0 |
1 |
3 |
400 |
1 |
4 |
20 |
2,135 |
| Housing Market Spillovers: Evidence from the End of Rent Control in Cambridge Massachusetts |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
2 |
2 |
8 |
300 |
| How Individual Preferences Get Aggregated in Groups - an Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
95 |
| How Individual Preferences are Aggregated in Groups: An Experimental Study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
137 |
| How Well Do Structural Demand Models Work? Counterfactual Predictions in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
1 |
28 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
57 |
| How individual preferences get aggregated in groups - An experimental study |
0 |
0 |
1 |
74 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
161 |
| Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms |
0 |
0 |
0 |
11 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
48 |
| Immigration Lottery Design: Engineered and Coincidental Consequences of H-1B Reforms |
1 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
1 |
4 |
7 |
53 |
| Impact Evaluation in Matching Markets with General Tie-Breaking |
0 |
0 |
1 |
39 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
58 |
| Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing |
0 |
2 |
2 |
55 |
0 |
3 |
10 |
225 |
| Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing |
1 |
2 |
2 |
43 |
1 |
3 |
6 |
159 |
| Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
47 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
147 |
| Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
95 |
| Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
61 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
209 |
| Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
46 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
140 |
| Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets* |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
| Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
| Mechanism Design meets Priority Design: Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process Through Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
11 |
0 |
2 |
7 |
47 |
| Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp |
0 |
0 |
1 |
41 |
0 |
1 |
9 |
144 |
| Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design |
0 |
1 |
1 |
18 |
1 |
3 |
7 |
80 |
| Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
49 |
| Race and the Mismeasure of School Quality |
0 |
0 |
2 |
26 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
42 |
| Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
| Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
25 |
| Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
1 |
5 |
165 |
| Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
111 |
| Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
60 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
95 |
| Reserve System Design for Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in a Pandemic: Some Perspectives from the Field |
0 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
15 |
| Reversing Reserves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Reversing Reserves |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
| School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
181 |
| School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation |
0 |
1 |
2 |
44 |
1 |
2 |
6 |
139 |
| Short Interest and Stock Returns |
0 |
0 |
0 |
248 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
969 |
| Simple and Credible Value-Added Estimation Using Centralized School Assignment |
0 |
0 |
1 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
62 |
| Simple and Credible Value-Added Estimation Using Centralized School Assignment |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
| Small High Schools and Student Achievement: Lottery-Based Evidence from New York City |
0 |
0 |
1 |
43 |
1 |
2 |
10 |
206 |
| Speculative Attacks and Risk Management |
0 |
0 |
0 |
157 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
384 |
| Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston's Charter High School on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
154 |
| Stand and Deliver: Effects of Boston's Charter High Schools on College Preparation, Entry, and Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
76 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
296 |
| Still Worth the Trip? School Busing Effects in Boston and New York |
1 |
1 |
2 |
21 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
36 |
| Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match |
0 |
1 |
1 |
98 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
298 |
| Strategy-proofness vs. Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redisigning the NYC High School Match |
0 |
0 |
0 |
50 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
120 |
| The Boston Public School Match |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
1 |
1 |
7 |
170 |
| The Costs of Free Entry: An Empirical Study of Real Estate Agents in Greater Boston |
0 |
0 |
1 |
30 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
247 |
| The Demise of Walk Zones in Boston: Priorities vs. Precedence in School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
234 |
| The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
42 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
113 |
| The Distributional Consequences of Public School Choice |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
2 |
4 |
60 |
| The Effects of Mandatory Transparency in Financial Market Design: Evidence from the Corporate Bond Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
125 |
| The Efficiency of Race-Neutral Alternatives to Race-Based Affirmative Action: Evidence from Chicago's Exam Schools |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
182 |
| The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools |
0 |
1 |
3 |
202 |
3 |
10 |
27 |
659 |
| The Elite Illusion: Achievement Effects at Boston and New York Exam Schools |
0 |
1 |
5 |
137 |
1 |
7 |
24 |
518 |
| The Long-Term Effects of Universal Preschool in Boston |
2 |
2 |
4 |
99 |
4 |
9 |
30 |
412 |
| The Market for Borrowing Corporate Bonds |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
136 |
| The New York City High School Match |
0 |
1 |
2 |
37 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
167 |
| The Trade-off Between Prioritization and Vaccination Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
44 |
| The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match |
0 |
0 |
1 |
44 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
141 |
| Unobserved punishment supports cooperation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
| Who Benefits from KIPP? |
0 |
0 |
1 |
162 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
657 |
| Who Benefits from KIPP? |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
2 |
2 |
6 |
265 |
| Total Working Papers |
6 |
22 |
75 |
4,844 |
63 |
144 |
529 |
18,433 |
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