Access Statistics for Michael Peters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 1 7 65 3 9 35 339
A REVELATION PRINCIPLE FOR COMPETING MECHANISMS 2 7 19 219 7 17 48 794
An Ascending Double Auction 0 2 8 136 1 5 38 424
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 4 8 16 280 11 26 75 906
Competing Pre-marital Investments 2 2 9 64 3 6 29 354
Competing Premarital Investment 2 2 6 63 2 6 25 342
Competition Among Mechanism Designers in a Common Value Environment 1 1 4 43 1 3 11 320
Competition Among Sellers who offer Auctions Instead of Prices 1 2 15 135 9 25 94 611
Definable and Contractible Contracts 0 2 21 21 1 4 33 33
Dynamic Monopoly Power When Search is Costly 1 1 6 22 2 3 9 199
Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism 1 1 17 40 2 2 32 53
Innis Lecture: Hedonic Equilibrium 3 3 5 54 4 7 24 207
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 3 6 27 157 9 19 67 351
Internet Auctions with Many Traders 2 2 4 190 2 7 34 489
Internet Trading Mechanisms And Rational Expectations 2 3 4 54 4 10 32 235
Internet auctions with many traders 0 3 4 84 2 8 18 228
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with costlySearch 1 2 6 30 3 9 29 206
Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency 1 4 18 170 4 28 93 799
Non-cooperative foundations of hedonic equilibrium 1 1 8 17 3 4 27 56
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 2 3 10 116 4 7 20 683
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The case of Complete Contracts 1 2 2 32 4 7 19 276
Other Regarding Preferences: Outcomes, Intentions, or Interdependence 0 2 11 75 1 3 33 129
Pure Strategies and No Externalities with Multiple Agents 0 0 3 43 2 4 19 170
SELF-SELECTION WITH RENEGOTIATION 0 0 0 0 0 2 6 170
Self-Selection with Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 0 4 10 59
Surplus Extraction and Competition 6 9 14 81 7 12 27 339
Technical Appendix to Internet Auctions with Many Traders 0 0 0 21 0 0 3 82
The Pre-Marital Investment Game 1 5 12 81 5 19 57 459
The Pre-Marital Investment Game: Addendum 0 0 1 30 0 1 9 103
Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium 0 0 1 24 0 3 15 127
Unobservable Heterogeneity in Directed Search 2 4 12 31 3 5 25 118
Total Working Papers 39 78 270 2,378 99 265 996 9,661

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Competitive Distribution of Auctions 0 0 7 34 3 5 24 146
A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms 1 2 5 80 1 2 12 182
An ascending double auction 0 1 5 5 1 4 18 18
Bertrand Equilibrium with Capacity Constraints and Restricted Mobility 2 5 40 140 15 31 124 514
Common Agency and the Revelation Principle 0 0 0 0 3 9 15 367
Competing Premarital Investments 3 7 19 103 4 15 48 436
Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices 1 6 25 77 4 16 61 195
Competition among mechanism designers in a common value environment 0 0 4 63 0 0 10 364
Decentralized Markets and Endogenous Institutions 0 0 4 4 0 1 6 206
Equilibrium Mechanisms in a Decentralized Market 0 1 5 15 0 2 14 69
Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109] 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 16
Ex Ante Price Offers in Matching Games Non-steady States 3 4 20 65 5 10 51 1,136
Immobility, Rationing and Price Competition 0 0 2 5 0 0 4 39
Imperfectly Enforceable Labour Contracts 0 1 2 2 0 1 4 158
Incentive-Consistent Matching Processes for Problems with ex Ante Pricing 0 0 1 6 0 0 3 22
Innis Lecture: Hedonic equilibrium 4 5 21 34 8 12 48 98
Internet auctions with many traders 1 5 12 62 2 8 27 138
Labour contracts in a stock market economy 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 16
Limits of Exact Equilibria for Capacity Constrained Sellers with Costly Search 1 1 5 17 1 2 15 58
Market Equilibrium and the Resolution of Uncertainty 1 4 8 10 1 4 11 146
Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency 0 1 7 38 2 3 17 125
On the Efficiency of Ex Ante and Ex Post Pricing Institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 150
On the Equivalence of Walrasian and Non-Walrasian Equilibria in Contract Markets: The Case of Complete Contracts 0 1 6 20 1 3 11 63
Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents 1 2 2 8 1 2 4 29
Repeated Insurance Contracts with Adverse Selection and Limited Commitment 0 1 8 78 0 2 16 200
Research and development with publicly observable outcomes 0 1 3 5 1 3 11 45
Restrictions on Price Advertising 0 0 1 20 0 2 9 115
Self-selection and Monitoring in Dynamic Incentive Problems with Incomplete Contracts 0 2 3 17 0 2 7 106
Sequential Selling Mechanisms 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 235
Surplus Extraction and Competition 0 0 0 0 2 4 9 117
The pre-marital investment game 2 2 6 11 2 7 23 43
Total Journal Articles 20 52 221 924 57 150 615 5,552

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Statistics updated 2009-12-07