Access Statistics for Ronald Peeters

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Differentiable Homotopy to Compute Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games 0 3 11 50 2 8 34 167
A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute All Nash Equilibria of n-Person Games 0 0 0 98 1 2 9 193
A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Compute Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games 0 0 2 152 0 0 5 239
Alternating-move Hotelling with Demand Shocks 3 6 10 26 3 7 29 108
An experimental comparison of sequential first- and second-price auctions with synergies 2 5 8 21 4 9 35 71
Competition against peer-to-peer networks 1 5 31 77 10 23 104 150
Differentiated Product Markets: An Experimental Test of Two Equilibrium Concepts 0 1 2 55 0 9 45 172
Dynamic Competition with Consumer Inertia 19 29 29 29 7 8 8 8
Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games 0 1 3 27 0 3 11 115
Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games 0 1 8 236 0 1 16 285
Focal prices and price cycles in an alternating price duopoly experiment 1 1 5 16 22 51 131 143
Heterogeneous Interacting Economic Agents and Stochastic Games 0 2 4 20 0 2 13 88
Homotopy Methods to Compute Equilibria in Game Theory 5 11 40 109 9 27 89 256
Immaterial rewards and sanctions in a voluntary contribution experiment 1 2 17 17 5 6 31 31
Intertemporal Market Divison 0 0 0 16 1 2 12 246
Noncooperative Collusion and Price Wars with Individual Demand Fluctuations 1 3 19 33 6 12 55 78
On the structure of the set of correlated equilibria in two-by-two bimatrix games 1 4 8 77 2 5 12 289
Piracy on the internet: Accommodate it or fight it? A dynamic approach 2 15 15 15 6 15 15 15
Price dynamics and collusion under short-run price commitments 0 0 10 10 1 5 16 16
Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game 0 1 7 42 2 5 20 114
Sender-receiver games 1 2 2 137 1 6 9 687
Sequential Auctions with Synergies: The Paradox of Positive Synergies 0 0 9 28 1 5 25 108
Sequential auctions with synergies: An experimental analysis 0 2 7 34 2 6 22 103
Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components 0 0 8 20 3 6 24 36
Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games: Structure, Selection, and Computation 2 3 19 132 5 14 62 389
Strategic behavior in repeated voluntary contribution experiments 1 1 17 17 5 6 10 10
Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! 1 2 2 29 1 5 12 103
The impact of the irrelevant – Temporary buy-options and bidding behavior in online auctions 1 1 4 39 3 5 16 90
The role of monetary incentives in prediction markets: a time series approach 1 4 13 13 4 15 50 50
Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games 0 2 5 20 3 7 27 82
Total Working Papers 43 107 315 1,595 109 275 947 4,442

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Intertemporal market division:: A case of alternating monopoly 0 0 3 22 0 0 12 116
Intertemporal price competition with exogenous demand shocks 0 1 8 11 2 5 40 59
Pricing behavior in asymmetric markets with differentiated products 2 3 11 11 5 9 33 33
Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game 1 3 6 6 3 8 27 27
Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation 1 3 6 35 1 6 15 124
Synergies are a reason to prefer first-price auctions! 0 0 0 4 0 2 3 29
symposium articles: A differentiable homotopy to compute Nash equilibria of n -person games 0 3 3 72 1 4 10 346
Total Journal Articles 4 13 37 161 12 34 140 734

logo

LogEc Home

Top Working Papers
Top Journal Articles
Top Books
Top Chapters
Top Software Items

Top Authors

Top Working Paper series and Journals

About LogEc

Authors with papers registered in the RePEc Author Service.

Register yourself as an author or register more papers in the RePEc Author Service.

Authors with no registered papers

RePEc
LogEc provides access and usage for services based on the RePEc data set.

Örebro UniversityLogEc is hosted by the Swedish Business School at Örebro University.

Questions or comments? Please see our explanation of how the statistics are collected or e-mail

Statistics updated 2009-11-04