Access Statistics for Carolyn Pitchik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover 0 0 0 244 0 0 0 1,751
An Experimental Test of a Theory of Markets With Asymetric Information 0 0 0 39 0 1 5 118
Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones? 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 112
Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 78 0 0 2 167
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 181
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 1 149 1 2 3 468
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 180
Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 50 0 0 0 255
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 90
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 230
Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing 0 0 0 61 1 1 1 211
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 0 2 1,230 1 3 12 5,114
Internal and External Regulation of Markets with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 12 0 1 1 182
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 35 1 1 2 238
Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 52 0 0 1 143
Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly 0 0 0 171 0 0 1 379
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 49 1 1 1 254
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 112
Regulating Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 106
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 34 0 0 3 244
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 447
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 0 1 3 174
The "Big Link" Hypothesis in Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 82
Total Working Papers 0 0 3 2,490 5 13 43 11,238

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An economic theory of leadership turnover 0 0 0 60 0 1 1 263
Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information 0 0 0 55 0 2 3 197
Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 117 0 1 1 404
Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence 0 0 0 30 0 1 2 61
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 0 1 1,188 0 1 6 4,412
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 1 175 0 1 6 437
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission: Correction 0 0 0 3 0 0 4 214
Information Transmission in Regulated Markets 0 0 0 29 0 1 1 172
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 205
Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 58 0 0 5 179
Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly 0 0 2 420 0 1 6 823
Profit-sharing in a collusive industry 0 0 0 15 0 3 3 88
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 0 2 5 203
The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model 0 0 1 99 0 2 4 278
Total Journal Articles 0 0 5 2,269 0 16 47 7,936

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06