Access Statistics for Carolyn Pitchik

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An Economic Theory of Leadership Turnover 0 0 0 244 0 0 0 1,751
An Experimental Test of a Theory of Markets With Asymetric Information 0 0 0 39 1 2 4 116
Are Large Firms More Powerful Than Small Ones? 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 112
Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions 0 0 0 78 0 0 2 165
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions With Incomplete Information 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 180
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 148 0 0 0 465
Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions with Incomplete Information 0 0 0 66 0 0 0 180
Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 50 0 0 1 255
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 88
Equilibria for a Three-Person Location Problem 0 0 0 68 1 1 1 230
Equilibria of a Two-Person Non-Zero Sum Noisy Game of Timing 0 0 0 61 0 0 0 210
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 0 2 1,228 2 3 12 5,105
Internal and External Regulation of Markets with Asymmetric Information 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 181
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 35 0 0 1 236
Perfect Equilibria in Budget Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 52 1 1 2 143
Price Competition in a Capacity-Constrained Duopoly 0 0 0 171 1 1 1 379
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 49 0 0 3 253
Profit-Sharing in a Collusive Industry 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 112
Regulating Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 27 0 0 0 104
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 1 2 3 173
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 59 1 1 2 447
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 34 2 2 3 243
The "Big Link" Hypothesis in Markets With Asymmetric Information: An Experimental Study 0 0 0 7 1 1 3 82
Total Working Papers 0 0 2 2,487 11 14 41 11,210

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
An economic theory of leadership turnover 0 0 0 60 0 0 2 262
Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information 0 0 1 55 0 0 1 194
Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity 0 0 0 117 0 0 1 403
Commitment, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence 0 0 0 30 1 1 1 60
Equilibrium in Hotelling's Model of Spatial Competition 0 0 5 1,188 0 1 14 4,408
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission 0 0 1 175 0 1 4 434
Honesty in a Model of Strategic Information Transmission: Correction 0 0 0 3 1 1 3 213
Information Transmission in Regulated Markets 0 0 1 29 0 0 1 171
Irreversible, Unobservable, Costly Investment in the Presence of Rivals 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 205
Perfect Equilibria in Budget-Constrained Sequential Auctions: An Experimental Study 0 0 1 58 2 3 5 177
Price competition in a capacity-constrained duopoly 0 0 9 420 0 0 14 819
Profit-sharing in a collusive industry 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 85
Self-Promoting Investments 0 0 0 18 2 3 4 201
The Nature of Equilibrium in a Location Model 0 0 0 98 0 0 1 274
Total Journal Articles 0 0 18 2,268 6 10 52 7,906

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03