Access Statistics for Michel Poitevin

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Autonomie alimentaire - Définitions et concepts 0 0 8 91 2 8 34 205
Autonomie alimentaire et volatilité des prix: une comparaison internationale 0 0 3 20 0 5 20 62
Bank Value and Financial Fragility 0 0 0 215 5 9 16 851
Bank Value and Financial Fragility 0 0 0 270 0 2 6 888
Bank Value and Financial Fragility 0 0 0 104 1 7 13 291
COMPETITIVE SCREENING IN FINANCIAL MARKET WHEN BORROWERS CAN RECONTRACT 0 0 0 0 6 7 11 258
Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? 0 0 1 474 2 3 11 1,630
Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Devcentralization? 0 0 0 0 1 6 15 216
Collusion and Banking Structure of a Duopoly 0 0 0 0 2 4 8 316
Competitive Screening in Financial Market When Borrowers Can Recontract 0 0 0 0 2 3 10 111
Concurrence fiscale et biens publics 0 0 0 14 3 4 6 63
Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design 0 0 0 24 3 4 6 182
Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design 0 0 0 329 2 6 14 1,650
Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory 0 0 0 1 2 3 8 335
Contrat dynamique de partage de risque avec contraintes d'engagement et épargne 0 0 0 93 4 5 7 1,514
Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate 0 0 0 0 1 6 11 28
Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings 0 0 0 185 2 8 24 1,232
Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings 0 0 0 10 0 2 11 97
Disclosure of Information in regulatory Proceedings 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 133
Effects of the Fiscal Treatment of Tax Losses on the Efficiency of Markets and the Incidence of Mergers 0 0 0 90 0 2 10 515
Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility 0 0 0 57 5 6 12 281
Endogenous Value and Financial Fragility 0 0 0 50 0 1 3 355
Environmental Risk: Should Banks Be Liable? 0 2 3 148 3 5 9 627
Environmental Risks: Should Banks Be Liable? 0 0 0 168 3 4 11 811
Environmental Risks: Should Banks Be Liable? 0 0 0 64 3 3 14 669
Financial Signalling and the "Deep Pocket" Argument 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 359
INFORMATION ET MARCHE FINANCIERS: UNE REVUE DE LA LITTERATURE 0 0 0 0 0 1 7 236
Incentives, Informational Economies of Scale, and Benchmarking 0 0 1 97 1 1 10 274
Information et Marche Financiers: une Revue de la Litterature 0 0 0 0 1 1 9 96
Innis Lecture: Can the Theory of Incentives Explain Decentralization? 0 0 0 64 3 4 9 227
L'impartition municipale: l'argumentaire 0 0 0 30 1 1 5 272
Le role du collateral dans le report des investissements en presence d'asymetries d'information 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 279
Le role du collateral dans le report des investissements en presence d'asymetries d'information 0 0 0 1 3 4 12 130
MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND THE AGENCY COSTS OF DEBT FINANCE 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 591
MORAL HAZARD AND THE FINANCING OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 200
Managerial Compensation and the Agency Costs of Debt Finance 0 0 0 0 2 2 6 185
Marketing vs Engineering: Who Should Decide ? 0 0 0 94 5 5 8 459
Moral Hazard and the Financing of Entrepreneurial Firms 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 63
Non-Commitment and Savings in Dynamic Risk-Sharing Contracts 0 0 0 59 2 4 9 239
Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion 0 0 0 12 4 9 21 72
Organizational Design of R & D Activities 0 0 0 120 1 2 11 427
Organizational Design of R&D Activities 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 330
Organizational Design of R&D Activities 0 0 0 261 0 1 6 1,102
Organizational Design of R&D Activities 0 0 0 63 1 3 22 354
Organizational Design of R&D activities 0 0 0 216 4 6 13 1,147
Relance de l’économie et autonomie alimentaire - Éléments de réflexions 0 0 5 51 3 6 23 171
SIGNALLING AND RENEGOTIATION IN COMPETITIVE CONTRACTUAL MARKETS 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 187
Should a Non-Rival Public Good Always Be Provided Centrally? 0 0 0 23 3 3 5 41
Should a Non-Rival Public Good Always Be Provided Centrally? 0 0 0 22 1 3 6 61
Should a Non-rival Public Good Always be Provided Centrally? 0 0 1 13 0 0 4 36
Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally 0 0 0 14 0 3 15 49
Should a non-rival public good always be provided centrally? 0 0 0 16 2 5 14 38
Signalling and Renegotiation in Competitive Contractual Markets 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 60
Strategic Financial Signalling 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 322
Tarification optimale du gaz carbonique et élasticités dans les transports 1 1 1 8 1 2 6 37
The Commitment Value of Contracts Under Dynamic Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 2 2 9 75
The Commitment Value of Contracts Under Dynamic Renegotiation 0 0 0 0 2 3 6 184
The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations 0 0 0 29 2 6 13 209
The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations 0 0 0 2 1 7 12 59
The Progressivity of Equalization Payments in Federations 0 0 0 56 1 4 9 461
Using Ex Ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts 0 0 1 109 4 6 15 778
Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts 0 0 0 5 2 3 6 68
Using Ex-ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts 0 0 0 0 3 3 7 106
Éducation et frais de scolarité 0 0 0 43 3 4 4 184
Total Working Papers 1 3 24 3,816 119 229 647 23,488

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A theory of (de)centralization 0 0 0 11 1 5 14 55
Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities? 0 0 0 2 3 6 16 32
Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities? 0 0 0 7 2 4 6 68
Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? 0 0 0 0 4 7 10 18
Can the theory of incentives explain decentralization? 0 0 1 67 2 2 7 258
Collusion and the Banking Structure of a Duopoly 0 0 1 49 0 1 5 311
Commentaire sur le texte de Stylianos Perrakis 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 44
Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract 0 0 0 48 2 4 12 246
Contract Renegotiation: A Simple Framework and Implications for Organization Theory 0 0 0 33 3 3 5 450
Contrats financiers avec asymétrie de l’information dans un cadre dynamique 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 55
Decision-making in organizations: when to delegate and whom to delegate 0 0 0 19 3 4 14 101
Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 140
Ex Ante Payments in Self-Enforcing Risk-Sharing Contracts 0 0 0 43 0 6 12 156
Financial Signalling and the "Deep-Pocket" Argument 0 0 1 148 1 3 8 459
Information asymétrique, contraintes de liquidité et investissement 0 0 0 10 1 3 8 99
Information et marchés financiers: une revue de littérature 0 0 0 6 2 4 10 45
Le rôle du collatéral dans le report des investissements en présence d’asymétries d’information 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 58
News of the Association / Chronique de l'Association Minutes of the 36th Annual General Meeting of the Canadian Economics Association / L'Association Canadienne d'Economique, Sunday 2 June 2002, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 113
Non-commitment and savings in dynamic risk-sharing contracts 0 0 0 52 1 4 8 179
Optimal provision of a public good with costly exclusion 0 0 0 5 1 5 11 41
Signalling and Renegotiation in Contractual Relationships 0 0 0 53 1 3 6 287
Strategic financial signalling 0 0 0 51 1 3 8 158
The Commitment Value of Contracts under Dynamic Renegotiation 0 1 1 39 3 4 11 334
The progressivity of equalization payments in federations 0 0 0 19 1 4 10 144
Éducation et frais de scolarité 0 0 0 24 2 3 12 137
Total Journal Articles 0 1 4 698 35 79 209 3,988

Book File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Impartition: Fondements et analyses 0 0 1 5 1 5 12 4,649
Le Québec économique 7: Éducation et capital humain 0 0 1 8 5 5 16 67
Total Books 0 0 2 13 6 10 28 4,716

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Statistics updated 2026-05-06