Access Statistics for Indrajit Ray

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Market Games 0 0 0 36 0 1 5 78
A Characterisation of Trading Equilibria in Strategic Market Games 0 0 1 19 0 0 4 12
A Difficulty in Characterising Mixed Nash Equilibria in a Strategic Market Game 0 0 0 14 0 3 3 9
A Remark on the Consistency Principle for Games in Strategic Form 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 420
Buying and Selling in Strategic Market Games 0 0 0 337 0 0 2 3,870
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition 0 0 1 14 0 0 4 328
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game 0 0 0 53 0 1 3 52
Coarse Correlated Equilibria in an Abatement Game 0 0 1 105 0 1 2 184
Coarse correlated Equilibria in Linear Duopoly Games 0 0 1 37 0 0 2 85
Coarse correlated equilibria in an abatement game 0 0 0 47 1 2 5 86
Coarse correlation and coordination in a game 1 1 1 82 2 2 3 182
Coordination in 2 x 2 Games by Following Recommendations from Correlated Equilibria 0 0 3 58 1 3 12 188
Deriving Correlated Equilibrium as the Stable Standard of behavior of a Social Situation: A Note 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 30
Do we need to listen to all stakeholders?: communicating in a coordination game with private information 0 0 1 22 1 1 7 155
Efficiency in Correlated Equilibrium 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 153
Efficiency in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 25
Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 85
Equilibrium Design by Coarse Correlation in Quadratic Games 0 0 0 20 0 2 4 58
Following Recommendations from Public and Private Correlation Devices in a Game of Chicken 0 0 4 4 1 1 6 6
Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences 0 0 0 473 1 1 4 1,533
Improving Abatement Levels and Welfare by Coarse Correlation in an Environmental Game 0 0 0 28 0 1 2 80
Improving Nash by Coarse Correlation 0 0 1 69 0 0 2 86
Information Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 42
Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Battle of the Sexes with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 71 0 0 3 170
Information-Revelation and Coordination Using Cheap Talk in a Game with Two-Sided Private Information 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 88
Mixed Strategies in Strategic Market Games 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 149
Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions 0 0 0 63 0 0 0 394
Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions 0 0 0 27 1 1 1 127
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions 0 0 0 31 1 1 1 171
Multiple equilibria as a difficulty in understanding correlated distributions 0 0 0 26 0 0 1 186
Nash vs. Coarse Correlation 0 0 1 18 0 0 2 123
Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame- Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 15
Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games 0 0 0 2 1 2 3 27
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games 0 0 0 82 0 0 1 495
Partition Equilibria in a Japanese-English Auction with Discrete Bid Levels for the Wallet Game 0 0 0 25 1 1 4 49
Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game 1 1 1 174 1 1 2 557
Sunspots, Correlation And Competition 0 0 0 32 0 0 0 129
Sunspots, Correlation and Competition 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2
Transparency is Overrated: Communicating in a Coordination Game with Private Information 0 0 0 61 0 1 3 146
Transparency is overrated: communicating in a coordination game with private information 0 0 1 33 0 0 1 109
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots 0 0 6 6 0 2 2 2
Total Working Papers 2 2 23 2,164 15 32 103 10,686

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions 0 0 1 24 0 1 4 113
A note on the wallet game with discrete bid levels 0 0 0 1 3 5 5 24
Buying and selling in strategic market games 0 0 0 38 0 1 2 155
Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibrium: A Definition 0 0 0 68 0 0 1 201
Coarse correlated equilibria in linear duopoly games 0 0 0 6 1 2 5 50
Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games 0 0 0 13 0 2 4 121
Correlated equilibrium as a stable standard of behavior 0 0 0 57 0 0 0 494
Efficiency in correlated equilibrium 0 0 0 41 1 2 2 119
Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification 0 0 1 69 1 1 5 315
Equilibrium design in an n-player quadratic game 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 5
Game Theory via Revealed Preferences 0 0 4 96 0 3 8 283
Improving Nash by coarse correlation 0 0 0 34 1 2 5 123
Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information 0 1 3 3 0 1 3 5
Nash versus coarse correlation 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 40
Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games 0 0 1 7 0 1 3 52
On games with identical equilibrium payoffs 0 0 0 40 0 0 2 125
Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3
Simple Mediation in a Cheap-Talk Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4
Slot allocation: A model of competition between firms when consumers are procedurally rational 0 0 0 30 0 1 3 172
Sunspots, correlation and competition 0 0 0 15 1 2 3 88
“Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies”: Back to the roots 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 7
Total Journal Articles 0 1 11 551 9 27 71 2,499

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Statistics updated 2025-09-05