Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 95
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 1 50 0 1 4 110
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 0 2 3 125
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 0 0 3 127
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 0 0 0 987
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 54
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 89
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 1 1 4 203
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 0 0 2 190
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 0 0 0 76 2 2 5 320
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 1 10 0 0 1 26
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 148 1 1 9 867
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 2 2 21 31 2 3 35 63
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 1 1 1 191
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 222
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 1 2 3 92
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 0 0 7 281
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 2 67 0 2 5 199
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 0 0 1 192
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 103
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 36 1 2 2 173
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 0 0 3 471
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 0 0 5 500
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 0 0 6 110
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 0 0 1 76
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 1 64 0 1 8 210
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 25
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 0 0 2 137
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 1 1 2 300
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 1 1 3 112
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 0 2 3 93
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 1 2 4 30
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 2 2 4 88
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 1 3 0 0 2 38
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 0 0 2 80
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 0 0 1 3 10 10
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 0 0 2 248
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 303 1 1 3 54
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 53 0 0 0 317
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 1 2 3 217
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 0 0 5 495
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 0 0 2 567
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 2 79 0 0 5 187
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 2 75 0 0 8 234
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 1 46 0 0 1 228
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 0 0 67 0 0 1 271
Total Working Papers 2 2 32 2,269 17 34 177 9,826

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 1 1 2 1 2 2 3
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 1 6 13 766
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 1 1 2 296
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 0 0 7 718
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 0 1 9 867
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 0 0 0 61 0 1 7 794
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 0 1 7 786
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 0 2 6 809
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 2 85 1 1 14 974
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 1 120 0 2 13 1,238
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 0 0 6 870
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 315
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 0 1 8 785
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 0 1 9 719
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 1 4 2 3 8 14
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 2 3 8 876
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 0 4 143 1 1 17 1,376
Stability in coalition formation games 0 0 1 187 0 0 10 1,254
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 0 1 1 0 0 10 11
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 0 0 2 26
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 3 6 1 1 6 13
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 1 2 7 704
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 17
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 2 2 6 750
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 0 0 8 825
Total Journal Articles 0 1 16 1,451 13 31 187 15,806

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Statistics updated 2025-10-06