Access Statistics for Antonio Romero Medina

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Sex-equal" Stable matching 0 0 0 1 1 2 6 100
(Group) Strategy-proofness and stability in many-to many marching markets 0 0 1 50 4 6 10 116
- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM 0 0 0 12 2 5 9 131
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 0 46 2 5 8 133
A methodology to measure hospital quality using physicians' choices over training vacancies 0 0 0 107 2 3 3 990
Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets 0 0 0 10 0 3 3 57
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 16 3 5 5 94
Boosting scientific research: evidence from a public program 0 0 0 19 2 5 8 208
COALITON FORMATION AND STABILITY 0 0 0 44 3 3 5 193
Can We Measure Hospital Quality from Physicians' Choices? 0 0 0 76 2 5 11 327
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 148 7 9 12 876
Centralized Course Allocation 0 0 0 10 3 4 5 31
Complementarities in childcare allocation under priorities 0 0 13 31 6 6 30 69
Converging to Efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program Experience 0 0 0 9 5 7 8 198
Converging to efficiency: the Ramón y Cajal Program experience 0 0 0 25 4 6 8 229
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 54 2 6 8 287
Fair School Placement 0 0 0 25 3 3 7 96
Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 67 1 2 5 201
Games of capacities: a (close) look to Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 41 3 7 7 199
Games with Capacity Manipulation: Incentives and Nash Equilibria 0 0 0 26 0 1 2 104
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 1 1 1 37 7 8 12 183
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 36 2 3 3 503
Group strategy-proof stable mechanisms in priority-based resource allocation under multi-unit demand: a note 0 0 0 123 3 6 8 477
Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations 0 0 0 20 1 2 8 112
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 0 4 5 5 23
Non-revelation Mechanisms in Many-to-One Markets 0 0 0 25 4 5 6 81
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 1 64 4 5 12 216
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 1 1 39 41 66
On Stability and Efficiency in School Choice Problems 0 0 0 54 4 7 8 144
Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy 0 0 0 35 3 3 4 303
Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem 0 0 0 27 3 5 8 118
School Choice with Transferable Students Characteristics 0 0 0 41 3 5 8 98
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 5 6 10 14 41
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 1 3 0 5 7 43
Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems 0 0 0 11 1 4 9 93
Stability in one-sided matching markets 0 0 0 16 3 5 7 86
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation 0 0 1 1 4 4 12 15
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 1 2 305 1 4 9 60
Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement 0 0 0 94 3 3 5 252
Students' assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 53 0 1 1 318
Students’ Assessment of Higher Education in Spain 0 0 0 54 4 5 8 222
Students’ assessment of higher education in Spain 0 0 0 0 2 5 6 6
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 150 3 6 8 574
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 0 34 7 12 14 509
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 1 79 2 4 8 192
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 75 2 8 15 243
Understanding preference formation in a matching market 0 0 1 46 4 7 11 238
Wage expectations for higher education students in Spain 0 0 0 67 5 7 8 279
Total Working Papers 1 2 23 2,273 141 276 425 10,134

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A fair procedure in a marriage market 0 0 1 2 3 5 7 8
Acyclicity and singleton cores in matching markets 0 0 0 51 4 7 15 774
BOOSTING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH: EVIDENCE FROM A PUBLIC PROGRAM 0 0 0 29 2 4 7 301
CAN WE INFER HOSPITAL QUALITY FROM MEDICAL GRADUATES’ RESIDENCY CHOICES? 0 0 0 44 6 7 7 725
Coalition Formation and Stability 0 0 0 104 0 1 7 870
Equitable Selection in Bilateral Matching Markets 1 1 1 62 2 3 5 797
Fair student placement 0 0 0 63 4 6 9 793
Games with capacity manipulation: incentives and Nash equilibria 0 0 0 73 3 7 10 817
Hiring Procedures to Implement Stable Allocations 0 0 2 85 3 4 10 978
Implementation of stable solutions in a restricted matching market 0 0 0 120 2 5 12 1,243
More on preference and freedom 0 0 0 67 3 6 7 876
Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets 0 0 0 40 5 5 5 320
On Preference, Freedom and Diversity 0 0 0 64 2 5 10 791
Relinquishing power, exploitation and political unemployment in democratic organizations 0 0 0 49 4 9 13 728
School choice with transferable student characteristics 0 0 0 4 2 7 14 23
Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem 0 0 0 94 1 3 7 879
Simple Mechanisms to Implement the Core of College Admissions Problems 0 0 3 144 3 5 18 1,387
Stability in coalition formation games 0 0 1 187 3 4 9 1,259
Strategic priority-based course allocation 0 1 1 2 6 10 19 24
Strategy‐proof and group strategy‐proof stable mechanisms: An equivalence 0 0 1 8 1 2 3 28
Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 4 7 4 9 18 26
The impact of public research contracts on scientific productivity 0 0 0 45 1 3 5 707
Two-sided strategy-proofness in many-to-many matching markets 0 0 1 2 5 8 10 25
Wage Expectations for Higher Education Students in Spain 0 0 0 44 1 2 4 752
`Sex-Equal' Stable Matchings 0 0 0 65 3 3 11 834
Total Journal Articles 1 2 15 1,455 73 130 242 15,965

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Statistics updated 2026-02-12