Access Statistics for Remzi Sanver

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 17 0 0 0 14
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 36 1 1 1 89
Ability or motivation? Voter registration and turnout in Burkina Faso 0 0 0 4 0 3 6 8
Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? 0 0 0 8 0 1 1 46
Absolute Qualified Majoritarianism: How Does the Threshold Matter? 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 24
Absolute qualified majoritarianism: how does the threshold matter? 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 3
An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 7
Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 8
Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 19
Compromise Rules Revisited 0 0 0 9 0 0 0 26
Compromising as an equal loss principle 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 17
Hyper-Stable Social Welfare Functions 0 0 0 33 1 1 1 96
Hyper-stable social welfare functions 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 15
Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
MONOTONICITY VIOLATIONS UNDER PLURALITY WITH A RUNOFF: THE CASE OF FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 0 1 3 10 1 3 13 36
Measuring consensus in a preference-approval context 0 1 1 14 0 1 1 85
Metrizable preferences over preferences 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections 0 0 0 6 1 1 2 5
On Domains That Admit Well-behaved Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions 0 0 0 40 0 3 4 130
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
Positively Responsive Collective Choice Rules and Majority Rule: A Generalization of May’s Theorem to Many Alternatives 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 33
Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives 0 0 0 7 0 1 3 22
Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: A generalization of May’s theorem to many alternatives 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 13
Positively responsive collective choice rules and majority rule: a generalization of May's theorem to many alternatives 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 106
Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited 0 0 0 4 1 1 1 18
Procedural versus Opportunity-Wise Equal Treatment of Alternatives: Neutrality Revisited 0 0 0 29 0 1 1 68
REVISITING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE NO-SHOW PARADOX AND MONOTONICITY * 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 28
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 13
Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 7
Simple but powerful models of stereotype formation * 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 6
Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence 0 0 0 13 0 1 5 109
Strong Equilibrium Outcomes of Voting Games are the Generalized Condorcet Winners 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 364
The Future of Economic Design 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 28
The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers 0 0 0 0 1 2 5 31
The Future of Economic Design: The Continuing Development of a Field as Envisioned by Its Researchers 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 15
The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 4
Uniform Random Dictatorship: A characterization without strategy-proofness * 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
Total Working Papers 0 2 5 273 10 29 73 1,539
1 registered items for which data could not be found

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
A characterization of superdictatorial domains for strategy-proof social choice functions 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 29
A characterization of the Copeland solution 0 0 0 39 3 3 4 97
A general impossibility result on strategy-proof social choice hyperfunctions 0 0 1 27 0 1 3 117
A minimax procedure for electing committees 0 0 0 28 0 1 1 157
A new monotonicity condition for tournament solutions 0 0 1 21 0 0 3 82
A solution to the two-person implementation problem 0 0 0 5 0 0 1 24
Absolute qualified majoritarianism: How does the threshold matter? 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 24
An Allocation Rule with Wealth‐Regressive Tax Rates 0 0 0 28 0 0 0 164
An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation 0 0 0 3 0 1 3 18
An individual manipulability of positional voting rules 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 57
Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited 0 0 0 2 1 4 9 19
Another characterization of the majority rule 0 0 1 73 0 1 4 173
Arrovian impossibilities in aggregating preferences over non-resolute outcomes 0 0 0 14 0 0 4 91
Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach 0 0 0 12 0 0 0 56
Choosers as extension axioms 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 42
Compromise Rules Revisited 0 1 2 5 1 2 3 44
Compromising as an equal loss principle 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 5
Correction to: Anonymous, neutral, and resolute social choice revisited 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 5
Dictatorial domains in preference aggregation 0 0 0 56 0 0 0 113
Efficiency in the Degree of Compromise: A New Axiom for Social Choice 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 16
Eighth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 26
Ensuring Pareto Optimality by Referendum Voting 0 0 1 21 0 0 1 108
Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies 0 0 0 8 0 0 1 101
Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1 0 0 0 15 0 0 0 105
Evaluating the Degree of Manipulability of Certain Aggregation Procedures under Multiple Choices 0 0 0 30 0 0 0 121
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness 0 0 1 13 0 1 4 49
Expected Utility Consistent Extensions of Preferences 0 0 0 20 0 0 0 75
Hyper-stable social welfare functions 0 0 0 6 2 2 6 44
Implementing Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational Outcomes by Veto 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 29
Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms 0 0 0 16 0 1 1 93
Is abstention an escape from Arrow’s theorem? 0 0 0 19 1 1 1 61
Maskin monotonic aggregation rules 0 0 0 40 0 0 1 141
Metrizable preferences over preferences 0 0 0 6 0 1 2 27
Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules 0 0 0 30 0 0 1 130
Monotonicity properties and their adaptation to irresolute social choice rules 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 43
Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 10
Nash implementability of the plurality rule over restricted domains 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 77
Nash implementation of the majority rule 0 0 0 27 0 0 2 69
Nash implementation via hyperfunctions 0 0 0 12 0 0 1 54
Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards 0 0 0 34 0 0 1 151
Nash implementing social choice rules with restricted ranges 0 0 0 7 0 0 1 32
On combining implementable social choice rules 0 0 0 64 0 0 0 129
On domains that admit well-behaved strategy-proof social choice functions 0 0 0 14 0 1 6 106
On the alternating use of "unanimity" and "surjectivity" in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem 0 0 0 11 0 0 0 48
On the manipulability of voting rules: The case of 4 and 5 alternatives 0 0 0 31 0 0 3 79
On the subgame perfect implementability of voting rules 0 0 0 5 0 2 3 16
One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness 0 0 0 21 0 0 0 69
POSITIVELY RESPONSIVE COLLECTIVE CHOICE RULES AND MAJORITY RULE: A GENERALIZATION OF MAY'S THEOREM TO MANY ALTERNATIVES 0 0 1 12 0 0 2 35
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 17
Restricting the domain allows for weaker independence 0 0 0 2 1 2 2 43
Revisiting the connection between the no-show paradox and monotonicity 0 0 1 2 1 1 4 24
Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 79
Sets of alternatives as Condorcet winners 0 0 0 40 1 2 2 137
Simple Collective Identity Functions 0 0 0 18 0 1 2 134
Simple but Powerful Models of Stereotype Formation 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 5
Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 23
Sophisticated preference aggregation 0 0 0 14 0 0 0 45
Stereotype formation as trait aggregation 0 0 0 18 2 3 3 99
Strategy-proof resolute social choice correspondences 0 0 0 37 0 0 0 120
Strategy-proofness of the plurality rule over restricted domains 0 0 0 6 0 0 1 48
Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners 0 0 0 44 1 1 3 171
The relationship between Arrow’s and Wilson’s theorems on restricted domains 0 1 1 2 0 1 3 7
Voting games of resolute social choice correspondences 0 0 0 7 0 2 2 38
Well-designed incentive schemes: introduction to the special issue in honor of Semih Koray 0 0 2 4 0 1 16 26
Which dictatorial domains are superdictatorial? A complete characterization for the Gibbard–Satterthwaite impossibility 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 14
Total Journal Articles 0 2 12 1,043 18 45 134 4,391

Chapter File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference 0 0 0 0 1 1 5 17
How to Elect a Representative Committee Using Approval Balloting 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4
Introduction to the Handbook on Approval Voting 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8
Minimal Maskin Monotonic Extensions of Tournament Solutions 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 8
The Basic Approval Voting Game 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 9
Total Chapters 0 0 0 1 2 2 11 49

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Statistics updated 2025-03-03