Access Statistics for Patrick W. Schmitz

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes Men," Integrity, and the Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts 0 0 2 2 2 2 14 14
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 4 14 29 163 5 26 65 405
Allocating control in agency problems with limited liability and sequential hidden actions 1 3 23 90 2 7 65 263
Auctions with Anticipated Emotions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Prices 1 2 15 83 3 8 41 195
Ausgewählte Anwendungen der Theorie unvollständiger Verträge 0 0 6 21 2 5 17 44
Book Review of “Bargaining Theory with Applications” (Muthoo, 1999) 0 3 19 41 3 11 45 95
Book Review of “Contract Theory” (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) 4 8 28 85 13 30 84 199
Book Review of “Inflation and the Enforcement of Contracts” (Renner, 1999) 0 0 1 8 1 1 9 36
Book Review of “On Voting: a public choice approach” (Tullock, 1998) 1 3 4 13 3 6 13 33
Book Review of “Property Rights: Cooperation, Conflict, and Law” (Anderson and McChesney, 2003) 0 2 7 22 0 2 18 49
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 0 1 2 112 0 2 12 330
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 2 3 8 73 5 9 25 227
Can Coasean bargaining justify Pigouvian taxation? 1 1 4 34 4 6 20 123
Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidence 6 16 58 58 13 33 106 106
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 1 3 11 11 2 7 34 60
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 5 7 35 56 15 22 100 157
Cognitive Abilities and Behavioral Biases 1 3 24 86 7 17 66 117
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 2 14 39 2 8 45 80
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 0 1 14 14 3 11 31 43
Cooling-Off in Negotiations - Does It Work? 3 4 14 40 7 10 47 115
Der Effekt von Nachverhandlungen auf Investitionen mit Eigen- und Fremdwirkung 1 1 2 9 3 3 9 26
Der Lock in Effekt und das Hold up Problem 2 4 14 26 9 15 59 105
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 1 1 3 13 2 2 12 35
Die theoretische Fundierung unvollständiger Verträge 1 2 5 16 1 6 18 40
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 1 8 8 2 13 27 27
Exclusive versus Non-exclusive Licensing Strategies and Moral Hazard 3 9 28 101 9 23 120 320
Garbled Elections 0 1 1 27 0 1 10 80
Garbled Elections 0 0 0 5 0 0 6 31
Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence 5 18 46 46 45 98 138 138
Incomplete Contracts, the Hold-Up Problem and Asymmetric Information 11 22 60 168 19 34 120 324
Information Gathering and the Hold-Up Problem in a Complete Contracting Framework 6 11 20 20 9 21 39 39
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach 6 15 53 409 13 31 115 742
Job Protection Laws and Agency Problems Under Asymmetric Information 2 6 16 72 5 16 65 284
Joint Ownership and Incomplete Contracts: The Case of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 3 8 97 1 6 29 351
Joint Ownership and the Hold-up Problem Under Asymmetric Information 2 6 23 63 7 18 74 172
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 0 1 6 6 0 1 12 12
Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 3 9 18 18 5 13 34 34
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods under Private Information 5 9 20 37 6 13 33 73
On Randomization in Coalition Contracts 2 5 11 11 2 6 13 13
On Second Price Auctions and Imperfect Competition 2 7 18 86 3 11 32 255
On Synergies and Vertical Integration 0 0 0 1 5 12 54 1,314
On simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 2 6 16 16 3 10 34 34
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 3 7 22 22 7 19 54 54
On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation 4 8 17 17 6 10 27 27
Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights in Dynamic R&D Alliances 0 2 12 148 3 10 28 356
Optimal Contracting in Agency with Verifiable Ex Post Information 3 5 16 100 5 10 37 288
Optimal Contracting with Verifiable Ex Post Signals 0 0 3 82 0 0 10 394
Optimal Selling Strategies When Buyers May Have Hard Information 2 7 19 87 9 23 58 208
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 3 10 23 23 4 12 35 35
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 1 4 23 23 6 14 46 46
Public Versus Private Ownership: Quantity Contracts and the Allocation of Investment Tasks 3 12 46 46 5 23 78 78
Repeated Moral Hazard, Limited Liability, and Renegotiation 1 5 27 73 5 14 64 136
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 0 1 7 104 2 9 32 314
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 1 2 11 69 4 9 44 243
Reserve prices in auctions as reference points 1 2 17 113 4 9 35 324
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 1 5 15 65 8 20 44 205
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 0 4 10 46 2 7 23 144
Signaling an Outside Option 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3
Sollten Haftungsregeln durch Strafen ergänzt werden? 0 0 1 8 2 5 13 29
Task Scheduling and Moral Hazard 1 4 10 51 2 8 31 118
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 3 5 14 28 8 13 36 67
The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures 5 14 22 22 9 28 44 44
The Hold-Up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 6 10 47 47 8 17 67 67
Unmöglichkeitstheoreme bei asymmetrischer Information 0 0 1 10 0 0 2 20
Unvollständige Verträge und die Grenzen der Firma 0 2 5 16 1 5 15 34
Vertikale Unternehmenskooperationen 8 8 11 21 16 16 29 48
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 3 9 33 144 13 31 169 775
Total Working Papers 134 340 1,107 3,672 373 891 2,934 11,197

Journal Article File Downloads Abstract Views
Last month 3 months 12 months Total Last month 3 months 12 months Total
"Yes men", integrity, and the optimal design of incentive contracts 0 0 0 43 1 2 11 132
Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions 0 0 0 2 16 51 148 543
Anderson, T. L., and McChesney, F. S. (Eds.): Property Rights – Cooperation, Conflict, and Law 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Book reviews 0 0 2 2 0 1 8 10
Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation? 1 4 5 21 2 8 35 90
Die Bedeutung von privater Information für Vertragsbeziehungen zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern 0 0 0 0 3 6 14 93
ENDOGENOUS PUNISHMENTS IN AGENCY WITH VERIFIABLE EX POST INFORMATION * 0 0 7 35 0 4 30 161
Erratum to 'On the Joint Use of Liability and Safety Regulation': [International Review of Law and Economics (2000), 20, 371-382] 0 0 0 19 0 0 1 59
Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements? Comment 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 492
Exclusive versus non-exclusive licensing strategies and moral hazard 2 7 19 52 3 9 34 121
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information 4 12 31 48 6 14 50 81
Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach 7 18 81 246 13 33 174 612
Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework 6 13 28 28 8 16 50 50
Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information 2 6 15 56 3 7 22 145
Joint Ownership And Incomplete Contracts: The Case Of Perfectly Substitutable Investments 0 1 4 18 1 2 18 61
Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information 4 10 23 35 5 12 39 71
Know-how disclosure and incomplete contracts 1 3 7 72 2 4 10 137
On Monopolistic Licensing Strategies under Asymmetric Information 1 7 20 90 1 7 24 169
On second-price auctions and imperfect competition 2 7 14 66 2 10 45 170
On synergies and vertical integration 0 0 6 82 2 5 17 180
On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems 4 9 19 108 6 15 38 234
On the joint use of liability and safety regulation 4 8 20 69 6 10 25 149
Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances 0 1 6 79 0 5 20 159
Optimal selling strategies when buyers may have hard information 2 6 16 62 9 15 53 178
Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered 0 0 0 0 6 19 65 221
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining 0 1 1 1 2 11 19 19
Randomization in Coalition Contracts 2 6 13 44 2 6 16 94
Randomization in coalition contracts 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 21
Reserve Prices in Auctions as Reference Points 3 7 34 92 6 13 90 267
Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced? 2 7 18 65 3 12 46 211
Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem 5 9 25 128 6 11 40 490
Task scheduling and moral hazard 1 5 10 14 1 6 26 38
The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights 2 6 18 25 2 8 23 42
The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory 0 0 0 0 6 22 82 576
Workplace surveillance, privacy protection, and efficiency wages 1 8 26 158 3 14 81 662
Total Journal Articles 56 161 468 1,761 126 358 1,377 6,740

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04