| Working Paper |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| Antidumping Duties Under Asymmetric Cost Information |
0 |
0 |
1 |
51 |
1 |
1 |
6 |
209 |
| Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
108 |
2 |
3 |
7 |
392 |
| Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy Under Asymmetric Information |
0 |
0 |
0 |
73 |
1 |
5 |
8 |
226 |
| Fixed-prize tournaments versus first-price auctions in innovation contests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
66 |
0 |
3 |
11 |
260 |
| Hidden Benefits of Reward: A Field Experiment on Motivation and Monetary Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
45 |
1 |
2 |
16 |
135 |
| Hidden Benefits of Reward: A Field Experiment on Motivation and Monetary Incentives |
0 |
0 |
1 |
103 |
4 |
8 |
18 |
662 |
| Incentives to Motivate |
0 |
0 |
0 |
110 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
284 |
| Incentives to Motivate |
0 |
1 |
2 |
56 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
147 |
| Labor-Market Conditions and Leadership Styles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
10 |
1 |
5 |
18 |
49 |
| Leadership Styles and Labor-Market Conditions |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
3 |
5 |
20 |
51 |
| Leadership Styles and Labor-Market Conditions |
0 |
1 |
3 |
54 |
4 |
9 |
27 |
177 |
| Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
0 |
4 |
14 |
104 |
| Minimum Wages and Excessive Effort Supply |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
0 |
2 |
11 |
107 |
| Motivation and Incentives in an Online Labor Market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
13 |
3 |
4 |
14 |
57 |
| Motivation and incentives in an online labor market |
0 |
0 |
0 |
81 |
3 |
5 |
16 |
73 |
| Non-Competitive Wage-Setting as a Cause of Unfriendly and Inefficient Leadership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
2 |
5 |
9 |
55 |
| Non-Competitive Wage-Setting as a Cause of Unfriendly and Inefficient Leadership |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
4 |
5 |
9 |
185 |
| Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
26 |
2 |
13 |
23 |
97 |
| Optimal Allocation of Decision-Making Authority and the Provision of Incentives under Uncertainty |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
3 |
7 |
14 |
44 |
| Optimal Sales Force Compensation |
0 |
0 |
1 |
48 |
3 |
6 |
17 |
173 |
| Promotion tournaments and individual performance pay |
0 |
0 |
0 |
52 |
1 |
3 |
14 |
188 |
| Relational contracts and job design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
92 |
1 |
3 |
11 |
374 |
| Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
68 |
1 |
8 |
23 |
390 |
| Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
1 |
8 |
18 |
168 |
| Relative Performance Pay, Bonuses, and Job-Promotion Tournaments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
72 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
279 |
| Strategic Use of Unfriendly Leadership and Labor Market Competition: An Experimental Analysis |
0 |
0 |
2 |
23 |
2 |
4 |
18 |
24 |
| Strategic Use of Unfriendly Leadership and Labor Market Competition: An Experimental Analysis |
0 |
0 |
1 |
4 |
3 |
5 |
19 |
24 |
| Subsidising Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
3 |
6 |
10 |
| Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
1 |
8 |
12 |
22 |
| Subsidizing Technological Innovations in the Presence of R&D Spillovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
6 |
18 |
27 |
| Subsidizing technological innovations in the presence of R&D spillovers |
0 |
0 |
0 |
9 |
2 |
4 |
6 |
91 |
| Technological choice under organizational diseconomies of scale |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
1 |
3 |
5 |
207 |
| Technology Choice and Incentives under Relative Performance Schemes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
4 |
9 |
16 |
99 |
| Technology Choice, Relative Performance Pay, and Worker Heterogeneity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
1 |
3 |
39 |
| Wage Floors and Optimal Job Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
6 |
2 |
3 |
10 |
81 |
| Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
1 |
6 |
17 |
147 |
| Wage Floors, Imperfect Performance Measures, and Optimal Job Design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
2 |
7 |
18 |
99 |
| Wage floors and optimal job design |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
35 |
| Total Working Papers |
0 |
2 |
12 |
1,414 |
67 |
178 |
504 |
5,791 |
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