Access Statistics for Arunava Sen

Author contact details at EconPapers.

Working Paper	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Working Paper	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments	1	3	10	23	2	4	21	75
Implementation in Generic Environments	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	68
Incentive Compatibility in Multi-unit Auctions	0	2	14	64	1	7	35	318
Mechanism design by observant and informed planners	0	0	5	29	0	0	16	105
Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible Voting Schemes joint with Dipjyoti Majumdar	0	1	5	65	1	6	29	270
Ordinally Bayesian incentive-compatible voting schemes	0	0	4	29	0	0	13	128
Strategy-proof Cardinal Decision Schemes	0	2	14	59	0	3	25	137
Strategyproofness and Decomposability: Strict Orderning	0	0	0	0	1	1	17	330
Strategyproofness and decomposability: Weak Orderings	0	0	0	3	0	2	18	377
VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION IN NASH EQUILIBRIUM	0	0	0	0	5	9	36	210
Total Working Papers	1	8	52	272	12	34	215	2,018

Journal Article	File Downloads				Abstract Views
Journal Article	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total	Last month	3 months	12 months	Total
A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation	2	4	17	43	4	6	27	103
Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem	2	2	18	83	2	2	26	139
Corrigendum to "Strategy-proof social choice correspondences" [J. Econ. Theory 101 (2001) 374-394]	0	0	1	8	0	0	4	55
Dictatorial domains	1	1	15	68	1	1	33	244
Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information Environments	1	3	4	13	2	4	11	51
Implementation in generic environments	0	0	0	0	2	2	5	101
Implementation under strong equilibrium: A complete characterization	1	4	14	46	1	8	24	76
Ordinally Bayesian Incentive Compatible Voting Rules	1	1	2	30	2	2	11	197
Ranking Opportunity Sets and Arrow Impossibility Theorems: Correspondence Results	0	1	2	16	0	1	9	79
Separable Preferences, Strategyproofness, and Decomposability	0	0	0	0	0	2	15	153
Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods	1	2	4	15	1	2	8	57
Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences	1	1	3	19	2	3	14	78
Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition	1	2	16	53	2	3	29	112
Top-Pair and Top-Triple Monotonicity	0	0	0	11	0	1	7	36
Virtual Implementation in Nash Equilibrium	2	2	17	91	7	9	38	600
Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation	2	4	12	33	3	11	47	184
Total Journal Articles	15	27	125	529	29	57	308	2,265

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Statistics updated 2009-11-04