| Journal Article |
File Downloads |
Abstract Views |
| Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
Last month |
3 months |
12 months |
Total |
| A Four-Flagged Lemma |
0 |
0 |
0 |
19 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
64 |
| A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation: B. Dutta and A. Sen, Review of economic studies 58 (1991), 121-128 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
61 |
2 |
2 |
4 |
151 |
| Auctioning the Provision of an Indivisible Public Good |
0 |
0 |
0 |
48 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
152 |
| Bargaining over a finite set of alternatives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
32 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
122 |
| Book reviews |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
| Characterizing approval voting |
0 |
0 |
0 |
29 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
| Characterizing fidelity for reflexive choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
35 |
| Choice, hull, continuity and fidelity |
0 |
0 |
0 |
4 |
1 |
1 |
2 |
28 |
| Class conflict and fairness in “democratic capitalism” |
0 |
0 |
1 |
10 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
24 |
| Competitive capitalism and cooperative labor management in a dynamic nutshell |
0 |
0 |
0 |
40 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
286 |
| Cooperative interim contract and re-contract: Chandler's M-form firm |
0 |
0 |
0 |
98 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,002 |
| Core is manipulable via segmentation |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
82 |
| Does majoritarian approval matter in selecting a social choice rule? An exploratory panel study |
0 |
0 |
0 |
33 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
125 |
| Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium--a note on the nature of competition |
0 |
0 |
0 |
12 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
78 |
| Equilibrium outcomes of Lindahl-endowment pretension games1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
105 |
| Equivalence and Stability Results for Two Forms of Workers' Enterprise Facing Imperfect Labor Markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
113 |
| Existence of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems |
0 |
0 |
0 |
5 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
42 |
| Explorations in aggregating choices |
0 |
0 |
0 |
7 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
38 |
| Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria |
0 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
11 |
| Manipulability of the men- (women-) optimal matching rule via endowments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
49 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
164 |
| Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
27 |
1 |
1 |
1 |
91 |
| Nash implementation: A full characterization: J. Moore and R. Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990), 1083-1099 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
143 |
1 |
1 |
4 |
327 |
| On the continuity of closed convex hull |
0 |
0 |
1 |
24 |
0 |
0 |
2 |
96 |
| On the routewise application of choice |
0 |
1 |
4 |
54 |
0 |
1 |
6 |
208 |
| Prakash and Sertel's theory of non-cooperative equilibria in social systems -- twenty years later |
0 |
0 |
0 |
34 |
2 |
2 |
3 |
99 |
| Pretend-but-perform contracts in sharecropping |
0 |
0 |
2 |
28 |
0 |
1 |
5 |
277 |
| Pretend-but-perform regulation and limit pricing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
78 |
| Profit-maximizing design of enterprises through incentives |
0 |
0 |
0 |
22 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
71 |
| Pseudo-experimental estimates of labor supply functions in two Turkish state enterprises |
0 |
0 |
0 |
36 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
300 |
| Ranking Committees, Income Streams or Multisets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
8 |
1 |
2 |
2 |
59 |
| Ranking committees, income streams or multisets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
17 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
73 |
| Regulating a duopoly by a Pretend-but-Perform Mechanism |
0 |
2 |
2 |
33 |
1 |
3 |
3 |
70 |
| Routes and paths of comparison and choice |
0 |
0 |
2 |
5 |
0 |
0 |
3 |
26 |
| Strong equilibrium outcomes of voting games ¶are the generalized Condorcet winners |
0 |
0 |
0 |
44 |
1 |
1 |
3 |
171 |
| Synopses in the Theory of Choice |
1 |
3 |
6 |
152 |
1 |
3 |
8 |
349 |
| The Lindahl solution with changing population and resources1 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
15 |
0 |
1 |
1 |
117 |
| The Manipulability of Matching Rules via Segmentation |
0 |
1 |
1 |
25 |
1 |
2 |
3 |
81 |
| The Nash bargaining solution manipulated by pre-donations is Talmudic |
0 |
0 |
0 |
43 |
2 |
2 |
2 |
132 |
| The majoritarian compromise is majoritarian-optimal and subgame-perfect implementable |
0 |
0 |
0 |
57 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
260 |
| The n-person Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution under pre-donations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
14 |
0 |
1 |
2 |
81 |
| The trade paradox persists under excise taxes |
0 |
0 |
0 |
20 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
75 |
| Two forms of workers' enterprises facing imperfect labor markets |
0 |
0 |
0 |
25 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
99 |
| Workers' enterprises in imperfect competition |
0 |
0 |
1 |
31 |
0 |
0 |
1 |
92 |
| Total Journal Articles |
1 |
8 |
24 |
1,383 |
19 |
33 |
78 |
5,947 |
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